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INTRODUCTION
C HIEF Justice Earl Warren's unanimous opinion for the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education' made no pre-
tense that its interpretation was an authentic translation of what
the Fourteenth Amendment meant to those who drafted and rati-
fied it. The Court described the historical sources as "[a]t best,....
inconclusive."'2 This "at best" carries the strong implication that in
the cold, hard eye of objective historical examination, the sources
point the other way. Stating that "we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the Amendment was adopted,"3 the Court based its
decision primarily on the "modern authority" of social science.'
Brown was arguably the first explicit, self-conscious departure
from the traditional view that the Court may override democratic
decisions only on the basis of the Constitution's text, history, and
interpretive tradition-not on considerations of modem social
policy.5
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Id. at 489.
3 Id. at 492.
4 Id. at 494.
5 As recently as 1939, Jacobus tenBroek, probably the leading constitutional scholar of
the Fourteenth Amendment at that time, could write:
Whenever the United States Supreme Court has felt itself called upon to announce a
theory for its conduct in the matter of constitutional interpretation, it has insisted,
with almost uninterrupted regularity, that the end and object of constitutional
construction is the discovery of the intention of those persons who formulated the
instrument or of the persons who adopted it.
Jacobus tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitu-
tional Construction, 27 Cal. L. Rev. 399 (1939). Another candidate for the first depar-
ture-but of less importance than Brown-is Home Bldg. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398
(1934).
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 81:947
In the forty years since Brown, legal scholars generally have con-
cluded that the Court did not rely on the historical understanding
because it could not. Shortly after the decision, in what remains
the leading article on the issue, Professor Alexander Bickel sur-
veyed the events leading up to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment and stated that the "obvious conclusion," to which the
legislative history "easily leads," is that the Amendment "as origi-
nally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor
suffrage, nor anti-miscegenation statutes, nor segregation."' 6  A
decade later, constitutional historian Alfred Avins wrote an article
pointing out that efforts by members of the Reconstruction Con-
gresses to prohibit school desegregation in the 1875 bill to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment were defeated.7 He described as
"inevitable" the conclusion that the Brown decision was "an
unwarranted exercise of "non-existent authority... illegitimate in
its origin...." With remarkably few exceptions, 9 later scholarship
has continued to accept this historical assessment (though not nec-
6 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 58 (1955). Bickel's article was based on research he had done as law clerk
for Justice Frankfurter during the course of deliberations over Brown.
7 Alfred Avins, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected Light On the
Fourteenth Amendment From the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 38 Miss. L.J. 179 (1967).
8 Id. at 246.
9 The only unequivocal statements I have found in the academic literature since Brown
arguing that the decision was correct on originalist principles are in Michael Perry, The
Constitution in the Courts, 145-46 (1994) and John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1462-63 (1992). These scholars deal with the
segregation issue, however, in a few short paragraphs with little historical detail. See also
Note, Is Segregation Consistent with Equal Protection of the Laws? Plessy v. Ferguson
Reexamined, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 631-33 (1949) (pre-Brown Note presenting brief
summary of the evidence that segregation was understood to be unconstitutional). More
equivocal, but still an exception, is John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original
Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 421, 456-67. "We
conclude that it was accepted virtually unanimously by all who supported the fourteenth
amendment that it required equal schools and that a very large number of its supporters
thought that the amendment forbade segregated schools." Id. at 467. An earlier version of
this article was published under the same title at 50 Colum. L. Rev. 131 (1950). In
addition, two leading historians of the period have treated the evidence as inconclusive.
See Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case 65 (1987) ("The evidence points both ways.");
William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 134-35 (1988) (there is "evidence that at
least some members of Congress and the state legislatures may have appreciated the
capacity of the Fourteenth Amendment to promote desegregation[,]" but "Congress never
institutionalized this judgment in its debates on the Fourteenth Amendment").
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essarily the jurisprudential conclusion). In a recent article, for
example, Professor Michael Klarman states that:
When Chief Justice Warren declared in Brown that evidence of the
framers' views on school segregation was "inconclusive," he was
being considerably less than candid. Evidence regarding the origi-
nal understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous as
to a wide variety of issues, but not school segregation. Virtually
nothing in the congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to prohibit school segregation, while
contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation fan-
ciful; twenty-four of the thirty-seven states then in the union either
required or permitted racially segregated schools.10
In a similar vein, Robert Bork states that "[t]he inescapable fact is
that those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed
segregated education or segregation in any aspect of life."" From
the other side of the ideological spectrum, Mark Tushnet agrees:
"Suppose that we [turned] back the clock so that we could talk to
the framers of the fourteenth amendment. If we asked them
whether the amendment outlawed segregation in public schools,
they would answer 'No.' ",12
These expressions of scholarly judgment are strong and unequiv-
ocal. The evidence is "obvious" and "[un]ambiguous," the conclu-
sion is "inevitable" and "inescapable," and "[v]irtually nothing"
supports the opposite claim, which is said to be "fanciful." This is
10 Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modem Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L.
Rev. 213, 252 (1991) (citations omitted).
11 Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 75-76 (1990). Bork nonetheless defends
the result, though not the opinion, in Brown on the ground that-as "had been
demonstrated in a long series of cases"-"segregation rarely if ever produced equality."
Id. at 82. Bork argues that holding segregation unconstitutional was necessary to bring to a
halt the "[e]ndless litigation" over the quality of segregated facilities, which would impose
a "burden on the courts" and "never produce the equality the Constitution promised." Id.
To my mind, this argument is more typical of the constitutional methodology Bork
criticizes than it is of his own professed originalist methodology. If segregation is not
unconstitutional, how can the burden of litigation on the courts justify striking it down?
For critiques of Bork's position, see Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L.
Rev. 1365, 1375-76 (1990); Raoul Berger, Robert Bork's Contribution To Original
Intention, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1167, 1176-83 (1990) (reviewing Robert Bork, The Tempting
of America (1990)); David AJ. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1373, 1379-82 (1990) (reviewing Bork).
12 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 800 (1983).
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one point on which Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin, Richard
Kluger, Earl Maltz, Bernard Schwartz, Laurence Tribe, Thomas
Grey, Donald Lively, Richard Posner, and David Richards-not to
mention Bickel, Avins, Klarman, Bork, Tushnet, and countless
others-can agree.' 3 In the fractured discipline of constitutional
law, there is something very close to a consensus that Brown was
inconsistent with the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment, except perhaps at an extremely high and indetermi-
nate level of abstraction.' 4 According to one recent survey of the
literature, "the 'original understanding' on the issue of school seg-
regation is not genuinely in doubt."' 5
The supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous
importance in modem debate over constitutional theory. Such is
the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not
produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the the-
ory is seriously discredited.' 6 Thus, what once was seen as a weak-
13 Raoul Berger, Government By Judiciary 117-33, 241-45 (1977); Ronald Dworkin,
Law's Empire 360-61, 366 (1986); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 634 (1975); Earl M.
Maltz, Civil Rights, the Constitution and Congress, 1863-1869, at 113 (1990); 1 Bernard
Schwartz, Statutory History of the United States 660 (1970); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael
C. Doff, On Reading the Constitution 12-13 (1991); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have An
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 712 (1975); Donald E. Lively,
Constitutional Turf Wars: Competing for the Consent of the Governed, 42 Hastings L.J.
1527, 1538 (1991); Posner, supra note 11, at 1374; David A.J. Richards, Abolitionist
Political and Constitutional Theory and the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 1187, 1188 (1992); Mark Tushnet, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of
Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1919 (1991).
14 The historicity of Brown is often defended by invoking abstract ideas of "equality" at
odds with those of the Framers. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 6, at 61-65; Walter E.
Dellinger, III, School Segregation and Professor Avins' History: A Defense of Brown v.
Board of Education, 38 Miss. L.J. 248 (1967); Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth
Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1049 (1956); cf.
Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role
of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 811, 829 n.67 (1990)
(discussing why abstract values, as opposed to concrete intentions, are a problematic basis
for originalism).
15 Andrew Kull, The Color-Blind Constitution 258 n.26 (1992).
16 Professor Mark Tushnet has written: "For a generation, one criterion for an
acceptable constitutional theory has been whether that theory explains why [Brown] was
correct." Mark V. T"shnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the
Religion Clauses, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 997, 999 n.4 (1986); accord Bork, supra note 11,
at 77; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1242-43 (1993);
Posner, supra note 11, at 1374; Stephen L. Carter, Bork Redux, or How the Tempting of
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ness in the Supreme Court's decision in Brown is now a mighty
weapon against the proposition that the Constitution should be
interpreted as it was understood by the people who framed and
ratified it.
The thesis of this Article is that the consensus is wrong. I will
show in Part I that the evidence purportedly supporting the schol-
arly consensus is far from conclusive. Parts II and III then demon-
strate that the belief that school segregation1 7 does in fact violate
the Fourteenth Amendment was held during the years immediately
following ratification by a substantial majority of political leaders
who had supported the Amendment. In a large number of votes
over a three and one half year period, between one-half and two-
thirds of both houses of Congress voted in favor of school desegre-
gation and against the principle of separate but equal. These delib-
erations, which were conducted in explicitly constitutional terms by
Congresses charged with enforcing the new Amendment in the
years immediately following its enactment, constitute the best
available evidence of its meaning. Part II presents the constitu-
tional and other arguments of both proponents and opponents of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and Part III recounts the tortuous
history of the bill, including each of the many votes on the bill and
on important amendments.
The analysis of the constitutional arguments in Part II will reveal
that there are two, and only two, plausible interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment under which school segregation would be
lawful. The first is that segregation is not a form of inequality pro-
hibited by the Amendment. Because neither whites nor blacks
would be permitted to commingle, segregation could be said to
subject whites and blacks alike to the same rule of law. The second
is that the Fourteenth Amendment did not command equality with
regard to everything, but only with regard to "civil rights" or (to
use the Fourteenth Amendment's own language) "privileges or
America Led the People to Rise and Battle for Justice, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 759, 777-78 (1991)
(reviewing Robert Bork, The Tempting of America (1990)).
17 By "segregation," I mean the exclusion of a child from a particular school on the basis
of race, or de jure segregation. There was widespread expectation and approval of the
proposition that both blacks and whites would freely choose to attend schools of their own
race, and thus that actual "race mixing" would be rare. See infra text accompanying notes
626-32.
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immunities of citizens of the United States," and that education
was not among these protected rights. Education was, rather, a
"social right," or maybe no right at all-a mere benefit that could
be withheld at the government's discretion. For the Court to have
decided Brown in favor of the school defendants on originalist
principles, it would have had to conclude that the original under-
standing of the Amendment embraced one or both of these ideas.
Part III will show that neither of these propositions commanded
majority support among the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Properly understood, the authoritative actions of the
Reconstruction Congress in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875
contradicted both.
For these purposes there is no need to plumb the inner feelings,
motivations, or private opinions of the participants in the contro-
versy over the 1875 Act-to separate sincerity from hypocrisy,
political calculation from principle, or ambivalence from convic-
tion. Other studies of the period have emphasized the sociological
and political context. Constitutional interpretation by its nature
depends on public statements and public acts. An argument made
on the floor of Congress, even if insincere, tells us something about
the speaker's judgment of his audience: what arguments the
speaker thought were likely to persuade. I do not doubt that many
of the proponents of strong civil rights measures in Congress enter-
tained misgivings in private and had mixed motives for their
actions.18 But what matters is their public position on what the
Constitution means. This is a study of the legal thinking of the
antagonists in the debate, and for this purpose it is necessary to
take their arguments seriously on their own terms.
Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss the Supreme Court's major seg-
regation decisions in light of the original understanding. I will
show that the Court's first desegregation case, Railroad Company
v. Brown,19 decided in 1873, powerfully supports the position that
segregation was understood at the time to violate the principle of
equality; that Plessy v. Ferguson,20 far from being an accurate
reflection of the original understanding, adopted a position more
18 See William Gillette, Retreat From Reconstruction 1869-1879, at 202-08, 214-20, 260-
66, 271 (1979).
19 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
20 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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extreme than even most opponents of civil rights could maintain in
the early 1870s; and that Brown v. Board of Education, decided in
1954, while correctly answering the question presented, adopted a
nonhistorical interpretive methodology that seriously weakened
the decision. An originalist approach in Brown would have paved
the way for a more powerful judicial assault on the Jim Crow laws
of the South.
It should be obvious that the historical issue raised here is more
important for its implications for constitutional interpretive meth-
odology than for the legitimacy of Brown, which is utterly secure.
But I believe it casts light on the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as well. To understand how Congress went about
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment is to gain insight into many
doctrinal issues of importance today, including state action; the
extent of congressional enforcement authority; the relevance of
intent and effect; the meaning of "equality" as a matter of formally
equal treatment or of racial subordination; the relation between
due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities; and
many more. Although my focus here is on the question of school
segregation, I will comment briefly on other constitutional issues as
they arise.
I. THE STANDARD AccouNT RECONSIDERED
The argument that Brown was inconsistent with the historical
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is primarily based on
three types of evidence. First, the legislative history of the Four-
teenth Amendment, including the related history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, contains almost no evidence that the framers
and ratifiers expected the Amendment to affect school segregation
and one clear statement by a prominent supporter that it would
not. Moreover, although this legislative history contains little
direct reference to the issue of school desegregation, its treatment
of such collateral issues as voting rights, jury service, and miscege-
nation suggests that the Amendment was not understood to have
the sweeping consequences that advocates of school desegregation
typically attribute to it. This was the burden of Bickel's famous
article. Second, the practice of school segregation was widespread
in both Southern and Northern states, as well as the District of
Columbia, at the time of the proposal and ratification of the
1995] 955
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Amendment, and almost certainly enjoyed the support of a major-
ity of the population even at the height of Reconstruction.21 This
makes it doubtful that the Congress would have proposed, or that
the people of the various states would have ratified, an Amend-
ment understood to outlaw so deeply engrained an institutional
practice. Indeed, even in the North most state supreme courts in
which the issue was raised concluded that school segregation did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and Congress actually
maintained segregated schools in the District of Columbia through-
out Reconstruction. This is the evidence that Klarman and others
have found so compelling. Third, the Reconstruction Congress
considered, debated, and ultimately rejected measures to prohibit
school segregation under its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. This was the evidence from which Avins concluded
that the Brown decision was unwarranted.
This Part will explore the evidence from the framing of the Four-
teenth Amendment and the practices of the time and show that this
evidence is far more equivocal than the scholarly consensus sug-
gests. It may come as a surprise to those who have read that there
is "virtually nothing" in the historical record to support the "fanci-
ful" claim that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited segregated
education to learn that there was genuine debate and uncertainty
about this issue throughout the period. This Part is not intended to
establish that the Fourteenth Amendment as originally understood
outlawed school segregation, but merely that these aspects of the
21 See Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877, at 367
(1988) ("Whatever their political affiliation, moreover, white parents proved unwilling to
have their children sit alongside blacks in the classroom."); Nelson, supra note 9, at 135
("Historians who conclude that most Americans in 1866 favored segregated schools are
probably correct in their assessment."); Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro In
South Carolina During Reconstruction, 1861-1877, at 216 (1965) ("Native whites were
virtually unanimous in their opposition to 'mixing' the races in the schools."). Alfred Kelly
observed that:
[T]here was comparatively little popular interest in national mixed school
legislation. Even in the North most communities were content to allow the issue to
be settled as a local or state matter rather than by a federal law. The demand from
Negro voters for mixed school legislation, to be sure, was powerful and insistent,
... . [but] virtually all southern whites were extremely hostile to school
desegregation....
Alfred H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64
Am. Hist. Rev. 537, 539 (1959).
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history do not conclusively establish the contrary proposition.
Parts II and III, which are based on congressional deliberations
over the Civil Rights Act of 1875, will make the affirmative case.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Framing of the
Fourteenth Amendment
As Alexander Bickel found forty years ago, the direct evidence
about school segregation in the legislative history of the Amend-
ment, including deliberations over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, is
quite scanty.22 Through the entire course of the debate, there is no
explicit affirmation of school desegregation. Historian William
Nelson has noted that "the segregation issue simply was not an
important one in, those debates."23 More colorfully, John W.
Davis, arguing for the State of South Carolina in Brown, told the
Supreme Court that "perhaps there has never been a Congress in
which the debates furnished less real pablum on which history
might feed. '24 The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment contains surprisingly little discussion of the meaning of the
substantive provisions of Section One, with respect to segregation
or anything else. I think this is largely because the framers of Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment employed language ("due
process" and "privileges or immunities") that was present in the
Constitution in other contexts and that already had reasonably
established meanings.25 But whatever the reason, this sparsity of
discussion makes interpretation difficult.
Any analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment must begin with its
statutory precursor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This Act guaran-
teed to all "citizens, of every race and color" the "same right.., as
is enjoyed by white citizens" to make and enforce contracts; to sue,
be parties, and give evidence in court; to buy, sell, lease, hold, and
inherit both real and personal property; and to receive the full and
22 Bickel, supra note 6, at 56-59.
23 Nelson, supra note 9, at 135.
24 Argument of John W. Davis, Esq., on behalf of Appellees R.W. Elliott et al., Brown,
in 49A Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Law 481 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds. 1975).
25 See Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American
Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition? 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1159, 1160-
64 (1992).
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equal benefit of laws for the security of person and property.26
Note that the bill neither forbade racial discrimination generally
nor did it guarantee particular rights to all persons. Rather, it
required an equality in certain specified rights. If a state provided
these rights to its "white citizens," it had to provide the "same
right" to all citizens. Moreover, the enumerated rights were of a
particular sort and did not include political rights. As explained by
Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, who introduced the Act in the Senate,
the bill protected "civil liberty," by which he meant that part of
"natural liberty" which was left after the creation of civil society.2 7
These rights bore a strong resemblance to basic common law rights;
although there was no discussion of the point, if pressed the law-
yers of that day would probably have said that the common law
and civil liberty were virtually indistinguishable.
The bill was passed pursuant to Congress's authority to enforce
the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment, and was designed to
counter the so-called "Black Codes" passed by the Southern states,
denying fundamental civil rights to the freedmen. From its incep-
tion, however, the 1866 Act was plagued with doubts as to its con-
stitutionality. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act for that
reason, and although his veto was overridden, constitutional con-
cerns were sufficiently serious that supporters of the Act set to
work on a constitutional amendment to cure them. These concerns
were not confined to members of the political opposition. The
principal draftsman of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
John A. Bingham of Ohio, was among those who believed the prin-
ciples of the 1866 Act to be desirable, but Congress's power to be
lacking.28 The principal purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, as virtually all students of the subject agree, was to
provide a firm constitutional basis for the 1866 Act and to ensure
that future Congresses would not be able to repeal it.29
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was evidently never intended by its
sponsors to speak to the issue of school segregation, but the debate
26 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
27 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866).
28 See Nelson, supra note 9, at 48.
29 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 13, at 22-23; Nelson, supra note 9, at 48; Bickel, supra
note 6, at 58; Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the
Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 863, 910-11 (1986).
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over its phrasing has considerable bearing. As originally intro-
duced by Senator Trumbull, the bill, as amended, began with a
statement of general principle: "there shall be no discrimination in
civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of-any State or
Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous
condition of slavery. '30 It then enumerated a list of specific rights
that would be guaranteed to persons of "every race and color."'3 1
Controversy revolved around the opening statement forbidding
"discrimination in civil rights or immunities." Trumbull equated
this phrase with the privileges and immunities protected under
Article IV, as interpreted in the famous case of Corfield v. Cory-
ell.32 This broad interpretation inspired opponents of the bill to
stress its radical implications, and to claim that it exceeded Con-
gress's authority under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Senator Edgar Cowan, a conservative Republican from Penn-
sylvania, expressly charged that the bill would outlaw segregated
schools in his state, a result he professed to find "monstrous. 33
Representatives Michael Kerr of Indiana and Andrew Rogers of
New Jersey made similarly dire references to school segregation in
the lower chamber.34 The mere fact that opponents of the bill
would leap to the conclusion that segregated schools are a violation
of "civil rights or immunities" suggests that the institution of segre-
gation was understood to be problematic. Other speakers warned
of different perils, a favorite being that the bill would forbid anti-
miscegenation statutes.3 5 Some said it might include political
rights.3 6 The basic theme was that the terms of the bill were so
broad that they would swallow up the powers of the states. "What
30 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866).
31 Id.
32 6 F. Cas. 546, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 474 (Jan. 29, 1866).
33 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (Jan. 30, 1866).
34 Id. at 1268 (Mar. 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Kerr); id. at 1121 (March 1, 1866)
(statement of Rep. Rogers); see also id. at app. 183 (Apr. 6, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Davis) (asserting that the bill would make -any enforcement of racial distinctions criminal).
35 See, e.g., id. at 1122 (Mar. 1, 1866) (statement of Rep. Rogers); id. at 505-06 (Jan. 30,
1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson). President Johnson reiterated this charge in his veto
message. Id. at 679-80 (Mar. 27, 1866).
36 E.g., id. at 1157 (Mar. 2, 1866) (statement of Rep. Thornton); accord id. at 1291 (Mar.
9, 1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); id. at 476 (Jan. 29, 1866) (colloquy between Sen.
Trumbull and Sen. McDougall); id. at 477 (statement of Sen. W. Saulsbury).
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broader words than privileges and immunities are to be found in
the dictionary?" Rogers asked.3 7
James Wilson, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and
leading supporter of the bill, attempted to quiet these fears with a
narrow construction of the term "civil rights or immunities." He
expressly denied that the term would encompass the right to sit on
juries or to attend the same schools. 38 This was the only statement
by a proponent of the bill during the debates specifically denying
its applicability to school desegregation. It is the most direct piece
of evidence invoked by Alexander Bickel;3 9 Raoul Berger calls it
"proof positive that segregation was excluded from the scope of
the bill."40
Wilson's assurances did not satisfy the opposition, however, and
Bingham himself eventually moved to strike out the "no discrimi-
nation" clause.4' Wilson supported this change on the ground that
the original language "might give warrant for a latitudinarian con-
struction not intended."42 The motion carried unanimously, and
without further delay the bill passed by an overwhelming margin.43
This course of events strongly suggests that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 was not understood to forbid school segregation," but it
does not necessarily mean the same for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. To be sure, the principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to constitutionalize the 1866 Act, and speakers on both
sides often spoke as if the substance of the two measures were
identical.45 If we were to interpret the Amendment as meaning no
more than the 1866 Act, we would have to conclude that the
37 Id. at 1122 (Mar. 1, 1866).
38 Id. at 1117.
39 Bickel, supra note 6, at 56.
40 Berger, supra note 13, at 119.
41 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (Mar. 9, 1866). Bingham's principal concern
in making the amendment was to ensure that the bill was not interpreted to include
"political rights," the rights to vote and hold office. Id.
42 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (Mar. 13, 1866).
43 Id. at 1366-67.
44 Some Northern Republican newspapers nonetheless reported that the Act would
require admission of blacks to schools on the same terms and conditions as whites, and
after passage of the Act there was a flurry of litigation based on that reading. See Lofgren,
supra note 9, at 65; Kelly, supra note 14, at 1070.
45 See Bickel, supra note 6, at 47; Kaczorowski, supra note 29, at 911.
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Amendment did not forbid school segregation.46 But the Four-
teenth Amendment did not enumerate a list of protected rights, as
did the 1866 Act. Rather, it provided that "[n]o State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States."4 7 If we accept Trumbull's equa-
tion of "civil rights or immunities" to the phrase "privileges and
immunities,"4 the Amendment contains a provision identical to
the clause of the 1866 bill that was dropped on account of being too
broad. A fair inference is that the Amendment was understood to
encompass the broad range of "civil rights and immunities" that
were entailed by the original draft of the 1866 Act.
The linchpin of Alexander Bickel's argument is that the Joint
Committee's decision not to include the language "civil rights and
immunities" (using the phrase "privileges or immunities" instead)
was a "deliberate choice" that constituted a "rejection of what
were deemed [the] wider implications" of the original draft of the
1866 Act.49 But this interpretation is implausible in the context of
the debate. Not only did Lyman Trumbull specifically equate the
terms, but supporters linked both the substance of the 1866 Act
and the meaning of the new Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the rights protected under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and described in
Corfield. To be sure, as Bickel stresses, the moderate Republicans
whose votes were needed to secure a two-thirds majority would not
have supported a sweeping provision outlawing all forms of racial
discrimination,50 but the focus was on the distinction between civil
46 This, in a nutshell, is Berger's argument. Berger, supra note 13, at 22-23.
47 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
48 This congruence is probable but not certain. Some moderate Republicans understood
the term "privileges and immunities" as narrower than the term "civil rights," the latter
possibly encompassing "every right that pertains to the citizen under the Constitution,
laws, and Government of this country," including political rights. Cong. Globe, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham); see Maltz, supra note 13, at 101.
If so, the understanding was short-lived, for the term "civil rights" was frequently used in
debates in the 1870s as a shorthand description for the set of protected rights, excluding
both "political rights" and "social rights." For a particularly clear example, see Trumbull's
speech of February 8,1872, in which he stated that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "was based
upon this principle-confined exclusively to civil rights and nothing else, no political and
no social rights." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (Feb. 8, 1872).
49 Bickel, supra note 6, at 57.
50 Id. at 57-58.
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rights (meaning privileges and immunities, as interpreted in
Corfield), social rights, and political rights. The formula adopted
by the Joint Committee responded to the moderates' principal con-
cern (that the Amendment might extend to blacks the right to
vote) but it did not weaken the Amendment's application to basic
civil rights, the common law rights possessed by all free persons.
Whether segregation of schools, transportation, or places of public
accommodation represented an inequality with respect to those
rights was not debated or resolved in 1866. As will be seen, the
issue arose soon after ratification and was debated at length.
Those later debates, rather than the debates of 1866, hold the real
answer to the segregation question.
B. School Desegregation at the State Level
Although it is true that most states maintained segregated
schools both before and after ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is not true that this passed without comment or
controversy. Indeed, the first attacks on racially segregated educa-
tion occurred at the state level, in both the South and the North.
Developments in the two regions, however, were so different that
they must be considered separately.
1. Southern States
Because no state that had seceded could be readmitted to the
Union until Congress had examined its state constitution and ruled
that it was "in conformity with the Constitution of the United
States in all respects," 51 the issue of segregation had to be faced
more immediately and more explicitly in the South than in the
North. The Southern states followed a consistent pattern: drafting
constitutions for review in Congress that either explicitly outlawed
school segregation or were, at a minimum, silent on the subject,
while (with few exceptions) instituting segregation as a matter of
state statute or local policy.
51 Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). Tennessee was readmitted
before passage of the Act, and is therefore the only Confederate state to be readmitted
under its antebellum state constitution, amended to abolish slavery. S. Con. Res. 73, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess., 14 Stat. 364 (1866).
962 [Vol. 81:947
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions
Delegates to virtually every Southern state constitutional con-
vention argued that desegregated education was necessary to com-
ply with the new national norms of equality.5 2  A state rep-
resentative in North Carolina, for example, stated that he "would
prefer that the two races should not be educated together," but
that the new state constitution, written pursuant to Reconstruction
principles, "had neither the word 'white' nor the word 'black' in it,
and therefore class legislation, so far as mere color is concerned,
was gone forever. '53 Significantly, no constitutional convention of
a Southern state seeking readmission to the Union openly adopted
a policy of racially segregated education. Although amendments to
this effect were proposed, they were uniformly rejected.5 4 This
presumably is attributable to a belief that such a policy would
doom readmission. During congressional debate over Arkansas,
the first state to seek readmission after passage of the Reconstruc-
tion Act, an amendment to permit the state to establish segregated
schools was defeated in the Senate by an overwhelming vote of 5-
30.55 No such attempt was made again. Three states (Texas, Mis-
sissippi and Virginia) were readmitted upon the stipulation "that
the constitution of [the state] shall never be so amended as to
deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the
school rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said
52 Frank & Munro, supra note 9, at 459; see also Foner, supra note 21, at 322 (noting that
in every state black delegates successfully opposed constitutional language requiring
segregation in education).
53 Remarks of Rep. Sweatt, quoted in Legislature of North-Carolina, Weekly North-
Carolina Standard, July 22, 1868, at 4, quoted in Nelson, supra note 9, at 133.
54 See, e.g., Official Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama
237-38, 242 (1868); Journal of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the
People of Georgia 151, 558 (1867); Journal of the Proceedings in the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Mississippi, 1868, at 316-18, 479-80 (1871); Edgar W. Knight,
The Influence of Reconstruction on Education in the South 22 (1923) (describing North
Carolina's constitutional convention); Journal of the State of Virginia Constitutional
Convention 299-301 (1867).
55 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2748 (June 1, 1868). The amendment, proposed by
Missouri Unionist Senator John Henderson, provided that "no person on account of race
or color shall be excluded from the benefits of education, or be deprived of an equal share
of the moneys or other funds created or used by public authority to promote education in
said State." Id. Henderson offered the amendment as a substitute for a provision that
"there shall never be in said State any denial or abridgment of the elective franchise, or of
any other right, to any person by reason or on account of race or color, excepting Indians
not taxed." Id. He explained that unless his amendment were adopted, the provision
would deny the state the authority "to provide separate schools for whites and blacks." Id.
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State. '5 6 In other instances, the school segregation issue went
unaddressed.
In 1867, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, who had
argued against school segregation as a lawyer in 1850 and would
later be the champion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, proposed
legislation that would compel the states of the former confederacy
to establish "public schools open to all, without distinction of race
or color."'57 The proposal evenly split the Senate (by a vote of 20-
2W8) and thus did not carry, but it was a show of strength for Sum-
ner's position. The vote does not, however, cast much light on the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the Amendment
had not yet been ratified and the source of congressional authority
was likely some combination of the war power and the Guarantee
Clause.59
Two Southern states, Louisiana and South Carolina, explicitly
prohibited racially segregated public education. Louisiana's Con-
stitution of 1868 provided:
All children of this State between the years of six and twenty-one
shall be admitted to the public schools or other institutions of
learning sustained or established by the State in common, without
distinction of race, color, or previous condition. There shall be no
separate schools or institutions of learning established exclusively
for any race by the State of Louisiana.
60
South Carolina's Constitution of 1868 provided that "[a]ll the pub-
lic schools, colleges and universities of this State ... shall be free
and open to all the children and youths of the State, without regard
to race or color."'61 Less explicitly, Florida's Constitution of 1868
provided that "[i]t is the paramount duty of the State to make
56 Act of Mar. 30, 1870, ch. 39, 16 Stat. 81 (Texas); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, ch. 19, 16 Stat.
68) (Mississippi); Act of Jan. 26, 1870, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 63 (Virginia).
57 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (Mar. 16, 1867).
58 Id. at 170.
59 A similar proposal, also made by Sumner, was later ruled out of order. Id. at 581
(July 11, 1867).
60 La. Const. of 1868, tit. VII, art. 135, reprinted in 3 The Federal and State
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and
Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of America 1449, 1465 (Francis N.
Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter Constitutions].
61 S.C. Const. of 1868, art. X, § 10, reprinted in 6 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3281,
3300.
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ample provision for the education of all the children residing
within its borders, without distinction or preference." 62 This
appears to have outlawed school segregation without calling atten-
tion to the fact.63 Alabama adopted a provision almost identical to
that of Iowa, which was interpreted by the Iowa courts as outlaw-
ing segregation.' 4 A motion to require school boards to make
"proper provision" for "the education of the children of white and
colored persons in separate schools" was defeated. 65 Other South-
ern states repealed earlier education provisions of their state con-
stitutions containing express racial distinctions, replacing them
with provisions containing neither explicit nor implicit reference to
the race question.66 Conservatives charged that these provisions
would lead to mixed schools.67
But constitutional language and actual practice were far apart.
Shortly after gaining readmission with colorblind state constitu-
tions, most Southern state legislatures enacted laws permitting or
requiring segregated schools, 68 and Congress had no authority (or
no inclination) to review the domestic legislation of sovereign
states. 69 One state, Tennessee, was so bold as to revise its state
62 Fla. Const. of 1868, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 2 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 704,716.
63 In 1873, the Florida legislature passed a statute forbidding any racial distinction in the
full and equal enjoyment of public schools, conveyances, accommodations, and
amusements. Act of Jan. 25, 1873, 1873 Fla. Laws ch. 1947, § 1.
64 Ala. Const. of 1867, art. XI, § 6, reprinted in 1 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 132,
149; see Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266, 274 (1868).
65 Horace M. Bond, Negro Education in Alabama: A Study in Cotton and Steel 93
(1939).
66 Compare Tex. Const. of 1866, art. X, § 2, reprinted in 6 Constitutions, supra note 60,
at 3569, 3588-89 and Act of Feb. 6, 1867, No. 35, § 5, 1867 Ark. Acts 100 (containing
express racial distinctions) with Tex. Const. of 1868, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 6
Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3591, 3609 and Ark. Const. of 1868, Art. IX, § 6, reprinted
in 1 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 306, 323 (including no racial distinctions).
67 See Thomas S. Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas 245 (Studies in History,
Economics & Public Law Vol. 59, 1923) (noting that conservatives denounced the school
provision in the 1868 constitution, which removed all mention of separate schools, as
requiring schools in which there would be "'indiscriminate social intercourse between
whites and blacks' ") (citation omitted in original).
68 For example, Arkansas instituted segregated schools a month after achieving
readmission. Act of July 23, 1868, no. 52, § 107, 1868 Ark. Acts 196 as amended by Act of
Apr. 29, 1873, No. 130, § 108, 1873 Ark. Acts 423. See also Act of July 11, 1870, ch. 259,
§ 47, 1870 Va. Acts 413 (providing for segregated education within six months of the
congressional vote on readmission).
69 No one in Congress even protested when the Virginia legislature adopted a
mandatory school segregation statute in 1870. Kelly, supra note 21, at 542.
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constitution after readmission to require segregated schools. 70
(The other Southern states waited until after Reconstruction. 71)
Only one major Southern school system, that of New Orleans, was
"thoroughly and successfully integrated." 72 Even in South Caro-
lina, with a state constitutional requirement of desegregated educa-
tion and a strong black political presence, separate schools were
universal except in remote areas, where only white schools existed
and black children were often given no schooling at all.73 Gener-
ally, it was difficult enough to build, fund, and staff schools for the
freedmen, without the additional problems of desegregation.
Whites stayed away from "mixed" schools;74 thus, blacks generally
found "separate schools infinitely superior to no schools at all."'75
In Mississippi, according to Henry Pease, who was state Superin-
tendent of Education from 1869-74, "under the law regulating the
system the child of the colored man can enter the school where
white children are taught, and the laws of the State will protect
him," but "not one instance has come to my knowledge where a
colored man has attempted to enforce the law in this respect. 76
70 Tenn. Const. of 1870, art. XI, § 12, reprinted in 6 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3448,
3469 ("No school established or aided under this section shall allow white and negro
children to be received as scholars together in the same school.").
71 See Ala. Const. of 1875, art. XII, § 1, reprinted in 1 Constitutions, supra note 60, at
153, 176; Fla. Const. of 1885, art. XII, § 12, reprinted in 2 Constitutions, supra note 60, at
732, 754; Ga. Const. of 1877, art. VIII, § 1, reprinted in 2 Constitutions, supra note 60, at
842, 868; La. Const. of 1898, art. 248, reprinted in 2 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 1522,
1575; Miss. Const. of 1890, art. 8, § 207, reprinted in 4 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 2090,
2115; N.C. Const. of 1876, art. IX, § 2, reprinted in 4 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 2822,
2838; 9-C. Const. of 1895, art. XI, § 7, reprinted in 6 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3307,
3339; Tex. Const. of 1876, art. VII, § 7, reprinted in 6 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3621,
3644; Va. Const. of 1902, art. IX, § 140, reprinted in 7 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 3904,
3934.
72 Foner, supra note 21, at 367; C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow 24
(3d rev. ed. 1974). The New Orleans schools remained integrated until 1877, when
Reconstruction came to an end. For a description of the success of desegregation in
Louisiana, see 2 Cong. Rec. app. 478-79 (June 16, 1874) (statement of Rep. Darrall). For a
more ambivalent assessment, see Gillette, supra note 18, at 195.
73 Williamson, supra note 21, at 222.
74 Meyer Weinberg, A Chance To Learn: The History of Race and Education in the
United States 51 (1977); Williamson, supra note 21, at 216-17; Woodward, supra note 72, at
24-25.
75 Foner, supra note 21, at 367 (quoting Frederick Douglass' New National Era).
76 2 Cong. Rec. 4154 (May 22, 1874).
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The evidence thus shows that during Reconstruction, antisegre-
gation forces in Congress were strong enough to block overt state
constitutional measures permitting or requiring segregated schools,
and in some cases strong enough to force states to embrace school
desegregation as a matter of formal policy. This shows at least
some degree of concern about school segregation as a constitu-
tional issue. In most cases, however, the Southern states could sat-
isfy federal demands by silence or studied ambiguity about
segregation, since Congress lacked sufficient energy or will to pur-
sue the matter to the extent of actual enforcement.
2. Northern States: Antebellum Practice and Post-War Legislative
Action
Even in the North, school segregation was widespread before the
Civil War. It has been estimated that 90% of the 28,000 black chil-
dren attending Northern schools in 1860 attended all-black
schools,77 and many more black children were denied admission to
public schools altogether.78 Nonetheless, agitation against segre-
gated education began in the 1840s, through political action, peti-
tions, mass meetings and school boycotts by black pupils. The first
desegregation lawsuit was filed in 1850 by abolitionist lawyer and
future Senator Charles Sumner, who represented black plaintiffs in
a suit against separate but equal public schools in Massachusetts,
Roberts v. City of Boston.79 Sumner argued that "[t]he separation
of children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or
race, is in the nature of caste, and is a violation of equality."80 With
the insouciance toward niceties of legal doctrine that later charac-
terized his fight for the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Sumner appealed
77 Weinberg, supra note 74, at 26.
78 See, e.g., Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332,334-35 (1850); Chalmers v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386
(1842) (holding that admission of black children to the public school is unlawful).
79 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1850). On the background of the case, see Carl F. Kaestle,
Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860, at 176-79
(1983); Kull, supra note 15, at 40-52; Roderick T. Baltimore & Robert F. Williams, The
State Constitutional Roots of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine: Roberts v. City of
Boston, 17 Rutgers L.J. 537 (1986). Previously, the schools of Lowell, Nantucket, New
Bedford, Worcester and Salem had integrated as a result of political action. See Kaestle,
supra, at 177.
80 Roberts, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) at 202.
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broadly to "the spirit of American institutions, and especially of
the constitution of Massachusetts." ' Sumner maintained that
the separate school inflicts upon [colored children] the stigma of
caste; and although the matters taught in the two schools may be
precisely the same, a school exclusively devoted to one class must
differ essentially, in its spirit and character, from the public school
known to the law, where all classes meet together in equality. 2
In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw,
the Supreme Judicial Court rejected Sumner's argument, conclud-
ing that discretion in the matter was vested in the school commit-
tee, and that the Board's conclusion that the best interests of both
races would be served by segregation was "the honest result of
their experience and judgment. 8 3  The legislature promptly
responded, however, with legislation ending the segregation of
Massachusetts schools. s4
In Minnesota, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, all states
with tiny black populations, the schools had never been segre-
gated.s5 Connecticut and Rhode Island had no state laws permit-
ting segregation, but it was practiced in some local schools.s6 In
most of the Northern states outside of New England, racial segre-
gation was either allowed or required in the public schools until
after the Civil War.s7 In 1866, some efforts were made in Illinois to
bring desegregation to the public schools by political means,8 and
elsewhere lawsuits were filed challenging school segregation under
the newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1866.89
Some Northern state legislatures (New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Michigan, Connecticut and Illinois) desegregated their schools
81 Id. at 201.
82 Id. at 203.
83 Id. at 209.
84 Act of Apr. 28, 1855, ch. 256, § 1, 1855 Mass. Acts 674.
85 Act of Mar. 3, 1864, ch. IV, § 1, 1864 Minn. Laws 25-26 (Minnesota); Segregation and
the Fourteenth Amendment in the States 248 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. & Paul E. Wilson
eds. 1975) [hereinafter Segregation] (Maine); id. at 388 (New Hampshire); id. at 680
(Vermont).
86 Segregation, supra note 85, at 60 (Connecticut); id. at 548-50 (Rhode Island).
87 Kaestle, supra note 79, at 179.
88 Robert L. McCaul, The Black Struggle for Public Schooling in Nineteenth-Century
Illinois 67-72, 83-85, 108-42 (1987); Nelson, supra note 9, at 134.
89 Nelson, supra note 9, at 134.
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shortly after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,9° but most
Northern states were slow to act. They may not have fully recog-
nized that the new Amendment would force the North to change as
well as the South. Many Northerners assumed that the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments were for the reconstruction of the
rebel states, not of their own.91 Moreover, at least after 1870, the
focus of antisegregation political activity, especially by African-
Americans, was on obtaining nationwide relief through what would
be the Civil Rights Act of 1875. This distracted from efforts at the
state level.92
In four Western or Midwestern states (Nevada, Kansas, Indiana
and California), laws creating or recognizing school segregation
were passed even after ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,93 which strongly suggests that in those states the Amend-
ment was not initially understood to foreclose school segregation
(at least outside the South). School segregation laws were also
passed in Kentucky and Maryland, former slaveholding states that
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment,94 and in their fellow border
90 See NJ. Const. of 1844, art. II, § 1, reprinted in Segregation, supra note 85, at 395; Act
of Mar. 7, 1866, ch. 609, 1866 R.I. Acts & Resolves 186; Act of Feb. 28, 1867, No. 34, § 28,
1867 Mich. Pub. Acts 1 42, 43; Act of Aug. 1, 1868, ch. 108, § 1, 1868 Conn. Pub. Acts 206;
Act of Apr. 1, 1872, Schools, § 48, 1872 Ill. Laws 700, 720-21. Michigan made the
prohibition of separate schools even more explicit in 1871, Act of Apr. 17, 1871, No. 170,
§ 28, 1871 Mich. Pub. Acts 1 271, 274, as did New Jersey in 1881, Act of Mar. 23, 1881, ch.
149, § 1, 1881 N.J. Laws 186.
91 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1761 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (Apr. 4,
1866) (the 1866 Act "could have no operation in Massachusetts, New York, Illinois, or
most of the states of the Union"); id. at 474 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (Jan. 29, 1866)
(commenting that the impetus for the 1866 Act was the behavior of the "insurrectionary
states"); see generally Nelson, supra note 9, at 111 ("inhabitants of 'good' states would
never sense that the act applied to them"); Kaczorowski, supra note 29, at 881 (describing
the perception by Northern whites of civil rights enforcement as a Southern problem).
92 McCaul, supra note 88, at 110.
93 Act of Mar. 8, 1867, ch. 52, § 50, 1867 Nev. Stat. 89, 95; Act of Mar. 3, 1868, ch. 18, art.
1, § 75, 1868 Kan. Sess. Laws 129, 146; Act of May 13, 1869, ch. 16, § 2, 1869 Ind. Acts 41;
Act of Apr. 4, 1870, ch. 556, § 56, 1870 Cal. Stat. 824, 839. The Kansas legislation applied
only to cities of more than 15,000 inhabitants. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
94 Act of Mar. 22, 1904, ch. 85, 1904 Ky. Acts 181-82; Act of Mar. 30, 1868, ch. 407, tit. 1,
ch. 9, § 1, 1868 Md. Laws 745, 766. In these states, which had not seceded from the Union
and had not been subject to the Emancipation Proclamation, slavery did not end until
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Not having been through Reconstruction,
Kentucky was probably the state with greatest political resistance to the principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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states, Missouri and West Virginia, where resistance to civil rights
was almost equally strong.95
Within a decade, however, opinion had changed. Almost all
Northern states abolished school segregation by the end of the
1880S.9 6 Although it is not always possible to know why this hap-
pened, in at least one state desegregation was expressly linked to
the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment. When Pennsylvania
repealed its law allowing school segregation in 1881, the sponsor of
the repealing legislation stated:
In proposing the repeal of the act of 1854, which in terms would
be prohibited by the present State and Federal Constitutions, it
seems a matter of surprise that an act so directly in conflict with
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution of
the United States should have been permitted to have remained in
the statute book until this time.97
Similarly, two successive governors of Ohio advocated school
desegregation legislation in language borrowed from the federal
constitution, declaring separate schools to be "a badge of servi-
tude" and a denial of "equal privileges, 9 8 and stating that the leg-
islation would give "our colored fellow citizens... the enjoyment
of the rights of citizenship that other citizens have." 99 At the same
time, however, the chief sponsor of the desegregation legislation in
95 Mo. Const. of 1875, art. XI, § 3, reprinted in 4 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 2229,
2263; W. Va. Const. of 1872, art. XII, § 8, reprinted in 7 Constitutions, supra note 60, at
4033, 4061.
96 See, e.g., Act of Apr. 1, 1872, Schools, Sec. 1, § 48, 1872 Ill. Laws 700, 720-21; Act of
Feb. 28, 1867, No. 34, § 28, 1867 Mich. Pub. Acts 142,43; Act of Mar. 23, 1881, Ch. 149, § 1,
1881 N.J. Laws 186; Act of Apr. 9, 1873, ch. 186, § 1, 1873 N.Y. Laws 303; Act of Feb. 22,
1887, House Bill No. 71, § 1, 1887 Ohio Laws 34; Act of June 8, 1881, No. 83, § 1, 1881 Pa.
Laws 76. The New York statute, which provided that all citizens were entitled to the "full
and equal enjoyment of any accommodation, advantage, facility or privilege" furnished by
school authorities, was interpreted in 1883 as allowing separate but equal schools. People
ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 456-57 (1883). The legislature did not again abolish
segregation until 1900. Act of Apr. 18, 1900, ch. 492, § 1, 1900 N.Y. Laws II 1173. Even
then, the legislation appears to have exempted rural districts from the desegregation
requirement. See Bickel, supra note 6, at 37 & n.71. Indiana did not repeal its school
segregation law until 1949. See Act of Mar. 8, 1949, ch. 186, § 1, 1949 Ind. Acts 603, 604.
97 Penn. Senate Journal (May 26, 1881) (statement of Sen. Sill).
98 Inaugural Address of Governor Hoadley (1884), quoted in Frederick A. McGinnis,
The Education of Negroes In Ohio 59 (1962).
99 Inaugural Address of Governor Foraker (1886), quoted in McGinnis, supra note 98, at
60.
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the Ohio House of Representatives (Benjamin Arnett, an African-
American), delivered a speech containing twelve principal argu-
ments which, while including "the teachings of the Son of Man and
God and the Golden Rule," did not mention the possibility that the
status quo was in violation of the federal Constitution. °°
3. Northern States: Early Judicial Interpretation
The standard account relies heavily on what is said to be the
"nearly unanimous judicial response" among state courts during
Reconstruction "that the recent constitutional amendments made
no difference to the existing law of segregation.'' 101 This account
essentially echoes the rhetorically effective claim made by the
Plessy majority that "the establishment of separate schools for
white and colored children.., has been held to be a valid exercise
of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political
rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly
enforced."' 2 This picture of school segregation litigation in the
Northern states, however, is highly misleading.
Between 1868 and 1883, the issue of school segregation reached
the supreme courts of nine Northern states. Far from being unani-
mous, the opinions were almost evenly split, with five upholding
segregation and four striking it down. 03 Admittedly, with few
exceptions, the cases holding school segregation unlawful were
decided under state law, while the cases holding school segregation
lawful generally reached the federal constitutional issue and held
that school segregation is consistent with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This creates the impression of unanimity on the federal con-
stitutional question. But we must bear in mind that proper legal
practice, and in some cases jurisdictional requirements, led state
courts to consider issues of state law first, and if they found a basis
in state law for invalidating segregation there was no need to
100 Benjamin W. Arnett & Jere A. Brown, The Black Laws, Speeches 15-17 (1887),
quoted in McGinnis, supra note 98, at 60-61.
101 Kull, supra note 15, at 95.
102 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
103 California, Indiana, Nevada, New York and Ohio upheld segregation, whereas
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas and Michigan held segregation to be unlawful. See infra notes 104-
37 and accompanying text.
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address federal law.1 4 Only if a court was willing to say that segre-
gation was lawful under state law did it reach the Fourteenth
Amendment issue. When a state court interpreted equality lan-
guage in its own state constitution or statutes as prohibiting segre-
gation, it may be fair to infer that the court would have given the
Fourteenth Amendment a similar construction had it reached the
federal constitutional issue. The strength of this inference depends,
of course, on the language being interpreted.
The first state supreme court decision on school segregation after
the Civil War was Clark v. Board of Directors,105 rendered by the
Supreme Court of Iowa in 1868, shortly before the completion of
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the Amend-
ment was not yet effective, the federal constitution was not at issue.
The court held racial segregation unconstitutional under a vaguely
worded provision of the Iowa Constitution of 1857 requiring the
school board to "provide for the education of all the youths of the
State, through a system of common schools.' 10 6 The court declared
the principle that "all the youths are equal before the law" and
concluded that the board of education could not "in their discre-
tion, or otherwise, deny a youth admission to any particular school
because of his or her nationality, religion, color, clothing or the
like."' 0 7 The court acknowledged the school board's argument that
"'public sentiment in their district is opposed to the intermingling
of the white and colored children in the same school,' "108 but held
that to require students of any particular class or origin to attend a
separate school "would be to sanction a plain violation of the spirit
of our laws not only, but would tend to perpetuate the national
differences of our people and stimulate a constant strife, if not a
war of races."' 0 9 In 1873, in its first segregation case after ratifica-
tion of the Amendment, the Iowa Supreme Court explicitly associ-
ated the principle of Clark with the new Amendment, and
104 See People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Educ., 101 Ill. 308, 316 (1882); Board of
Educ. v. Tmnon, 26 Kan. 1, 16-18 (1881) (each mentioning the federal constitutional
argument but looking to state law as the actual ground of decision).
105 24 Iowa 266 (1868).
106 Iowa Const. of 1857, art. 9, § 12, reprinted in 2 Constitutions, supra note 60, at 1136,
1150.
107 24 Iowa at 277.
108 Id. at 276.
109 Id.
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extended the requirement of desegregation to common carrier
transportation.110
In 1869, just after completion of ratification, the Michigan
Supreme Court held racial segregation unlawful under a Michigan
statute providing that "'[a]ll residents of any district shall have an
equal right to attend any school therein.' """ The opinion, which
was written by Chief Justice Thomas Cooley, the most celebrated
constitutional scholar and judge of the last half of the nineteenth
century, relied entirely on the state statute. In the last sentence of
the opinion, Cooley made what appears to be an oblique reference
to the Fourteenth Amendment, but pointed out: "As the statute of
1867 is found to be applicable to the case, it does not become
important to consider what would otherwise have been the law.' ' 12
In 1872, by contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court rendered an opin-
ion squarely upholding segregated schools under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In State ex reL Games v. McCann,"3 the Ohio court
declined to hold that racial segregation works a "substantial ine-
quality of school privileges between the children of both
classes."1 4 According to the court, "[e]quality of rights does not
involve the necessity of educating white and colored persons in the
same school, any more than it does that of educating children of
both sexes in the same school, or that different grades of scholars
must be kept in the same school.""' This opinion carried particu-
lar weight because it was rendered in a generally progressive state
by a court composed entirely of Republicans. 1 6 In the same year,
the Nevada Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that a statute estab-
lishing separate schools for "Negroes, Mongolians and Indians"
violated the "spirit" but did not violate the "letter" of the United
States Constitution. 1 7 In 1874, the supreme courts of California
110 Coger v. North W. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 153-55 (1873).
M People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Educ., 18 Mich. 399,408-09 (1869) (citing Act of
Feb. 28, 1867, No. 34, § 28, 1867 Mich. Pub. Acts 1 42, 43).
112 Id. at 414.
113 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872).
114 Id. at 211.
115 Id.
116 See J. Morgan Kousser, Dead End: The Development of Nineteenth-Century
Litigation on Racial Discrimination in Schools 19 (1986).
117 State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 346 (1872). The statement is dictum
because the court ordered relief for the excluded black child on state constitutional
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and Indiana held that exclusion of black children from school on
account of race would violate the Equal Protection Clause, but that
a, policy of separation of the races for educational purposes on
equal terms was constitutional.118 These decisions carried less
weight than did the Ohio decision. California had not ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, Indiana was notoriously the most racist of
the Northern states, and both courts were dominated by Demo-
crats, the party hostile to Reconstruction. 19 Indeed, the author of
the Indiana opinion had issued a decision three years earlier hold-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 unconstitutional. 20
Two years after Games, the Illinois Supreme Court, with only
one dissent, interpreted a provision of state law requiring that the
state provide "all" the children of the State with an "equal" educa-
tion as prohibiting a school board from setting up a separate school
for the four black children in the district.12 1 The attorneys for the
school board cited the Games decision for the proposition that a
requirement of "equality" is not inconsistent with segregation,1
but the Illinois court-notwithstanding its 5-2 Democratic major-
ity' 3-found the rationale of Games unpersuasive. The "free
schools of the State are public institutions," the court reasoned,
and although their directors "have large and discretionary powers
in regard to the management and control of schools,.., they have
no power to make class distinctions, neither can they discriminate
grounds. Id. at 346-47. Although the case involved exclusion rather than segregation, the
court explained that under state law school authorities "may not deny to any resident
person of proper age an equal participation in the benefits of the common schools";
however, the authorities would be permitted "to send all blacks to one school, and all
whites to another; or, without multiplying words, to make such a classification ... as may
seem to them best." Id. at 348.
118 Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 51-52 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 361-62 (1874).
119 See Kousser, supra note 116, at 19-21.
120 State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 402-03 (1871).
121 Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Ill. 383, 385 (1874). The court declined to address whether
separate schools would have been lawful "[h]ad the district contained colored children
sufficient for one school, and white children for another." Id. at 385-86. Such a case could
theoretically present a different question, because the plaintiffs in Chase were white
taxpayers who complained of the expense of building and staffing a separate school when
the facilities of the white school were adequate for the education of the black children as
well. The prohibition on segregation was extended to all schools in People ex rel. Longress
v. Board of Education, 101 Ill. 308 (1882).
122 McCaul, supra note 88, at 132.
123 Id. at 131. A Democratic justice, Alfred M. Craig, wrote the opinion in Chase.
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between scholars on account of their color, race or social
position."'124
With the exception of a New York case in 1883,125 no court in
any other Northern state upheld school segregation after 1874.
The legislatures of California 126 and Ohio' 27 reversed the judicial
decisions upholding segregation and banned separate schools in
1880 and 1887, respectively. A lower court in Pennsylvania held in
1881 that education is a privilege or immunity of United States citi-
zens and that segregation, being "the very personification of caste"
is therefore unconstitutional. 128 Because of enactment of desegre-
gation legislation a few months later, however, this decision, which
is the only explicit judicial holding that school segregation violates
the Fourteenth Amendment, was never appealed.129 The same
year, the Kansas Supreme Court struck down the segregation pol-
icy of a local school board. 30 Although it never reached the Four-
teenth Amendment argument, the court devoted a page of its
opinion to discussing why the constitutionality of segregated
schools "may be doubted,' 3' and engaged in a lengthy discussion
of why it was "better for the grand aggregate of human society, as
well as for individuals, that all children should mingle together and
learn to know each other.' 132
It bears mention that the focus of nineteenth-century civil rights
litigation was on equal rights rather than on governmental discrimi-
124 Chase, 71 Ill. at 385.
125 People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883).
126 Cal. Political Code, § 1662 (as amended Apr. 7, 1880 & Mar. 12, 1885); see Wysinger
v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588 (1890). Note, however, that the 1885 amendment to the Code
gave school boards power to establish separate schools for children of Chinese or
Mongolian descent. Act of Mar. 12, 1885, ch. 117, § 1, 1885 Cal. Stat. 99, 100. This
amendment was approved just nine days after the California Supreme Court held that
§ 1662 did not allow teachers to exclude Chinese students from public schools. Tape v.
Hurley, 66 Cal. 473 (1885).
127 Act of Feb. 22, 1887, House Bill No. 71, § 1, 1887 Ohio Laws 34.
128 Commonwealth ex rel. Allen v. Davis, 10 Weekly Notes of Cases (Pennsylvania) 156,
159-60 (1881). The case is discussed in Kousser, supra note 116, at 21-22. For a complete
listing of school desegregation litigation in the nineteenth century, see id. at 56-58.
129 Kousser, supra note 116, at 22.
130 Board of Educ. v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881).
131 Id. at 17-18. The dissenter, future United States Supreme Court Justice David J.
Brewer, interpreted this dictum as a statement of the court's opinion on the constitutional
issue, and expressed his disagreement with it. Id. at 23-24 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 19.
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nation or wrongdoing. The issue posed would be whether a black
child had a right to be admitted to a particular school without
regard to his race, not whether the state behaved wrongfully in
establishing a separate school. Thus, even when black children
won lawsuits entitling them to admission to the (formerly) "white"
school, the state remained free to operate separate schools for
black children. Unless or until there was political pressure for
reform, civil rights could be enforced only person-by-person, at
considerable expense. Thus, even in the North, separate schools
remained widespread even after the right to desegregated school-
ing was established. 133
Moreover, even as the Northern states approached consensus on
the proposition that requiring black children to attend racially sep-
arate schools is a violation of their right to equality in education,
the national picture was more clouded than ever. As will be
recounted in detail below, the congressional effort to end school
segregation under authority of the Fourteenth Amendment col-
lapsed in 1875. Reconstruction came to a close in 1877, and the
Southern states moved quickly and unanimously toward a system
of de jure segregated education-to be followed a decade later by
segregation throughout the Southern economy and public life. In
light of the retreat from federal enforcement of civil rights, it
became difficult to sustain the argument that federal law required
desegregation. In 1882, Federal Circuit Court Judge John Baxter,
an opponent of school segregation, concluded reluctantly that
Ohio's segregated schools were not unconstitutional (though he
insisted upon a degree of material equality among the separated
schools that was unheard of again until the 1940s, and that resulted
in substantial desegregation of Ohio schools).2 4 Similarly, Justice
Cooley, who had held segregation of the Detroit schools unlawful
in 1869,135 wrote in the 1880 edition of his constitutional law trea-
133 See Weinberg, supra note 74, at 64-80.
134 See United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 735-36 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882). Newspaper
accounts reported Judge Baxter's statement that he
"had come to the conclusion, after much deliberation, that the [state segregation]
statute was constitutional, yet he did not desire to be understood as saying that he
approved of the law which recognized separate schools, because he believed it would
be far better policy fot the State to remove such irritating differences."
Springfield Daily Republic, Nov. 4, 1882, quoted in Kousser, supra note 116, at 25.
135 See People ex rel. Workman v. Board of Educ., 18 Mich. 399 (1869).
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tise that under the Fourteenth Amendment, "it seems to be admis-
sible to require colored persons to attend separate schools,
provided the schools are equal in advantages, and the same mea-
sure of privilege and opportunity is afforded in each. 13 6
The experience in the Northern states during the fifteen year
period after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment thus falls
short of proving that school segregation was understood to violate
the Amendment, but it is also inconsistent with the equally
extreme view that the Amendment had no bearing on the issue.
Confronting the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time, five
Northern state supreme courts (those of California, Indiana,
Nevada, New York and Ohio) upheld segregation of public
schools, while another four Northern state supreme courts (those
of Illinois, Iowa, Kansas and Michigan) held segregation unlawful.
As the implications of the new constitutional regime came to be
more fully understood in the North, segregation eventually was
prohibited, either by legislative or judicial action, in every state.137
C. The District of Columbia
The single piece of evidence most often cited in support of the
proposition that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
deem school segregation unconstitutional is the fact that the
schools of the District of Columbia, under the direct constitutional
authority of Congress, remained segregated by law during the
entire period of proposal, ratification, and enforcement of the
Amendment (and indeed remained segregated until after Brown).
In 1862, shortly after emancipation in the District, Congress passed
statutes "initiating a system of education of colored children," to
be financed by a special tax on property "owned by persons of
color."13 Prior to that time, there were no publicly supported
schools for black children in the District.139 In 1864, Congress
136 Thomas M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United
States of America 230-31 (Boston, Little, Brown 1880).
137 This is not to say that de jure segregation was eliminated in the North. Segregation
survived in many areas, including southern Illinois, southern New Jersey, and parts of rural
Ohio, despite legislation and judicial rulings. See Kousser, supra note 116, at 7 n.23;
McGinnis, supra note 98, at 64-70; Weinberg, supra note 74, at 68-71, 75-76.
138 Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 77, § 35, 12 Stat. 394, 402 (County of Washington); Act of
May 21, 1862, ch. 83, § 1, 12 Stat. 407 (Cities of Washington and Georgetown).
139 See Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1677-87 (Apr. 12, 1860).
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abolished the special tax and required the school authorities to use
a proportionate share of the common school funds for the educa-
tion of black children, evidently assuming that the schools would
be separate.140 The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed in 1866
and in the same year, Congress made appropriations for the two
separate school systems without reexamining the segregation
issue.14 1
In 1870, eighteen months after ratification of the Amendment,
Senator Sumner introduced legislation that would eliminate sepa-
rate schools in the District. 42 The trustees of the separate black
school system issued a formal report supporting desegregation on
the ground that this would be in "the best interests of the colored
people" as well as "those of all classes."'1 43 Neither Sumner nor the
trustees treated the issue as one of constitutional obligation (per-
haps because the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment did not
apply to either the national government or, consequently, to the
District of Columbia). The trustees stated that they regarded it "as
but a question of time" that the "custom of separation on account
of color must disappear from our public schools, as it has from our
halls of justice and of legislation," but acknowledged that
"[w]hether this unjust, unreasonable, and unchristian discrimina-
tion against our children shall continue at the capital of this great
Republic is for the wisdom of Congress to determine."'144
On February 8, 1871, the District of Columbia Committee of the
Senate, over the objections of its chairman, reported a bill that
would have reorganized the public school system of the District
and eliminated all racial distinctions in the admission of pupils to
the schools. 45 A similar bill was reported in the House of Repre-
140 Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 156, §§ 18, 23, 13 Stat. 187, 191, 193.
141 Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310, 316 (appropriations act for various civil
expenses); Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 308, 14 Stat. 343 (1866) (granting land for colored
schools within the district). Neither bill was seriously debated.
142 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 323 (Jan. 10, 1870).
143 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1055 (Feb. 8, 1871) (quoted in speech by Sen.
Sumner).
144 Id. at 1056.
145 Id. at 1054 ("[N]o distinction on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude shall be made in the admission of pupils to any of the schools under the control
of the board of education, or in the mode of education or treatment of pupils in such
schools."). The chairman of the committee, Sen. Patterson, stated that he "was overruled
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sentatives, together with an amendment to strike the desegregation
clause. 146 Some proponents of the bills argued that desegregation
was required by the spirit of the recent constitutional amend-
ments,147 but for the most part the bills were debated as issues of
policy. 48 The sponsor of the amendment to strike the desegrega-
tion requirement stressed repeatedly that he did "not differ with
the [proponents of the bill] as to principle, but as to policy, in this
matter.' 49  He believed that immediate desegregation would
"destroy the schools of the city, or... put them back at least ten or
fifteen years" and that desegregation should be postponed until the
black children had been given a certain degree of education and
the prejudice against them, which he described as "transitory," had
passed away.' 50  Another opponent asked: "[I]s it a crime to be
practical?' 151 The Senate bill died without further debate, and the
House bill was defeated by a vote of 71-88.152 A similar effort in
the Senate during the next Congress prevailed by a margin of 35-20
on a procedural test, 53 but never came to a final vote. Sumner
thereafter devoted his efforts to general civil rights legislation,
which would have ended school segregation not only in the District
in the committee in this matter" and proposed an amendment deleting the desegregation
provision. Id.
146 Id. at 1365-66 (Feb. 17, 1871). The bill provided that it shall be the duty of the board
of directors
to determine what particular school each scholar shall attend; and no distinction
shall be made on account of race or color, so that all unmarried youth resident in the
District of Columbia, between the said ages of six and eighteen years, shall be
entitled to and receive equal benefits of the public schools of their respective
districts.
Id. at 1366.
147 See, e.g., id. at 1055 (Feb. 8, 1871) (statement of Sen. Harris) ("We have adopted the
principle of equality in the Constitution of the United States, and I think this is a proper
place to enact a law in accordance therewith."); id. at 1056 (statement of Sen. Carpenter)
("[T]his bill... declares a principle which is sound if the amendments to the Constitution
are correct[,] ... that there shall be no distinction on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude made in our common schools.").
148 See, e.g., id. at 1059 (statement of Sen. Revels) (arguing that a law compelling school
segregation would encourage racial prejudice).
149 Id. at 1054 (statement of Sen. Patterson). He later repeated these sentiments. Id. at
1057.
150 Id. at 1054.
151 Id. at 1059 (statement of Sen. Tipton).
152 Id. at 1367 (Feb. 17, 1871).
153 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3124 (May 7, 1872).
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but nationwide. By the time that effort failed, Republicans had lost
control of the Congress, Reconstruction was over, and the question
of segregation in District of Columbia schools had disappeared
from public attention.
The segregation of schools in the nation's capital was a powerful
symbol. But as a legal matter it is less significant than may appear.
At no time after the Fourteenth Amendment did Congress vote in
favor of segregated schools in the District (although Congress
appropriated money for the segregated schools that already
existed). The sin was one of omission. More importantly, since the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to congressional legislation,
senators were free to vote in accordance with their assessments of
practical impact (and even according to their personal preferences
about the schools their children attended) rather than according to
the perceived dictates of the Constitution. Opponents of desegre-
gation followed a strategy of preventing an up-or-down vote, and
extraordinary numbers of representatives and senators failed to
vote even on procedural motions. One member said outright that
he could not cast a vote that might be interpreted as condoning
segregation, but that he preferred that the issue not be raised.' 54
To read this as proof that the Congress of the day viewed segrega-
tion as constitutionally legitimate is to overread the evidence.
D. Segregation in Common Carriers
A final source of evidence regarding the legal conception of seg-
regation at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment involves segre-
gation of transportation common carriers. Even scholars who find
the historical argument in favor of Brown implausible acknowledge
that "the originalist constitutional argument against racial segrega-
tion was always stronger in the public transportation than in the
public school context."' 55
Racial discrimination by common carriers raised a legal issue
under the common law even before the Fourteenth Amendment
because of the carriers' legal duty to serve all customers equally,
154 See Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1058 (Feb. 8,1871) (statement of Sen. Sawyer).
155 Michael J. Klarman, Brown v. Board of Education: Facts and Political Correctness,
80 Va. L. Rev. 185, 191 (1994); see also Earl M. Maltz, "Separate But Equal" and the Law
of Common Carriers in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 17 Rutgers L.L 553 (1986).
But see Kull, supra note 15, at 96.
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subject only to reasonable restrictions and regulations. Under the
common law, the legality of segregation thus depended upon
whether a potential passenger's race constituted a "reasonable"
ground for distinction. This was usually considered a question of
law for the court or for the jury rather than a matter of private
business judgment for the railroad. On this reasonableness issue,
authorities split. One prominent railroad law treatise, written in
1857, summarized the law as follows:
The company is under a public duty, as a common carrier of pas-
sengers, to receive all who offer themselves as such and are ready
to pay the usual fare, and is liable in damages to a party whom it
refuses to carry without a reasonable excuse. It may decline to
carry persons after its means of conveyance have been exhausted,
and refuse such as persist in not complying with its reasonable reg-
ulations, or whose improper behavior-as by their drunkenness,
obscene language, or vulgar conduct-renders them an annoyance
to other passengers. But it cannot make unreasonable discrimina-
tions between persons soliciting its means of conveyance, as by
refusing them on account of personal dislike, their occupation, con-
dition in life, complexion, race, nativity, political or ecclesiastical
relations. 156
By contrast, in an often-cited opinion involving the refusal of a
black woman to sit at the rear of a railway car, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held in 1867 that the railroad's racial distinction
was reasonable. 57 "The natural separation of the races," the court
found, is "an undeniable fact, and all social organizations which
lead to their amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature."'""
Earlier the same year, however, the Pennsylvania legislature had
passed a statute "[m]aking it an offence for railroad corporations
... to make any distinction with their passengers, on account of
race or color."'51 9 Earl Maltz concludes that "in the 1860's the
rights of blacks with respect to public transportation were some-
what uncertain. All agreed that blacks could not be totally
156 Edward L. Pierce, A Treatise on American Railroad Law 489 (New York, Voorhies
1857) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
57 West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209, 212-13 (1867).
158 Id. at 213.
159 Act of Mar. 22, 1867, No. 21, 1867 Pa. Laws 38.
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excluded from common carriers; the authorities disagreed, how-
ever,... on the segregation issue. 160
In its role as legislator for the District of Columbia, Congress
took an increasingly strong stand against segregation in public
transportation through the 1860s. Between 1863 and 1865, narrow
majorities in Congress passed a series of amendments to the char-
ters of railway and streetcar companies operating in the District of
Columbia, prohibiting exclusion on grounds of race.16' Most of
these amendments unmistakably prohibited segregated cars as well
as outright denial of service (prohibiting exclusion from "any
car"). 162 Both proponents and some opponents maintained that
black passengers already enjoyed legal protection against discrimi-
nation under the common law. Opponents thus argued that the
specific amendments were unnecessary, while proponents said they
would be useful to guard against judicial misinterpretation. 63
After 1865, support for these amendments in the Senate swelled to
over two-thirds. 64 This was on the eve of passage of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
After enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state's deci-
sion to treat racial distinctions as "reasonable" could be seen as
discriminatory state action, thus transforming a question of com-
mon law into a constitutional issue. The Iowa Supreme Court con-
cluded that "[t]he doctrines of natural law and of christianity forbid
that rights be denied on the ground of race or color" 65 and found
segregation in common carriers to be a violation of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which guar-
antees to "the colored man... equality with the white man in all
affairs of life, over which there may be legislation, or of which the
160 Maltz, supra note 155, at 558.
161 Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1329 (Feb. 27, 1863); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1156, 1161 (Mar. 17, 1864); id. at 3137 (June 22, 1864); see Maltz, supra note 155, at
558-63.
162 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 294 (Jan. 17, 1865); Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st
Sess. 3131 (June 21, 1864); id. at 1156 (Mar. 17, 1864).
163 Cong. Globe, 38th -Cong., 1st Sess. 3132 (Jun. 21, 1864) (colloquy between Sen.
Sumner and Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1158 (Mar. 17, 1864) (colloquy between Sen. Johnson
and Sen. Sumner); id. at 1159 (statement of Sen. Morrill).
164 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 604 (Feb. 6, 1865) (measure approved 26-10); id.
at 294 (Jan. 17, 1865) (measure approved 24-6).
165 Coger v. North W. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 154 (1873).
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courts may take cognizance."'1 66 Other courts continued to follow
the line of cases upholding the "reasonableness" of racial
distinctions. 167
Historians disagree about the degree of segregation and desegre-
gation in actual practice during the period following ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In his classic study, The Strange
Career of Jim Crow, 68 C. Vann Woodward made the surprising
case that public transportation was desegregated in actual practice
(and not just in legal theory) in most Southern jurisdictions from
the early 1870s until 1900.169 Desegregation was sometimes a
result of black-organized boycotts and political action, and perhaps
more often of the fact that railroads found it inefficient and expen-
sive to provide duplicate facilities for the two races. 170 Other his-
torians report that desegregation was less common.' 71  Actual
desegregation, they maintain, was often confined to lower-class
accommodations, such as railroad "smokihg cars," and a combina-
tion of custom, company regulation, and economics often barred
black passengers from first class accommodations. 72
Almost every Southern state passed laws during Reconstruction
guaranteeing equal access to transportation and public accommo-
dations, 7 3 and none mandated segregation by law. The first major
166 Id. at 155-56.
167 For a survey of decisions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, see David
McBride, Mid-Atlantic State Courts and the Struggle with the "Separate But Equal"
Doctrine: 1880-1939, 17 Rutgers L.J. 569 (1986).
168 Woodward, supra note 72.
169 Id. at 33-34 (Virginia); C. Vann Woodward, American Counterpoint: Slavery and
Racism in the North-South Dialogue 253 (1964) [hereinafter Woodward, American
Counterpoint] (discussing the situation in New Orleans, Charleston, Richmond, Savannah,
and Louisville).
170 Woodward, American Counterpoint, supra note 169, at 253; August Meier & Elliott
Rudwick, A Strange Chapter in the Career of "Jim Crow," in 2 The Making of Black
America 14, 14-19 (August Meier & Elliott Rudwick, eds., 1976) (Savannah, Georgia).
171 See Lofgren, supra note 9, at 7-27 (presenting a balanced account of the evidence);
Richard C. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South, 1820-1860 (1964) (tracing origins of Jim
Crow practices to the cities of the South prior to the War); Williamson, supra note 21
(discussing Southern movement toward segregation in the early years after the War);
Bruce A. Glasrud, Jim Crow's Emergence in Texas, 15 Am. Stud. 47, 52 (1974) (reporting
that racial segregation was widespread in Texas between 1865 and 1877). Woodward
acknowledges the historical dispute in Woodward, American Counterpoint, supra note 169,
at 253.
172 Foner, supra note 21, at 368, 371-72; Lofgren, supra note 9, at 9-17.
173 See Foner, supra note 21, at 370.
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wave of segregation legislation did not occur until the 1880s.174
The first genuine Jim Crow law requiring segregation of all railroad
facilities was passed by Florida in 1887, followed by Mississippi in
1888 and Texas in 1889.175 The Louisiana statute upheld in Plessy
was passed in 1890.176 In Plessy, the Court spoke as if Jim Crow
laws were part of the "established usages, customs and traditions of
the people, 177 but in fact the laws were of very recent vintage.
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1875
In contrast to the scant discussion of segregated education dur-
ing debate over the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction
Congresses during the period 1868-1875 were forced to confront
the issue repeatedly. While the Thirty-ninth Congress concen-
trated on passing the Amendment-a context in which avoidance
or obfuscation of controversial issues is often the best strategy-
later Congresses were forced to determine what it meant, in the
context of the most difficult questions of the day. The actions
taken by Congress from 1868 through 1875 to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment and the congressional deliberations over those
measures thus present the best available evidence of the original
understanding of the meaning of the Amendment as it bears on the
issue of school segregation. Although this evidence might be infer-
ior in principle to information directly bearing on the opinions and
expectations of the framers and ratifiers during deliberations over
the Amendment itself, there is no significant body of evidence con-
cerning the latter. The relatively modest evidence that does exist is
overwhelmed by the abundance of evidence from the enforcement
period.
The principal focus of this Article is therefore on the effort from
1870 through 1875, led by Charles Sumner in the Senate and Gen-
eral Benjamin F. Butler in the House, to enact legislation pursuant
174 For detailed accounts of the emergence of Jim Crow laws in four Southern
jurisdictions, see Glasrud, supra note 171; Linda M. Matthews, Keeping Down Jim Crow:
The Railroads and the Separate Coach Bills in South Carolina, 73 S. Atl. Q. 117 (1974);
Meier & Rudwick, supra note 170 (Savannah, Georgia); Stanley J. Folmsbee, Note, The
Origin of the First "Jim Crow" Law, 15 J.S. Hist. 235 (1949) (Tennessee).
175 Lofgren, supra note 9, at 22.
176 Act of July 10, 1890, No. 111, 1890 La. Acts 152, 154 (quoted in Plessy, 163 U.S. at
540).
177 163 U.S. at 550.
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to the Fourteenth Amendment to abolish de jure segregation in
public schools. The ultimate result of their efforts was the enact-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1875,178 which forbade racial dis-
crimination in inns, theaters, common carriers, and other forms of
public accommodation. Although this legislation, together with
the Civil Rights Act of 1866,79 was the centerpiece of enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment, its constitutional underpinnings
and legal substance have received little attention, perhaps because
the Act was struck down by the Supreme Court only eight years
after enactment, in the Civil Rights Cases.180 Because of this deci-
sion, scholarly analysis of the 1875 Act has been directed almost
exclusively to the problem of "state action" under the Amend-
ment, which was the focal point of the Civil Rights Cases, to the
neglect of the equally important implications for the questions of
segregation and the scope of the civil rights protected by the
Amendment. Moreover, because the legislation ultimately
adopted in 1875 did not apply to schools and made no overt refer-
ence to segregation, there has been little recognition of the rele-
vance of this legislation to the issue later faced in Brown. But in
fact, the most important and controversial question raised by the
legislation was the constitutionality of de jure segregation of the
public schools. This topic dominated debate in Congress for a
three and a half year period.
It is during this debate over what ultimately became the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 that constitutional theories of the day regarding
school segregation were most fully developed. The school desegre-
gation effort was ultimately unsuccessful, but the degree of support
it commanded belies the standard account, according to which it is
"fanciful" to suppose that the generation that enacted the Four-
teenth Amendment understood it to forbid segregated schools. In
a series of votes in different procedural contexts, opponents of
school segregation were able to muster significant support-often
large majorities-in both houses of Congress. Perhaps more
importantly, Congress eventually did pass legislation requiring
desegregation of common carriers and places of public accommo-
178 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
179 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
180 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
1995]
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 81:947
dation, and expressly refused to enact an amendment that would
sanction separate but equal schools.
Although the case for Brown would be stronger if school deseg-
regation legislation had actually passed, it is extremely significant
that half or more of the Congress voted repeatedly to abolish seg-
regated schools under authority of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is especially true given that the opponents of these measures
could not agree on any particular constitutional theory under
which segregation could be defended as lawful, and many of them
were acting out of evident hostility or indifference to the goals of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It may be helpful to understanding the following account to have
reference to a chronology of the relevant events:
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
1866 Congress enacts Civil Rights Act of 1866 (property, contract, capacity to sue,
etc.)-now 42 U.S.C. § 1981
Fourteenth Amendment proposed by Congress
1868 Fourteenth Amendment ratified
1870 1866 Act reenacted
Sumner introduces desegregation bill
1872 Debates on Sumner's bill as rider to amnesty bill
Introduction and debate on House desegregation bill
1873 Slaughter-House Cases
Railroad Co. v. Brown
1874 Sumner dies
Desegregation bill revised to reflect reliance on Equal Protection Clause
Revised bill passes the Senate, but floor vote is forestalled in the House
Congressional elections; Democratic landslide
1875 Lameduck House deletes schools provision; rejects separate-but-equal
alternative
House passes Civil Rights Act of 1875
Senate passes Civil Rights Act as amended
President Grant signs act into law
Democrats assume control of both Houses of Congress
1876 Disputed presidential election between Hayes and Tilden
1877 Compromise of 1877 recognizes Hayes as President and brings Reconstruction
to an end
1883 Civil Rights Act of 1875 struck down in Civil Rights Cases
1884 Congress fails to prohibit segregation in Interstate Commerce Act
1887 First Jim Crow law passed in Florida, requiring segregation in railway
transportation
1896 Plessy v. Ferguson
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A. Sumner's Bill
In 1870, Charles Sumner inaugurated the first attempt, pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment, to outlaw school segregation in
common schools, public accommodations, common carriers, and
other institutions throughout the United States. In introducing the
bill, Sumner declared: "I will say that when this bill shall become a
law, as I hope it will very soon, I know nothing further to be done
in the way of legislation for the security of equal rights in this
Republic."'' The effort was to outlive the Massachusetts Republi-
can. It would pass both houses of Congress only after his death,
and then only after it had been stripped of its most controversial
features, including the schools provision. Sumner was both the
best and the worst champion a cause could have. He was single-
minded and persistent, self-righteous and overbearing to his allies
and insufferable to his enemies. He was not well liked. But no one
can question his sincere and lifelong commitment to achievement
of the equality of rights for all Americans that he considered to be
the unfulfilled promise of the Declaration of Independence. Even
on his deathbed, he told his friend, Representative E.R. Hoar,
"You must take care of the civil-rights bill,-my bill, the civil-rights
bill, don't let it fail."'"
There is no doubt that Sumner's bill required desegregation, and
not merely equality of resources. The language of the bill forbade
"distinction of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" and
guaranteed "the equal and impartial enjoyment of any accommo-
dation, advantage, facility, or privilege" furnished by the covered
institutions. 83 The term "any" was understood to preclude exclu-
181 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (May 13, 1870).
182 David Donald, Charles Sumner and the Rights of Man 586 (1970).
183 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1872) (read on Dec. 20, 1871) (emphasis
added). The first section of the bill provided in full:
That all citizens of the United States, without distinction of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, are entitled to the equal and impartial enjoyment of any
accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished by common carriers,
whether on land or water; by inn-keepers; by licensed owners, managers, or lessees
of theaters or other places of public amusement; by trustees, commissioners,
superintendents, teachers, or other officers of common schools and other public
institutions of learning, the same being supported or authorized by law; by trustees
or officers of church organizations, cemetery associations, and benevolent
institutions incorporated by national or State authority; and this right shall not be
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sion of black citizens from any accommodation or facility-even if
another facility of comparable quality was provided. Similar lan-
guage had been used by Congress to forbid segregation of railroads
operating in the District of Columbia, and was so interpreted by
the Supreme Court.'8 Moreover, if the language of the bill left
any doubt, the debate quickly cleared it up. Senator Joshua Hill, a
Republican from Georgia, rose to declare that he did not "hold
that if you have public schools, and you give all the advantages of
education to one class as you do to another, but keep them sepa-
rate and apart, there is any denial of a civil right in that.' 18 5 He
made the same point with respect to hotels, dining rooms, railways,
and churches. Sumner responded that Hill's speech was "a vindica-
tion on this floor of inequality as a principle, as a political rule,"
and that segregation imposed an inequality on both races.186 The
following exchange ensued:
Mr. SUMNER.... The Senator mistakes substitutes for equality.
Equality is where all are alike. A substitute can never take the
place of equality. It is impossible; it is absurd. And still further, I
must remind the Senator that it is very unjust; it is terribly unjust.
Why, sir, we have had in this Chamber a colored Senator from
Mississippi; but according to the rule of the Senator from Georgia
we should have set him apart by himself; he should not have sat
with his brother Senators. Do I understand the Senator from
Georgia as favoring such a rule?
Mr. HILL. No, sir.
Mr. SUMNER. The Senator does not.
Mr. HILL. I do not, sir, for this reason: it is under the institutions
of the country that he becomes entitled by law to his seat here; we
have no right to deny it to him.
denied or abridged on any pretense of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
Id. The fourth section of the bill prohibited both state and federal courts from excluding
jurors on the basis of race. Remaining sections of the bill dealt with penalties, enforce-
ment, and preemption of inconsistent national and state law. Id.
184 Railway Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873). See infra notes 792-805 and
accompanying text.
185 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20,
1871).
186 Id. at 242.
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Mr. SUMNER. Very well; and I intend to the best of my ability to
see that under the institutions of his country he is equal
everywhere. 187
Upon Hill's further argument that proximity of black to white, or
white to black, in hotels- or railroads, does not affect their "comfort
or security"-an unambiguous defense of "separate-but-equal"-
Sumner hotly responded: "The Senator does not seem to see that
any rule excluding a man on account of his color is an indignity, an
insult, and a wrong; and he makes himself on this floor the repre-
sentative of indignity, of insult, and of wrong to the colored
race."1m Further debate contained similarly unambiguous state-
ments, from supporters and opponents alike, indicating that the bill
was clearly understood as prohibiting segregation.8 9 Senator
Thurman said of a later version of the bill: "I do not think there is
one member of the majority of the Judiciary Committee who will
not say, if the question is put directly to him, that the meaning of
the section is that there shall be mixed schools."' 9
In all the debates, the only statement by a supporter of Sumner's
bill that appears to countenance segregated schools is a speech by
Senator John Sherman of Ohio.19' On May 8, 1872, he endorsed
the result in State ex rel. Games v. McCann,'92 the decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court discussed in the previous Section, which
upheld separate but equal schools under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This statement is difficult to square with Sherman's consis-
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 E.g., id. at 3256-58 (May 9, 1872) (speech by Sen. Ferry defending separate schools
and opposing a requirement of "mixed schools"); id. at app. 42 (Feb. 8,1872) (statement by
Sen. Vickers) ("The friends of this measure are unwilling that separate schools for the
races shall be provided .... "); id. at app. 26-27 (Feb. 6, 1872) (statement by Sen. Thurman
criticizing the bill on the ground that separation of the races is not unequal); id. at app. 27
(Feb. 6, 1872) (statement by Sen. Trumbull describing the bill as forcing poor white and
colored children into the same schools); id. at 384 (Jan. 15, 1872) (statement by Sen.
Sumner) ("It is easy to see that the separate school founded on an odious discrimination
and sometimes offered as an equivalent for the common school, is an ill-disguised violation
of the principle of Equality, while as a pretended equivalent it is an utter failure.").
190 2 Cong. Rec. 4088 (May 20, 1874). Thurman's statement was not quite accurate, for
many supporters of the bill distinguished between "mixed schools" (meaning mandatory
integration) and desegregation. See infra notes 626-40 and accompanying text. As an
opponent of the measure, Thurman was inclined to blur the distinction.
191 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (May 8, 1872).
192 21 Ohio St. 198 (1872); see supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
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tent opposition to attempts to substitute a separate-but-equal
provision in the bill. It is possible that Sherman did not accurately
understand the court's holding, since the decision had come down
the preceding day and he was presumably relying on newspaper
accounts. His summary of the Games decision was ambiguous; he
explained that the State "does in certain cases provide for separate
schools,"'193 which could refer to either a freedom of choice plan or
a system of de jure segregation. The full opinion in Games makes
clear that de jure segregation was in fact the issue, but Sherman
may not have known that. In any event, the incident passed with-
out further comment, and is buried by the numerous statements of
both supporters and opponents that the bill outlawed segregated
schools.
B. The Proponents' Constitutional Theory
The debate over Sumner's proposal was a mixture of constitu-
tional arguments and arguments regarding policy and expedi-
ence-with doses of overt racism and obstructionism thrown in by
some of the opponents. Proponents maintained that the bill was an
appropriate means of enforcing the provisions of the new Amend-
ment;194 opponents maintained that it was not. 95 It was impossible
193 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (May 8, 1872).
194 For instance, Representative Walls explained his support for the bill on the ground
that:
[if] there is a denial, tacit or direct, to any person in any State of the equal protection
of all law[,] ... then the spirit of the provisions of the fourteenth article of
amendment to the Federal Constitution is violated, and there is need for the
appropriate legislation for the enforcement of the same as provided for in section 5
of said article.
2 Cong. Rec. 416 (Jan. 6, 1874).
195 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3733 (May 21, 1872) (statement by
Senator Casserly that he was against the bill because it was "grossly and wantonly
unconstitutional"); id. at 3257 (May 9, 1872) (statement by Sen. Ferry) ("[I]t has been the
assertion of those who support this bill with regard to the schools that compelling the
separation of the races into different buildings was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment ...."); id. at 3261 (statement of Sen. Bayard) ("Under this Government of
ours, where is the power delegated to Congress to perform these acts? There is none
expressed; there is none justly to be implied."); id. (argument of Sen. Casserly that
desegregated education is not a privilege and immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment); id. at app. 41-42 (Feb. 8, 1872) (argument by Sen. Vickers that school
desegregation does not violate the privileges and immunities clause, which he understood
to be the basis for the legislative proposal).
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to support the bill without at least implicitly taking the position
that segregation was a denial of the equality of rights mandated by
the Amendment. The only plausible source of congressional
authority to interfere with such matters of state law as inns, thea-
ters, schools, and intrastate transportation was the power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article."'1 96 At that time no
one would have conceived of the commerce power as a source of
authority to pass legislation governing the domestic practices of the
states, 97 and there were no federal appropriations to provide a
basis for regulation under the spending power. 98 In order to vote
for a bill outlawing segregation, a congressman thus had to con-
clude that segregation was in violation of the Amendment; other-
wise the bill would not be an "appropriate" enforcement measure.
As the principal sponsor and Chairman of the Judiciary Committee
in the House commented, supporters of the bill "have all come to a
conclusion on this subject ... that these are rights guaranteed by
the Constitution to every citizen, and that every citizen of the
United States should have the means by which to enforce them."'"
Supporters of the measure readily admitted that if the states
retained the authority to maintain segregated schools under the
Fourteenth Amendment, "we cannot interfere with it" by legisla-
tion. oo Indeed, supporters frequently averred not only that the bill
was within the power of Congress, but that Congress had the con-
196 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
197 The commerce power, Art. I, § 8, was the source of authority to pass Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964). The only reference to the commerce power during the course of the debates was
Sen. Carpenter's final speech on the bill in 1875, in which he opined that the provision of
the bill involving "public conveyance on land or water . . . might be sustained as a
regulation of commerce if confined to that commerce over which Congress possesses the
power of regulation . . . ." 3 Cong. Rec. 1861 (Feb. 27, 1875); see also id. at 1862
(distinguishing interstate commerce over which Congress has power to regulate from
intrastate commerce over which it does not). He went so far as to suggest that theaters
might be covered with respect to persons traveling in interstate commerce, though he
admitted that such a construction of the commerce power was "somewhat fantastic." Id. at
1861.
198 The spending power, Art. I, § 8, was the source of authority to pass Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598
(1982) (White, J., plurality op.).
199 2 Cong. Rec. 457 (Jan. 7, 1874) (statement of Rep. Butler).
200 Id. at 4173 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
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stitutional responsibility to pass such a bill. Senator Pratt of Indi-
ana was typical in declaring that he had
[a] duty, as a member of this body, sworn to support this Constitu-
tion in all its parts, a plain one, to aid by my voice and vote in
doing whatever is necessary to enforce and carry into effect this
article [the Fourteenth Amendment] wherever I find a single right
or privilege of citizenship withheld from the colored man.2° '
A vote for the bill, therefore, was tantamount to an interpretation
of the Amendment as barring segregation of the covered facilities.
A vote against the bill was-with a few exceptions noted below-
equally an affirmation of the opposite interpretation. 20 2
1. Equal Rights, Common Carriers, and Common Schools
The affirmative case for desegregation of the schools was, to its
proponents, quite simple. To them, the Fourteenth Amendment
stood for the proposition that all citizens are entitled to the same
civil rights, regardless of their race, color, nationality, social stand-
ing, or previous condition of servitude. This did not mean that citi-
zens were entitled to equality with respect to everything;
supporters and opponents of the bill alike had definite views about
the limited nature of "civil rights," which did not encompass all
privileges or benefits. The dominant understanding has been
labeled the theory of "limited absolute equality"-equality that is
limited to certain spheres ("civil rights") but is absolute within
those spheres.0 3 Senator George Edmunds explained that the civil
rights bill
proceeds upon the idea that the Constitution does secure to the
citizen certain inherent rights, because they are rights, and then it
merely undertakes to enforce those rights, not to enter into a par-
ley with the States about them and say "you may or may not
201 Id. at 4081 (May 20, 1874). For a similar statement, see 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (Feb. 4,
1875) (statement of Rep. Hale).
2m See infra notes 767-91 and accompanying text.
203 For an excellent discussion of this theory, see Maltz, supra note 13, at 68,157-58; Earl
M. Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory In the Era
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 Houston L. Rev. 221 (1987) [hereinafter Maltz,
Reconstruction Without Revolution].
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enforce them as you may think is desirable," or say "you may
enforce them in this way or that way."2°4
A particular subject, such as common school education, "is either
an absolute right that the Constitution gives to the citizens, or it is
nothing at all and does not touch the case."205
This approach differs from standard Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine today. At considerable risk of oversimplification, it can
be said that the current law of equal protection is oriented not
toward the rights of the individual but toward the decisionmaking
processes of the government. It is designed to root out intentional
discrimination across the entire range of state action.206 To the
supporters of the civil rights bills during the Reconstruction period,
however, the focus was on an equality of rights, not on whether the
processes of government were infected by discriminatory intent.
The Fourteenth Amendment (first by virtue of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, later shifting to the Equal Protection Clause)
meant that legally enforceable civil rights are the same for all citi-
zens (or, after the shift to Equal Protection, all persons), without
distinction on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of ser-
vitude. The practical test was to ask which rights a white citizen
would be able to enforce, and to extend the same set of rights to
all.
The legal theory supporting the Act was set forth at length by
Senator Sumner when he first proposed his civil rights rider, and
was repeated by proponents throughout the debate. Sumner
explained that the "inn is a public institution, with well-known
rights and duties," among which is "the duty to receive all paying
travelers decent in appearance and conduct." 20 7 He distinguished
the inn from "a lodging-house or boarding-house, which is a pri-
vate concern, and not subject to the obligations of the inn. ' 20 The
coverage of the civil rights bill was not based on the distinction
204 2 Cong. Rec. 4172-73 (May 22, 1874).
25 Id. at 4172. See also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3253 (May 9, 1872) (statement
of Sen. Wilson) (viewing "perfect and absolute equality" as a fundamental ideal of
American institutions).
206 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976). See David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989).
207 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872).
208 Id.
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between the governmental and the private, but on whether the
entities in question, public or private, had a general legal obligation
to serve all comers. Sumner cited a variety of legal authorities,
including Story's Commentaries on the Law of Bailments, Kent's
Commentaries, Parsons' Contracts, the entry on "Inn" in Cham-
ber's Encyclopedia, and the Chronicles of Holingshed, written in
the reign of Queen Elizabeth. These authorities demonstrated that
the common law provided a "peremptory rule opening the doors of
inns to all travelers, without distinction, to the extent of authoriz-
ing not only an action but an indictment for the refusal to receive a
traveler. '20 9 Thus, the civil rights bill "is only declaratory of
existing law giving to it the sanction of Congress. ' 210 Sumner
explained that this common law protection "ought to be sufficient,"
but that "it is set at naught by an odious discrimination," making it
necessary for Congress to "interfere." He applied the same analy-
sis, using similar citations, to public conveyances, theaters, and
places of amusement.211
Thus, in the view of its supporters, the civil rights bill did not
create any new rights or obligations. According to William Law-
rence of Ohio, one of the most careful lawyers among the Republi-
can proponents, the bill "simply declares that wherever public
rights already exist by law in favor of citizens generally, none shall
be excluded merely on account of race or color. '212 Most of these
rights derived from the common law.213 The Civil Rights Act of
1866 protected the common law rights of contract, property, and
security of the person. The Civil Rights Act of 1875 protected the
common law rights of access to public inns and accommodations,
209 Id.
210 Id. For similar legal analyses, see 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Lawrence); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3264 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Edmunds); id. at 3192 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman); id. at 843-44 (Feb. 6,
1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
211 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner)
("Public conveyances, whether on land or water, are known to the law as common carriers,
and they, too, have obligations not unlike those of inns."); id. ("Theaters and other places
of public amusement... are public institutions, regulated if not created by law, enjoying
privileges, and in consideration thereof, assuming duties not unlike those of the inn and the
public conveyance.").
212 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6, 1874); accord id. at 410 (statement of Rep. Elliott).
213 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (Feb. 6, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Sherman).
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amusements, common carriers, and the like. To its supporters, the
constitutional basis for the two Acts was the same.214
Enforcement was the issue. Advocates of the civil rights bill
maintained that the right to equality of treatment in the covered
facilities already existed in the law, but that racial prejudice ren-
dered actual enforcement defective. As Senator Sherman
explained, "we know as a matter of fact that in many States, in
many communities, a man cannot, on account of his color, exercise
these rights; and this [bill] merely supplements and gives him an
additional remedy. 2 15 Alonzo Ransier, a black Representative
from South Carolina, more pointedly asserted: "the States will not
give us protection in these matters, and well do these 'State-rights'
men know this. '2 16 A letter from a black citizen of Arkansas, read
into the record, reported that the state legislature had enacted
"good, if not entirely sufficient" laws securing equal rights in
steamboats, railroads and public thoroughfares generally, but that
"those charged under oath to see the laws faithfully executed look
on with seeming heartless indifference, while the law remains a
dead letter on the statute-book. ' 217 Lawrence said that the "bill is
necessary because the common law has been changed by local stat-
utes" making protections unavailable to blacks.21 8 The purpose of
the bill, then, was to provide federal enforcement to ensure that
214 Id. at 383 (Jan.15, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner) ("The bill for Equal Rights is
simply supplementary to the existing Civil Rights Law, which is one of our great statutes of
peace, and it stands on the same requirements of the Constitution."); accord id. at 3191-92
(May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
215 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192 (May 8, 1872). Sherman also pointed out that
the enforcement by black citizens of their rights was impeded by "local laws still alleged to
be in force." Id. Senator Pratt later repeated this point:
But it is asked, if the law be as you lay it down, where the necessity for this
legislation, since the courts are open to all? My answer is, that the remedy is
inadequate and too expensive, and involves too much loss of time and patience to
pursue it.... [T]his bill is justified in providing a more efficient remedy, one that is
so stringent in its penalties that it is likely to be obeyed, and render litigation
unnecessary.
2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (May 20, 1874)
216 2 Cong. Rec. 383 (Jan. 5, 1874). See also 3 Cong. Rec. 940 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement
of Rep. Butler) ("[W]e put in this penalty because there are portions of the country where
there is not any law which can be enforced in favor of a colored man.").
217 Letter from E.A. Fulton to Sen. Charles Sumner (Jan. 30, 1872), quoted in Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 726-27 (Jan. 31, 1872).
218 3 Cong. Rec. 940 (Feb. 3, 1875).
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black citizens would not be denied the rights white citizens already
had to nondiscriminatory treatment by common carriers and other
institutions with a preexisting legal obligation to serve all comers
without discrimination.
Common school education, according to Sumner, presented an
easier and yet a more important case. It falls "into the same cate-
gory" as public inns, conveyances, and places of amusement,
because "[like the others, it must be open to all or its designation
is a misnomer and a mockery. '219 Indeed, the "common school has
a higher character," both because of the importance of its function
and because "it is sustained by taxation to which all contribute."220
Senator Matthew H. Carpenter of Wisconsin, who questioned ex-
tension of the bill to "voluntary institutions, whether incorporated
or not, which we ought not to interfere with," had "no doubt of the
power of this Government under the fourteenth amendment.., to
say that a colored man shall have his right in the common
school."221 Schools, he insisted, are among the institutions that
"are supported by law and maintained by general taxation," and
thus required to extend their benefits to all. Although not a mem-
ber of the Thirty-ninth Congress, Carpenter had probably studied
the Fourteenth Amendment more intensively than any other mem-
ber of the Reconstruction Congress, since he represented litigants
in the first two Fourteenth Amendment cases to reach the Supreme
Court.2 2 His formulation came close to the modem public-private
distinction. Senator Sherman expressed the point as follows:
It is the privilege of every person born in this country, of every
inhabitant of the country whether born here or not, of a certain
age, to attend our public schools which by law are set aside for the
public benefit. Boys and girls go to the schools. It is the privilege
of all, and declared to be so. All contribute to the taxes for their
support; all are benefited by the education given to the rising gen-
eration; and therefore all are entitled to equal privileges in the
public schools. 23
219 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383-84 (Jan. 15, 1872).
220 Id. at 384.
221 Id. at 763 (Feb. 1, 1872).
222 Carpenter represented the monopoly butchers in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36, 57 (1873), and a woman denied admission to the practice of law on the basis
of her gender in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 133 (1873).
22 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at 844 (Feb 6, 1872).
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Proponents of the bill had no difficulty declaring that racial seg-
regation was a plain effort "to defeat equal rights" to which all citi-
zens are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 They
professed to consider the point obvious and "self-evident." 5 In
his first major introductory speech, Sumner stated that "[i]t is easy
to see that the separate school founded on an odious discrimina-
tion and sometimes offered as an equivalent for the common
school, is an ill-disguised violation of the principle of Equality. ''226
He recounted an "incident occurring in Washington, but which
must repeat itself where ever separation is attempted," where
black children living near the public school were "driven from its
doors, and compelled to walk a considerable distance.., to attend
the separate school." Not only was this "super-added pedestrian-
ism and its attendant discomfort" a "measure of inequality in one
of its forms," but more importantly, "[t]he indignity offered to the
colored child is worse than any compulsory exposure, and here not
only the child suffers, but the race to which he belongs is blasted
and the whole community is hardened in wrong.... This is plain
oppression," Sumner declaimed, "which you, sir, would feel keenly
were it directed against you or your child. '227
2. Basis in Constitutional Text
While clear about the legal theory for the bill, Sumner appeared
unconcerned about the precise textual source of constitutional
authority for it. He stated that he found constitutional authority
for the bill "not in one place or in two places or three places, but I
find it almost everywhere, from the preamble to the last line of the
last amendment."8 At various times he invoked the Declaration
of Independence and the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as the
Fourteenth.2 9 Sumner's arguments based on the Declaration were
not well-received, even by his supporters °30 Other advocates of
224 See id. at 3264 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
225 See 2 Cong. Rec. 4147 (May 22, 1874)
226 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872).
227 Id.
n8 Id. at 727 (Jan. 31, 1872).
229 Id. at 728.
230 See Id. at 760-61 (Feb. 1, 1872) (statement of Sen. Carpenter); id. at 730 (Jan. 31,
1872) (statement of Sen. Lot Morrill); id. at app. 1 (Jan. 25, 1872) (statement of Sen. Lot
Morrill).
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the measure, fortunately, were more precise. In a lengthy speech,
Carpenter located the source of the power in the Privileges or
Immunities clause, augmented by Section 5.31 This was the most
obvious and natural source of authority, for this was the clause that
extended fundamental private rights to all citizens, without regard
to race, color or other irrelevant characteristics. Senator John
Sherman of Ohio, who had been a leading supporter of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provided a similar constitutional analysis, like-
wise relying on Congress's power to enforce the Privileges or
Immunities clause.232 In the House, the bill's sponsor, General
Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts, also relied on Privileges or
Immunities.23 Senator Oliver Morton of Indiana relied instead on
Equal Protection,2 as did Senator George Edmunds of Vermont,
another prominent supporter of the Amendment.23- 5
The constitutional argument took an abrupt and surprising turn
in 1873, when the Supreme Court handed down its first decision
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, in the Slaughter-House
Cases.236 The decision involved a controversy seemingly far
removed from the concerns of the framers of the Amendment or of
the antagonists in the struggle over the civil rights bill. The State of
Louisiana had passed an ordinance granting a monopoly over the
business of meat butchery in New Orleans and surrounding par-
ishes to a single firm, the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and
Slaughter-House Company. The excluded butchers of the City
challenged the ordinance on the ground that it reserved the right to
engage in a common trade or business, which is a privilege or
immunity of citizens, to a particular class of persons, in violation of
the equality of rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court rejected that argument. In so doing, it
adopted an extraordinarily narrow reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, which had been understood to be the central
and most important substantive provision of the Amendment. In
231 Id. at 761-63 (Feb. 1, 1872); see also id. at 763-64 (statement by Sen. Davis)
(interpreting Carpenter's position as relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
232 Id. at 843-44 (Feb. 6, 1872). For a detailed analysis of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, see Harrison, supra note 9.
233 2 Cong. Rec. 340 (1874) (statement of Rep. Butler on Dec. 19, 1873).
234 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (Feb. 6, 1872).
235 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 26 (Feb. 6, 1872).
236 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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essence, the Court held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected only against infringements of rights of United States citi-
zens and not rights that derive from state law. As a result, such
rights as habeas corpus, interstate travel, and the care and protec-
tion of the federal government while on the high seas or abroad
would be protected,237 but common law rights of tort, property,
and personal security would not be.238
This interpretation is implausible for three nearly incontrovert-
ible reasons. First, it makes the Privileges or Immunities Clause
redundant: rights derived from federal law already are protected
against hostile state legislation under the Supremacy Clause.239
Second, it is inconsistent with the universal view that the Four-
teenth Amendment encompassed (at least) the rights protected by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The 1866 Act protected black citizens
in their enjoyment of numerous rights derived from state law,
including the right to make and enforce contracts, to acquire, hold,
and dispose of property, and to testify in court.2 4 ° If Slaughter-
House is correct, then these rights were not privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens-a position impossible to square with the legislative
history of the Amendment. Third, the Slaughter-House decision
means that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects a different set of rights than the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article Four, which is both textually
improbable and contrary to extensive legislative history.241 The
better view is that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment protected citizens against denials by their own
237 Id. at 79-80.
238 See Id. at 75-76.
239 See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1415. This point was effectively made by Justice Field
in his Slaughter-House dissent. 83 U.S. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the point
was admitted by prominent Democratic opponents of the Act. See 2 Cong. Rec. app. 312
(May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon) ("Thai provision [referring to the Privileges
or Immunities Clause] is merely surplusage; if there was a citizenship of the United States
before the adoption of this amendment to the Constitution, the States could not abridge
the rights of a citizen of the United States before its adoption.").
240 See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1416.
241 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835-37 (Apr. 7, 1866) (statement of
Rep. Lawrence, citing antebellum interpretations of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV in explaining the content of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment); id. at 474-75 (Jan. 29, 1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull to
similar effect).
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states of the same set of rights that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article Four protected against infringement by other
states, and possibly, in addition, other rights of United States citi-
zenship. On this reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
the rights that once were guaranteed to out-of-staters were now
guaranteed to all citizens.242
Democratic opponents of the bill immediately seized on the
Slaughter-House decision and quoted it over and over. The rights
protected by the proposed civil rights bill all were derived from
state law, mostly state common law. It followed, these opponents
said, that Congress had no authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to legislate with respect to these rights. Congressman Roger
Mills of Texas put the point in these words:
From the authority of adjudged cases it is clear that the privi-
leges and immunities mentioned in the fourteenth amendment are
only such as are conferred by the Constitution itself as the supreme
law over all ....
... Whatever rights the State confers are subject to its own sov-
ereign pleasure. Whether it shall grant them, how grant them, and
what discriminations it shall make in granting them, are questions
left entirely to its own discretion.243
Senator Norwood stated:
no one, lawyer or layman, will deny that every privilege named in
this bill before the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, was
derived by those who enjoyed them exclusively from the States of
which they were citizens. To keep a public inn; to bury the dead; to
construct and manage railroads and other modes of conveyance; to
242 See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1418-19, 1452. For an example of this point in the
debates over the Sumner rider prior to the Slaughter-House decision, Senator Carpenter
stated:
"[P]rivileges and immunities" were then what they are now. Privileges and
immunities are protected differently now from what they were then .... Now these
same privileges and immunities are protected in a different way, but they are the
same. The same things which were then at the mercy of the States in a certain
particular, are now secured and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment.
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (Feb. 1, 1872).
243 2 Cong. Rec. 384-85 (Jan. 5, 1874). Similar speeches were made by Representatives
Bright, id. at 414-15 (Jan. 6, 1874); Herndon, id. at 419; Durham, id. at 405-06; Harris, id. at
376 (Jan. 5, 1874); and Stephens, id. at 379-80; Beck, id. at 342-43 (1874) (speaking on Dec.
19, 1873).
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open and manage a theater, are privileges conferred by each
State.24
It followed, under the logic of Slaughter-House, that Suner's bill
overstepped federal authority.
The Slaughter-House decision changed the tenor of the debate
and forced the Republicans to clarify or revise the textual basis for
their constitutional position. Some Republicans simply insisted
that the Slaughter-House decision "is not the law" and should not
be followed by the Congress. 245 Senator Howe predicted that the
Slaughter-House opinion would never "be accepted by the profes-
sion or the people of the United States.' '246 So unnatural was the
Slaughter-House reasoning that most members of Congress contin-
ued to speak in terms of privileges and immunities except when
explicitly discussing the decision itself. Others interpreted Slaugh-
ter-House as standing for the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits "distinctions and discriminations... made
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," but
has no application when distinctions are "made upon any other
ground. ' 247 The main Republican response, however, was to shift
the weight of their position from the Privileges or Immunities
Clause to the Equal Protection Clause.
The relation between the Equal Protection and Privileges or
Immunities Clauses is an unsettled question, to which little schol-
arly or judicial attention has been paid.24 This is what we can say
244 Id. at app. 240 (Apr. 30, and May 4, 1874).
245 See 3 Cong. Rec. 1792 (Feb. 26, 1875) (statement of Sen. Boutwell) (stating, in terms
reminiscent of Lincoln's remarks on Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856),
that the Slaughter-House decision "is the law of the case, but it is not law beyond the case;
it is not law with reference to the rights of the States generally, and certainly is not law for
the Senate"). Senator Alcorn stated:
This is one branch of this Government, the legislative department; the judiciary is
another branch; and we go forward without regard to the opinions of each other
unless those opinion have taken the form of judicial decision rendered in answer to
the demands of a case properly brought before the court.
2 Cong. Rec. app. 304 (May 22, 1874).
246 2 Cong. Rec. 4148 (May 22, 1874). He was, of course, mistaken in a literal sense, as
the Privileges or Immunities Clause has essentially been read out of existence; but the
substance of his prediction has been fulfilled circuitously by the expansive interpretation
now afforded to the Equal Protection Clause.
247 See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. 943 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch).
248 Maltz, supra note 13, at 96-102, and Harrison, supra note 9, are the principal
exceptions.
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with confidence: the Privileges or Immunities Clause by its terms
applies only to United States citizens, while the Equal Protection
Clause applies to "any person within [a state's] jurisdiction. 249
The Equal Protection Clause clearly applies to laws passed for the
security of persons and property,250 and perhaps to other laws for
the benefit or protection of persons;251 but it falls short of protect-
ing the full range of privileges and immunities of citizens3. 52 Thus,
the Privileges or Immunities Clause applies to a smaller class of
persons and a larger class of rights.253 The only clear example we
have of a right that was protected on behalf of citizens under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause but not on behalf of noncitizens
under the Equal Protection Clause was the right to own real prop-
ertyy24 but in theory there must have been others.
Republican supporters of the civil rights bill turned to the Equal
Protection Clause as a solution to the Slaughter-House problem
because that Clause was not limited to rights of federal citizenship.
In one of the most important speeches in the House debates, Rob-
ert Elliott of South Carolina reasoned as follows:
249 U.S. Const. am. XIV, § 1.
250 See Harrison, supra note 9, at 1435-38; see also Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.J. 507, 566-
70 (1991) (defining the scope of the Equal Protection Clause, as originally understood, as
encompassing civil protection, criminal protection, and prevention of injury).
251 Harrison, supra note 9, at 1441; see Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (Feb. 6,
1872) (statement of Sen. Morton) (Equal Protection "means not simply the protection of
the person from violence, the protection of his property from destruction, but it is
substantially in the sense of the equal benefit of the law"); accord 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6,
1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence). As Harrison points out, this was distinctly a minority
position before Slaughter-House, but was more commonly .held after the decision.
Harrison, supra note 9, at 1430. A good statement of the prevailing view prior to
Slaughter-House was made by Senator Allen Thurman, Democrat from Ohio, at Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (Jan. 22, 1872).
252 Harrison, supra note 9, at 1449-51.
253 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 102.
254 This can be deduced from the fact that section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870,
which reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, applied only to citizens and included the
rights of property, while section 16, which was new, applied to all persons and
conspicuously did not include the rights of property. See Act of May 31, 1870, Ch. 114,
§§ 16, 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144. This distinction survives in current law. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1988) (applicable to all persons) with 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988) (applicable only to
citizens). For a more detailed discussion, see Harrison, supra note 9, at 1442-51; Earl M.
Maltz, The Constitution and Nonracial Discrimination: Alienage, Sex, and the Framers'
Ideal of Equality, 7 Const. Comm. 251, 257-65 (1990).
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There are privileges and immunities which belong to me as a citi-
zen of the United States, and there are other privileges and immu-
nities which belong to me as a citizen of my State.... But what of
that? Are the rights which I now claim [summarizing the rights
protected by the bill] rights which I hold as a citizen of the United
States or of my State? Or, to state the question more exactly, is
not the denial of such privileges to me a denial to me of the equal
protection of the laws? For it is under this clause of the fourteenth
amendment that we place the present bill, no State shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
No matter, therefore, whether his rights are held under the United
States or under his particular State, he is equally protected by this
amendment. 255
William Lawrence, a former judge and a supporter of the Four-
teenth Amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress, delivered a
lengthy and meticulous analysis of the constitutional issue, in which
he argued that the word "protection" in the Equal Protection
Clause "must not be understood in any restricted sense, but must
include every benefit to be derived from laws. ' '12 6 This included
the right "to an equal participation in the benefit to result from the
law regulating common carriers."' 25 7 He explained that "[a]ll these
[civil rights] acts proceed upon the idea that if a State omits or
neglects to secure the enforcement of equal rights, that it 'denies'
the equal protection of the laws within the meaning of the four-
teenth amendment. '12 8 These speeches established the new consti-
tutional theory of the bill.
Democrats did not bother to respond to the equal protection
argument. They continued to make speeches quoting from Slaugh-
ter-House and insisting that the rights protected by the bill were
not privileges or immunities of United States citizens.259
It is evident that Equal Protection would not have emerged as
the basis for the bill if not for Slaughter-House. The Republicans'
255 2 Cong. Rec. 409 (Jan. 6, 1874).
256 Id. at 412.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 414; accord id. at 416 (statement of Rep. Walls) (conceding for sake of
argument that the privileges or immunities of citizens were not presently being denied
under state law but basing support for the bill on the denial of equal protection).
259 See, e.g., id. at 741-42 (Jan. 17, 1874) (statement of Rep. Hamilton); id. at app. 1-3
(Jan. 7, 1874) (statement of Rep. Southard).
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resourceful reliance on the Equal Protection Clause as the princi-
pal provision dealing with issues of racial discrimination persists to
this day. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is a virtual dead let-
ter, while the Equal Protection Clause has expanded to cover all
the rights previously protected by the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, and more. This is a remarkable inversion, since the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was viewed by the framers as the prin-
cipal provision, and the Equal Protection Clause received little
attention. The most important practical effect of the doctrinal shift
has been to obscure the distinction between rights pertinent to citi-
zens and rights pertinent to noncitizens, which was significant to
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment (as is obvious on the
face of the text), but is largely inconsequential to the constitutional
law of today.260
So far as the debates reveal, only one member of Congress
changed his position as result of the Slaughter-House decision, but
he was an influential convert: Senator Matthew Carpenter of Wis-
consin. Carpenter is also the only member of Congress who spoke
in favor of the policy and justice of the bill, 261 but against its consti-
tutionality.262 As already noted, prior to Slaughter-House, Carpen-
ter had stated that he had "no doubt of the power of this
Government under the fourteenth amendment" to pass the bill as
applied to schools and other institutions "supported by law and
maintained by general taxation."263  After Slaughter-House, in
260 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,642-43 (1973) (holding alienage to be a
suspect basis of classification under the Equal Protection Clause). The holding of
Sugarman is ironic, because the very text of the Fourteenth Amendment discriminates
between "citizens" and other "persons." As a practical matter, the elevation of alienage to
protected status creates serious difficulties only as applied to political rights, which, as has
been noted, were not originally understood to be encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment at all. Having collapsed the distinction between the privileges and immunities
of citizens and the right of all persons to the equal protection of the laws, as well as the
distinction between civil and political rights, the Supreme Court has been forced to
recreate the distinction between citizens and persons for purposes of political rights cases
under the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982)
(upholding a citizen/alien distinction where the restriction on aliens has a political, as
opposed to economic, function). Thus, the original logical structure of the Amendment
reemerges from the rubble of the Court's decisions.
261 See 3 Cong. Rec. 1861 (Feb. 27, 1875).
262 Id. at 1861-63.
263 Cong. Globe, 42d Con., 2d Sess. 763 (Feb. 1, 1872). From the beginning, Carpenter
believed that the jury provisions of the bill were unconstitutional. See Cong. Globe, 42d
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which he was the lawyer for the monopoly butchers, Carpenter
became convinced "that all of the provisions of this bill are in con-
flict with the Constitution of the United States as expounded by
the Supreme Court."264 It is only natural for counsel to be per-
suaded by the opinion in a case that he won. But Carpenter found
equal support for this conclusion in Bradwell v. Illinois,2 65 which he
had lost. Carpenter did not defend Slaughter-House or Bradwell
on the merits. "It may be said that these decisions are incorrect,"
he acknowledged, but "still it must be admitted that the decisions
exist, and that they prescribe for the judicial department of the
Government a rule which must be applied to this bill.''266 Carpen-
ter predicted that, by force of Supreme Court precedent, "every
circuit court in which a suit may be commenced" would find the
bill unconstitutional. 267 He also predicted that "this bill, should it
pass through all the forms of enactment, would be a dead letter. ' 2 1
Its only effect would be "to involve the colored man in litigation in
which he is certain to be defeated. '269 In the end, the bill "would
delay, not accelerate, the end desired." 270 This was to prove a
more accurate prophecy than he had any just cause to expect.
C. Constitutional Arguments of the Opposition, and the
Republican Response
Two principal constitutional theories dominated the arguments
of the opposition. Some opponents conceded that the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed all persons an equality of rights, including
education, but denied that segregated education is unequal if facili-
ties are otherwise comparable in quality or cost. That argument
will be considered in Subsection 1. Others maintained that the
Amendment gave Congress no authority to interfere with the
administration of public schools, which are a state and local
Cong., 2d Sess. 827-28 (1872). His other constitutional objections, having to do with
churches and private organizations, had been remedied by amendments to the bill. See
infra notes 497-504 and accompanying text.
264 3 Cong. Rec. 1863 (Feb. 27, 1875).
265 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
266 3 Cong. Rec. 1863 (Feb. 27, 1875).
267 Id.
268 Id. at 1862.
269 Id. at 1863.
270 Id. at 1861.
1005
Virginia Law Review
responsibility. Education, according to this theory, is not a civil
right. That argument will be considered in Subsection 2. It should
be noted at the outset that the second argument is in tension with
the first. If the Fourteenth Amendment does not have application
to education, then there is no constitutional requirement that facili-
ties must be "equal," or indeed, that black children be allowed to
attend school at all. In making the separate-but-equal argument,
opponents of the bill implicitly (and often explicitly) disavowed the
argument that education is not a civil right protected by the
Amendment. The clearest example comes in this colloquy between
Senators Morton and Merrimon:
Mr. MORTON. If I understand the scope of the Senator's ques-
tion he now admits, in effect,.. . that if the State law excludes the
colored children from the schools entirely, that is a violation of the
fourteenth amendment.
Mr. MERRIMON. I admit that with all its force. But the point I
make is this, that it is competent for the State to make a distinction
on account of race or color if it shall make the same provision for
the black race that it makes for the white race .... 271
This tension in the opponents' arguments is significant because it
shows that no one constitutional theory opposed to school desegre-
gation commanded more than a fraction of a minority.
1. Segregation Is Not Unequal
The legitimacy of separate but equal facilities was defended on
three grounds: (a) the principle of formal (or "symmetrical")
equality; (b) an interpretation of the social meaning of segregation;
and (c) the distinction between civil rights and social rights.
a. Formal Equality
The formal equality argument was based on the proposition that
laws permitting or requiring segregated facilities treat members of
both races precisely alike. Blacks cannot attend white schools;
whites cannot attend black schools; all persons are required to
attend schools of their own race. The distinguishing character of
the argument is that it is based on the formally symmetric treat-
ment of the two races, without regard to the social context in which
271 2 Cong. Rec. app. 359 (May 21, 1874).
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the system operates. It was first articulated (in these debates) by
Senator Joshua Hill of Georgia. Hill took issue with
the proposition that if there be a hotel for the entertainment of
travelers, and two classes stop at it, and there is one dining room
for one class and one for another, served alike in all respects, with
the same accommodations, the same attention to the guests, there
is anything offensive or anything that denies the civil rights of one
more than the other.2 72
Racial segregation, Hill argued, preserves a perfect equality of
legal rights for all persons, black as well as white. "I myself am
subject in hotels and upon railroads to the regulations provided by
the hotel proprietors for their guests, and by the railroad compa-
nies for their passengers. '273 Hill said he was "entitled, and so is
the colored man, to all the security and comfort that either
presents to the most favored guest or passenger," but proximity to
a person of a different race "does not increase my comfort or
security, nor does proximity to me on his part increase his; and
therefore it is not a denial of any right in either case." 274
The argument for separate but equal schools was essentially
identical to the argument for separate facilities in inns and trans-
portation, but more intense. Blacks and whites could have "equal"
schools, opponents of the bill said, without going to the "same"
schools.275 Senator Arthur Boreman of West Virginia stated that
"it is just as much a violation of the right of a white child to keep
him out of a black school as it is of a black child to keep him out of
a white school."276 Similarly, Representative John Atkins of Ten-
nessee argued:
272 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20,
1871).
273 Id. at 242.
274 Id.
275 2 Cong. Rec. 4144 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Stockton).
276 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3195 (May 8, 1872); accord 2 Cong. Rec. app. 313,
315 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon). In a telling misstatement of the
argument, Senator Francis Blair, an abolitionist Democrat from Missouri and former
Union colonel, stated that the "white children can no more be compelled to enter schools
in which black children are being taught than the blacks can enter those in which the
whites are being taught, and the discrimination is as much against one as the other." Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3251 (May 9, 1872). He seemed not to notice the difference
between compulsion and permission.
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Are the States to be forced, in the education of the youth, to a
procrustean rule which requires children of all colors and both
sexes to be together[?] May not equal advantages be enjoyed by
all, and yet keep the sexes and colors apart? Would that not be a
general law, and would it work any deprivation or hardship to any
one? The social restriction would apply to the white child as well
as to the black.277
Senator Orris Ferry of Connecticut, who as a Northern Republican
was one of the most important opponents of the school desegrega-
tion proposal, argued that "[t]he same facilities, the same advan-
tages, the same opportunities of education are given to the white
child and the black child .... The only difference is that they do
not receive those equal facilities and advantages in the same
school-room ... ."278 Thus, the separate-but-equal argument was
clearly presented, in terms not dissimilar to those at the time of
Brown.
Proponents countered that symmetrical restrictions on the two
races do not constitute "equality." They said that "free govern-
ment demands the abolition of all distinctions founded on color
and race." 279 "[Y]ou cannot get out by saying that there is an
equality of right when you declare that you will put the black sheep
in one place and the white sheep in another," Edmunds asserted."8
As Sherman put the point: "The time has come when all distinc-
tions that grew out of slavery ought to disappear... ; but, sir, as
long as you have distinctions and discriminations between white
and black in the enjoyment of legal rights and privileges[,] ... you
will have discontent and parties divided between black and
white."281  Sumner characterized the proposal for "separate
arrangements" for colored persons as "a substitute for equality."'
277 2 Cong. Rec. 453 (May 8, 1874).
278 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (1872).
279 2 Cong. Rec. 4083 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Pratt); accord 3 Cong. Rec. 945
(Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch); id. at 958 (statement of Rep. Harris); 2 Cong.
Rec. 3260 (May 9, 1874) (statement of Sen. Edmunds); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess.
819 (Feb. 5, 1872) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
280 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (May 8, 1872).
281 Id. at 3193.
282 Id. at 382 (Jan. 15, 1872).
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This he said was "clearly a contrivance, if not a trick, as if there
could be any equivalent for equality. ' ')n 3
Supporters of the bill found no incongruity in the proposition
that segregation discriminates against members of both races.
Thus, in a colloquy with Hill, Sumner was asked, "On which race
... does the inequality to which the Senator refers operate?"'' 4
Sumner replied, "On both."2 5 That the discrimination was sym-
metrical did not make it any less discrimination.
Although the term "color-blind," later made famous by the first
Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 286
was not uttered during the debate, proponents of the bill used
synonymous formulations. Representative John Lynch stated that
"[t]he duty of the law-maker is to know no race, no color, no reli-
gion, no nationality, except to prevent distinctions on any of these
grounds, so far as the law is concemed."8 7 Sumner quoted from
Smith v. Gould.2ss that "[t]he common law takes no notice of
negroes being different from other men," which he then para-
phrased as "[the law] makes no discrimination on account of
color."289 Sherman said that the way to restore peace in the South
was to "[w]ipe out all legal discriminations between white and
black,... make no distinction between black and white." 290 Rep-
resentative Richard Cain, a black congressman from South Caro-
lina, stated that "my understanding of human rights, of democracy
if you please, is all rights to all men,.., without regard to sections,
complexions, or anything else. "291
b. Social Meaning of Segregation
Opponents of the bill also offered arguments based on the social
meaning of segregation, denying that, as a matter of practical real-
ity, segregation was understood by blacks as a badge of inequality.
In fact, supporters of segregation frequently stated, "the negro is as
283 Id.
284 Id. at 242 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20, 1871).
285 Id.
286 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
287 3 Cong. Rec. 945 (Feb. 3, 1875).
288 92 Eng. Rep. 338, 338 (1706).
289 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (Jan. 15, 1872).
290 Id. at 3193 (May 8, 1872).
291 3 Cong. Rec. 956 (Feb. 3, 1875).
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much interested in keeping aloof from the white man as the white
man is interested in keeping aloof from the negro." 292 They pro-
fessed not to understand why blacks would interpret segregation as
a brand of inferiority. "Have they no pride of race and of kin-
dred?" Senator Cooper of Tennessee inquired. "Think you that it
would trouble the Anglo-Saxon for any other race to turn him
aside? Think you he would care? '293
There was some validity to the claim that a significant number of
black Americans supported, or at least tolerated, segregated edu-
cation, though the degree of black support was greatly exagger-
ated.294 What the congressional spokesmen for segregation
neglected to point out, however, is that a principal motivating fac-
tor in black support for segregated schools was the fear that their
children would be insulted and mistreated in common schools.295
Opponents of the bill frequently drew analogies to forms of sep-
aration that do not ordinarily carry a connotation of subordination
or inferiority, such as the separation of young from old, or boys
from girls.2 9 6 In light of arguments a century later over whether
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to gender discrimination, it is
noteworthy that many members of Congress invoked the analogy
of sex-segregated schools. Senator Thurman inquired, "Is not a
female child a citizen? Is she not entitled to equal rights? Why,
then, do you allow your school directors to provide a school for her
separate from a school for the male?"297 Senator Carpenter argued
that if
292 2 Cong. Rec. app. 316 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon); accord 2 Cong.
Rec. 411 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Blount); id. at 381 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement of
Rep. Stephens); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3259-60 (May 9, 1872) (statement of
Sen. Hill); id. at 241 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20,1871). This contradicted the
opponents' other argument, that the Republicans were supporting the bill only for the
purpose of currying favor with the 800,000 black voters in the South. See id. at 4083 (May
30, 1872) (statement of Sen. Thurman).
293 2 Cong. Rec. 4155 (May 22, 1874).
294 See Gillette, supra note 18, at 201 (describing arguments within the black
community); Kaestle, supra note 79, at 175-76 (same).
295 Kaestle, supra note 79, at 173, 178; Gillette, supra note 18, at 201. Black parents
were also very concerned about having black teachers for their children, which would not
be likely in integrated schools. Kaestle, supra, at 176.
296 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 4144 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Stockton); Cong.
Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3261 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Casserly).
297 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 26 (Feb. 6, 1872).
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these provisions of the fourteenth amendment require that colored
persons should be eligible to serve as jurors in State courts..-.,
then this bill ought to be so amended as to provide that women
and babes at the breast should be so eligible; because they are per-
sons equally with colored citizens entitled under these two clauses
of the amendment to everything secured to colored citizens.298
Senator Merrimon noted that "[t]here is no provision in the Con-
stitution of the United States which protects color any more than
sex or age. '299 Proponents did not quite know how to respond.
Even as well-informed a Senator as George Edmunds was unsure
about the implications of the Fourteenth Amendment for the ques-
tion of gender discrimination, stating that he had "never consid-
ered the female question. ' '300 Notably, they did not retort that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to racial classifications only, or
that it is irrelevant to distinctions based on sex.
Proponents of the civil rights bill heaped scorn on the opposi-
tion's claim that segregation was understood to be equal in its prac-
tical effect. The notion that "color and race are reasons for
distinctions among citizens," they said, is a "slave doctrine." 30 1
When compelled by law, the segregation of the races is "an unjust
and odious proscription. '30 2  Segregation is tantamount to
"caste. '30 3 Senator Frelinghuysen called segregation by law "an
enactment of personal degradation" and a form of "legalized disa-
298 3 Cong. Rec. 1861-62 (Feb. 27,1875). For additional statements on the application of
the Fourteenth Amendment to gender, see 2 Cong. Rec. 4171-72 (May 22, 1874) (statement
of Sen. Sargent); id. at app. 359 (May 21, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon); id. at 453
(Jan. 7, 1874) (statement of Rep. Atkins); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (May 8,
1872) (statement of Sen. Ferry).
299 2 Cong. Rec. app. 313 (May 22, 1874).
3W Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (May 8, 1872). For some of Senator
Edmunds' subsequent ruminations about sex and age discrimination, see id. at 3260 (May
9, 1872).
301 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Edmunds);
accord id. at app. 16 (Feb. 3, 1872) (statement of Rep. Rainey).
32 3 Cong. Rec. 945 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch).
33 3 Cong. Rec. 1000 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Burrows); 2 Cong. Rec. 407 (Jan.
6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (Jan. 15, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner). In 1869, Sumner delivered a lecture entitled "On the
Question of Caste," published in 13 Works of Charles Sumner 133 (Boston, Lee & Shepard
1880), in which he defined the term "caste" as "any separate and fixed order of society,"
where one group "claim[s] hereditary rank and privilege" while another is "doomed to
hereditary degradation and disability." Id. at 140, 146.
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bility or inferiority," effectively a denial of citizenship and a return
to slavery.3 4 Representative Burrows stated that the sole purpose
of the separate but equal schools proposal was "the subjugation of
the weak of every class and race" and averred that he would
"never give [his] vote or voice to the support of any such perni-
cious doctrine."3°5 Representative Rainey said that segregation
treats the black man like a leper.30 6 Sumner declared that "any
rule excluding a man on account of his color is an indignity, an
insult, and a wrong. ' 30 7 Speaking as floor leader for the bill after
Sumner's death, Frelinghuysen addressed the argument at length:
If it be asked what is the objection to classification by race, sepa-
rate schools for colored children, I reply, that question can best be
answered by the person who proposes it asking himself what would
be the objection in his mind to his children being excluded from
the public schools that he was taxed to support on account of their
supposed inferiority of race.
The objection to such a law in its effect on the subjects of it is
that it is an enactment of personal degradation.
The objection to such a law on our part is that it would be legis-
lation in violation of the fundamental principles of the nation.
The objection to the law in its effect on society is that "a commu-
nity is seldom more just than its laws;" and it would be perpetuat-
ing that lingering prejudice growing out of a race having been
slaves which it is as much our duty to remove as it was to abolish
slavery.30 8
Proponents of the bill denied that segregated facilities were or
could be equal, in light of the message of inferiority conveyed by
the arrangement. For example, in answer to Senator Hill's argu-
ment that railroads should be permitted to segregate their passen-
gers by race "provided all the comfort and security be furnished to
passengers alike, ' 30 9 Sumner replied: "Now let me ask the Senator
whether in this world the personal respect that one receives is not
304 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
305 3 Cong. Rec. 999 (Feb. 4, 1875).
306 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 16 (Feb. 3, 1872).
307 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner on Dec. 20,
1871).
308 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
309 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872) (Sen. Hill speaking on Dec. 20, 1871).
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an element of comfort? If a person is treated with indignity, can he
be comfortable? 310
The proponents also argued that desegregation was necessary as
a political guarantee that facilities would even be materially equal.
Sumner stated that it was "impossible... for a separate school to
be the equivalent of the common school." He explained that
"[w]hite parents will take care not only that the common school is
not neglected, but that its teachers and means of instruction are the
best possible, and the colored child will have the benefit of this
watchfulness."'31' Frelinghuysen asserted that "we know that if we
establish separate schools for colored people, those schools will be
inferior to those for the whites" because the whites are politically
dominant and will favor their own.312 "The value of the principle
of equality in government is that thereby the strength of the strong
inures to the benefit of the weak .. ,. . In a later speech,
Edmunds presented extensive evidence of the actual inequality of
the schools, arguing that segregation enabled states "to grind out
every means of education that the colored man can have, and to
feed the white at the expense of the black. '314
Sumner went to extraordinary lengths to refute the claim that
black citizens favored racial segregation. For an entire day, Janu-
ary 15, 1872, Sumner read and commented upon a large number of
letters, petitions, and resolutions from all over the country, repre-
senting many thousands of black citizens complaining of exclusion
from schools, common carriers, and public accommodations on
grounds of race and asking for enactment of the civil rights bill.
The report of this oration consumes seventeen columns of small
type in the Congressional Globe.31 5 A typical letter was that from
Mr. J.F. Quarles of Georgia, who wrote:
[I]n whatever direction we go, whether it be in public places of
amusement, in the street cars, upon the railroad, in the hotel, or in
the way-side inn, we encounter the invidious distinction of caste
and oligarchy. We cannot think of these things without impa-
310 Id. at 243.
311 Id. at 384 (Jan. 15, 1872).
312 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
313 Id.
314 Id. at 4173 (May 22, 1874).
315 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 429-34 (Jan. 7, 1872).
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tience; we cannot speak of them without denouncing them as
unworthy of an intelligent and humane people. Nay, we would be
less than men if we did not everywhere, and under all circum-
stances, utter our earnest and solemn protest against this inhuman
outrage upon our manhood.31 6
Two weeks later, Sumner was at it again, filling eleven more col-
umns with letters and commentary to the same effect.3 17 Similarly,
in the House, Alonzo Ransier, a black South Carolinian, declared
that "I know that I speak for five million people" in support of the
bill, and read into the record memorials from three national or
regional conventions of African-Americans expressing their sup-
port for the bill in the strongest of terms.318
Most of all, proponents of the bill insisted that school segrega-
tion was based solely on "prejudice" and would foster "preju-
dice. 31 9  Representative Williams of Wisconsin interpreted
segregation as "teach[ing] our little boys that they are too good to
sit with these men's children in the public school-room, thereby
nurturing a prejudice they never knew, and preparing these classes
for mutual hatred hereafter .... "320 Representative Butler com-
mented that "the only argument which has been introduced here
[is] the argument to prejudice. '321 "The God-given color of the
African," Sumner said, "is a constant offense to the disdainful
white," but the "equal rights, promised by the great Declaration"
must not be "sacrificed to a prejudice."'3
c. The Distinction Between Civil Rights and Social Rights
The final argument in defense of segregation was that the inter-
mixing of the races was not a civil, but a social right. This argu-
ment conceded that all citizens had a civil right to access to
facilities of equal quality, but characterized the additional require-
ment of desegregation as an attempt to enforce "social equality,"
which was beyond the reach of congressional authority under the
316 Id. at 429.
317 See id. at 726-29 (Jan. 31, 1872).
318 2 Cong. Rec. 1311-12 (Feb. 7, 1874).
319 See, e.g., id. at 408 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott).
320 3 Cong. Rec. 1002 (Feb. 4, 1875).
321 2 Cong. Rec. 457 (Jan. 7, 1874).
322 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872).
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Fourteenth Amendment.3 23  Representative Robert Vance of
North Carolina, for example, was willing to concede that "[o]ne of
the civil rights of the colored man undoubtedly is the right to be
educated out of moneys raised by taxation," but maintained that
the right to "go into the same school with white children, mixing
the colored children and the white children in the same schools" is
a "social right instead of a civil right. 3 24 Representative Aylett
Buckner of Missouri claimed that
[the blacks' complaint is] not that they are excluded from transpor-
tation on railroads and other means of conveyance, not that they
do not frequent places of amusement, not that they are compelled
to take shelter from the elements in the public street or in the open
highway, nor that their children are deprived of elementary educa-
tion in the public schools. This is not the ground of pretended
complaint. It is that they do not eat at the same table and sleep in
the same bed with the whites; that they do not ride in the same car,
and laugh at the stale jokes of circus-clowns from the same seat;
that their children are not sandwiched between the blue-eyed Ger-
man and the black-eyed American, at the same desk and con the
same lessons from the same book, and that the same earth that
conceals the dead body of the white man from sight shall cover the
corpse of the negro.32
According to Buckner, this meant that "[i]t is not civil rights but
social rights that [the bill] seeks to enforce and protect. It is not
equality before the law, but equality in society, that Massachusetts
hankers after with such avidity. 3 26 Another opponent made the
point by proposing an amendment to the title of the bill, to
"change it from 'civil rights' to 'social rights.' "327 This argument
was repeated over and over again.328 So common was the social
323 This argument should not be confused with the argument, made most prominently by
Senator Lyman Trumbull, that education itself is not a civil right. See infra Part II.C.2.
324 2 Cong. Rec. 555 (Jan. 10, 1874).
325 Id. at 428 (Jan. 6, 1874).
326 Id.
327 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4321 (June 7, 1872) (statement of Sen. Brooks).
328 See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. 949 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Fnck); 2 Cong. Rec. 411
(Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Blount); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3251 (May 9,
1872) (statement of Sen. Blair); id. at 819 (Feb. 5, 1872) (statement of Sen. Norwood); id. at
app. 9 (Jan. 30, 1872) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 242 (1872) (statement of Sen.
Hill on Dec. 20, 1871).
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equality argument that Republicans called it the "great bugaboo"
of the opposition.32 9
No one seemed to notice that this argument contradicted the
opposition's other argument: that segregation does not constitute
inequality and is equally desirable for both races. Democrats were
in the awkward position of arguing that segregation does not
impart a social meaning of inequality, and that the inequality it
imparts is merely social.
The "social rights" argument was based on a tripartite division of
rights, universally accepted at the time but forgotten today,
between civil rights, political rights, and social rights. 3  Supporters
and opponents of the bill alike agreed that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had no bearing on "social rights." This underscores that the
dominant Republican position was based not so much on an abhor-
rence of racial discrimination as a general moral evil as on a partic-
ular understanding of the concept of citizenship.3 31 Because of the
modem association of desegregation with opposition to racism in
all its forms, the persistence of racist attitudes and "negrophobia"
among many Republicans has been taken as evidence that they
could not have been committed to desegregation of schools and
other public institutions.3 32 But this inference is unreliable. To the
Republicans of the Reconstruction period, equality of civil fights
was not necessarily linked to equality in general, and particularly
not to social equality. The issue, for them, was not relations
between the races but realization of an ideal of a government of
citizens who were equal in their rights before the law, however
unequal they might be in other respects. Thus, General Butler, one
of the most radical of the Radicals, could declare:
"Equality!" We do not propose to legislate to establish any
equality. I am not one of those who believe that all men were cre-
ated equal, if equality is to be used in its broadest sense. I believe
that "equal" in the Declaration of Independence is a political
329 3 Cong. Rec. 957 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Cain).
330 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull). This distinction is discussed at greater length below. See infra notes 365-69,
376-86 and accompanying text.
331 See Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution, supra note 203, at 224.
332 See Berger, supra note 13, at 10-16; Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and
Segregation Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.L 624, 638, 648.
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word, used in a political sense, and means equality of political
rights.333
Senator Morton similarly stated that "[w]e have a constitutional
amendment that makes all men equal before the law. It does not
make them all equal in point of intellect, in point of property, in
point of education, but they have equal rights before the law.""a
But while agreeing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not
extend to "social rights," opponents and proponents of the bill
were far from agreement about what those rights were. There
were no attempts at systematic definition from either side, 3 5 but
opponents of the bill apparently viewed the category as encom-
passing all rights that relate to social interaction or contact
between the races. Thus, Senator Saulsbury framed the argument
in terms of the proponents' supposed "desire to enforce familiarity,
association, and companionship between the races. 3 3 6  Senator
Blair called it an attempt "to impose upon the whites of the com-
munity the necessity of a close association in all matters with the
negroes. 3 3 7 Several speakers claimed that the principle of the bill
would extend to private homes and associations. Senator Hill, for
instance, said that "[w]hat [Sumner] may term a right may be the
right of any man that pleases to come into my parlor and to be my
guest. That is not the right of any colored man upon earth, nor of
any white man, unless it is agreeable to me."338 Representative
Durham argued that "[w]e have no more right or power to say who
shall enter a theater or a hotel and be accommodated therein than
to say who shall enter a man's private house or enter into any
social amusement to pass away an evening's hour."3 39
333 2 Cong. Rec. 455 (Jan. 7, 1874).
334 3 Cong. Rec. 1795 (Feb. 26, 1875).
335 But see 2 Cong. Rec. 407 (Jan. 6,1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott, quoting Lieber on
Civil Liberty at 25: "By civil liberty is meant, not only the absence of individual restraint,
but liberty within the social system and political organism-a combination of principles
and laws which acknowledge, protect, and favor the dignity of man.") Neither this nor any
other attempted definition explained the distinction between civil, political, and social
rights, however.
336 2 Cong. Rec. 4158 (May 22, 1874).
337 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3251 (May 9, 1872).
338 Id. at 242 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20, 1871).
339 2 Cong. Rec. 405 (Jan. 6, 1874).
1995] 1017
Virginia Law Review
A significant undercurrent in the discussion of social rights was
the fear that intermixing would lead to miscegenation, and that the
theory of the Fourteenth Amendment underlying the bill would
logically extend to a right of racial intermarriage.340 Representa-
tive James Harper of North Carolina, for example, posed the
question:
If Congress has the power to pass this bill and make it a law it has
the power to enact laws to regulate the minutest social observances
of domestic or fashionable life. If it has the right to say to my
neighbor, "You must ride in the same car, eat at the same table,
and lodge in the same room with a negro," it can also say that you
must not interpose an objection on account of his color to any
advances he may make toward your children or family.1
41
It was a telling argument, because perceived support for racial
intermarriage was a clear political liability. 42 But it is striking that
not a single supporter of the 1875 Act attempted to deny that
under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation laws were unconsti-
tutional. 3  For the most part, Republicans diverted the argument
with comments mocking Southerners for the frequency of miscege-
nation under slavery.34 African-American congressmen were es-
340 See 2 Cong. Rec. 556 (Jan. 10, 1874) (statement of Rep. Vance); Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3252 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Blair); id. at 819 (Jan. 5, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Norwood); id. at 242 (1872) (statement of Sen. Hill on Dec. 20, 1871).
For a thorough analysis of the constitutional debates during this period on the issue of
miscegenation, see Steven A. Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of
Symmetry: The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. Chi. Sch.
Roundtable 303 (1995).
341 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 372 (May 4, 1872).
342 Rep. John Atkins commented that "[a]ll statesmen of all parties-indeed, the public
sentiment of the colored people themselves-approve of the ordinance and statutes, now
common in many of the States, which forbids intermarriage of the races." 2 Cong. Rec. 453
(Jan. 7, 1874). See Foner, supra note 21, at 321.
343 Remarkably, at least two state supreme courts struck down state anti-miscegenation
laws as conflicting either with the Fourteenth Amendment or with the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Bums v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872), limited by Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150 (1875),
overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877); Hart v. Hoss & Elder, 26 La. Ann. 90
(1874); Glasrud, supra note 171, at 53 (reporting that "in 1877 the courts voided the [Texas]
prohibition as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of
1875"). In addition, the legislatures of six states eliminated their anti-miscegenation laws
in the 1870s or 1880s. See Bank, supra note 340, at 343-44; Virginia Dominguez, White by
Definition: Social Classification in Creole Louisiana 26 (1986).
344 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 456 (Jan. 7, 1874) (statement of Rep. Butler); id. at 382 (Jan. 5,
1874) (statement of Rep. Ransier); see also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3253 (May 9,
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pecially bitter. Typical was the comment of Representative Ran-
sier of South Carolina:
These negro-haters would not open school-houses, hotels, places of
amusement, common conveyances, or the witness or the jury box
to the colored people upon equal terms with themselves, because
this contact of the races would, forsooth, "result injuriously to
both." Yet they have found agreeable associations with them under
other circumstances which at once suggest themselves to us; nor
has the result of this contact proved injurious to either race so far
as I know, except that the moral responsibility rests upon the more
refined and cultivated." 5
Butler, noting that "the highest exhibition of social equality is com-
munication between the sexes," remarked that he was "inclined to
think that the only equality the blacks ever have in the South is
social equality. ''346
But when forced to take a position, proponents defended the
proposition that the law should make no distinction on the basis of
race in marriage. Sumner himself responded to one Democratic
diatribe about miscegenation as follows: "I desire that every word
in the laws of this land shall be brought in harmony with the Con-
stitution of the United States; and if in any way the legislation,
which the Senator now calls attention to, is repealed or annulled,
so much the better." 47 Similar statements were made by Senators
Harlan348 and Pomeroy.349 These particular comments may be dis-
missed on the ground that the speakers were Radicals and not rep-
resentative of the Republican mainstream, 350 but it is harder to
dismiss the fact that other supporters of the bill refrained from
1872) (statement of Sen. Wilson) ("[U]nder freedom there is not a tenth part of the
improper associations between the races that existed before the war.").
345 2 Cong. Rec. 382 (Jan. 5, 1874). In a similar vein, see 3 Cong. Rec. app. 108 (Feb. 27,
1875) (statement of Rep. Lewis Carpenter); id. at 957 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep.
Cain).
346 3 Cong. Rec. 1006 (Feb. 4, 1875).
347 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 872 (Feb. 7, 1872).
34 Id. at 878 (Feb. 7, 1872).
349 Id. at 821 (Feb. 5, 1872) ("[W]e shall not now argue for a law to restrain men from
associating together whom God hath made of one blood.... [I]f any one in Georgia is
suffering from a law of that kind it ought to be repealed.")
350 See Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The
Original Intent, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1224, 1253-54 (1966).
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defending anti-miscegenation laws despite what must have been
substantial political pressure to do So.351
In making these arguments, the Democrats frequently conflated
the question of whether miscegenation should be permitted with
the inflammatory proposition that the Republicans would make
miscegenation mandatory. Representative James Beck of Ken-
tucky asserted that some supporters of the bill would want to
"arrest, imprison, and fine a young woman in any State of the
South if she were to refuse to marry a negro man on account of
color, race, or previous condition of servitude, in the event of his
making her a proposal of marriage, and her refusing on that
ground. '352 Representative William Crutchfield of Tennessee sar-
castically proposed an amendment to the bill that would make it a
crime for a white woman to refuse the marriage proposal of a black
man on account of race. 3  This paralleled claims that the desegre-
gation bill would outlaw discrimination in private homes or private
relationships. The "next step," according to William Read of Ken-
tucky, "will be that they [blacks] will demand a law allowing them,
without restraint, to visit the parlors and drawing-rooms of the
whites, and have free and unrestrained social intercourse with your
unmarried sons and daughters. '354
This hyperbole exposed the basic contradiction in the Demo-
crats' position with regard to state interference in the private
sphere. If it were true, as the opponents of the bill maintained,
that individuals should be free to choose whether and on what
terms to mingle with persons of the other race, then it should have
followed that anti-miscegenation laws, which interfere with that
freedom, are illegitimate. At the time of these debates, this contra-
diction did not extend to the issue of segregation in common carri-
351 This is in contrast to the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, during which
several Republican supporters of the bill disavowed any intention to prohibit anti-
miscegenation laws, and relied on the symmetrical equality argument in explanation of
their position. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505 (Jan. 30, 1866) (statement
of Sen. Fessenden); id. at 322 (Jan. 19, 1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
352 2 Cong. Rec. 343 (1874) (statement of Rep. Beck on Dec. 19, 1873).
353 Id. at 452 (Jan. 7, 1874).
354 Id. at app. 343 (May 29, 1874). See also id. at 4171 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen.
Sargent) ("I doubt if the office of the fourteenth amendment is to provide that I should
receive any man into my house; that my liberties shall be encroached upon for the benefit
of any man, be he white or black.").
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ers, because no state then required segregation. But by the time of
Plessy, after the passage of Jim Crow laws, the Democrats' position
that "social fights" could not be the subject of legislation was-or
should have been-a serious embarrassment.
The defense of the bill relied heavily on the distinction between
the private and civil spheres. Locating the issue of "social equal-
ity" in the private sphere, supporters could deny that there was any
"question of social equality in this bill. '3 -55 They distinguished
between spheres of life, such as one's own home or friendships, in
which each person has the unquestioned fight to decide with whom
he will associate, and public facilities, in which the individual has
no option but to accept the company of others not of his own
choosing. Senator Sumner stated that each person "is always free
to choose who shall be his friend, his associate, his guest," but
when he "walks the streets.., he is subject to the prevailing law of
Equality. ' 356 Senator Pratt stated that "[t]he negro does not seek
nor does this bill give him any of your peculiar social rights and
privileges. You may still select your own society and invite whom
you will to your table." But, he went on, "if you will travel in a
public conveyance, you must be content to share your convenience
with the Indian, negro, Turk, Italian, Swede, Norwegian, or any
other foreigner who avails himself of the same facility, because it is
public, and should therefore be open to all." He noted that "if you
choose to sit down at a public table in a public inn open to all
comers who behave themselves, you must be content to sit beside
or opposite to somebody whose skin or language, manners or reli-
gion, may shock your sensibilities." You do not have to "talk to
him or even look at him, much less make his acquaintance. ' 357 He
asserted that, within the public sphere everyone must accept the
355 2 Cong. Rec. at 427 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stowell); accord 3 Cong. Rec.
979 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. E.R. Hoar); id. at 940 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of
Rep. Butler); id. at 944 (statement of Rep. Lynch); id. at 960 (statement of Rep. Rainey); 2
Cong. Rec. 3451 (Apr. 29, 1874) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at 382 (Jan. 5, 1874)
(statement of Rep. Ransier); id. at 344 (1874) (statement of Rep. Rainey on Dec. 19, 1873);
Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4321 (June 7, 1872) (statement of Sen. Poland); id. at 382
(Jan. 5, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
356 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382 (Jan. 15, 1872).
357 2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (May 20, 1874)
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equal right of negroes, to avail themselves of the same facilities.358
As Senator Nye pointed out, "If I am placed at a table in inconve-
nient juxtaposition to a man I do not like, it is not my work to get
him out, but to get out myself." 35 9
Representative Chester Darrall of Louisiana invoked the impec-
cable authority of former Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard,
commander during the assault on Fort Sumter. He quoted Beaure-
gard as saying:
It would not be denied that in traveling and at places of public
resort we often share these privileges in common with thieves,
prostitutes, gamblers, and others who have worse sins to answer
for than the accident of color; but no one ever supposed that we
thereby assented to the social equality of these people with our-
selves. I therefore say that participation in these public privileges
involves no question of social equality.36 °
John Lynch, a black congressman from Mississippi, made a similar
point:
[I]f by conferring upon colored people the same rights and privi-
leges that are now exercised and enjoyed by whites indiscrimi-
nately will result in bringing about social equality between the
races, then the same process of reasoning must necessarily bring us
to the conclusion that there are no social distinctions among
whites, because all white persons, regardless of their social stand-
ing, are permitted to enjoy these rights.36'
Thus, under the proponents' analysis, a prohibition of segrega-
tion within the covered institutions was an issue of civil, not social,
rights. The responsibilities of these institutions to serve all mem-
bers of the public without unreasonable discrimination were gov-
erned by law. The individual's social rights included his own choice
of associates, but did not include a right to expect that other per-
sons whom he found undesirable (whether on the grounds of race
or otherwise) would be denied access to common carriers or public
accommodations, or shuffled off into separate facilities. The effect
of the Fourteenth Amendment was not to alter the boundary
358 See id. For a similar analysis, see 3 Cong. Rec. 940 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep.
Butler).
359 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 706 (Jan. 30, 1872).
360 2 Cong. Rec. app. 479 (June 16, 1874).
361 3 Cong. Rec. 944 (Feb. 3, 1875).
[Vol. 81:9471022
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions
between civil and social rights, but to make race an unreasonable
basis for discrimination within the civil sphere.
2. Education Is Not a Civil Right Protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment
The opponents' second principal constitutional argument was
that schools are not within the coverage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. From a modem perspective, this may seem a peculiar, even
preposterous, point. Public schools are an arm of the state; all state
action is covered by the Fourteenth Amendment. But from the
perspective of the Reconstruction era, the issue was far more com-
plicated, and there is a plausible argument that the public schools
as they existed at that time, especially in the South, were not cov-
ered. As discussed above, under the theory of "limited absolute
equality ' 362 that prevailed at the time, the Amendment did not
require equality with respect to everything, but only with respect to
civil rights, the "privileges or immunities of citizens." To the con-
stitutional lawyers of the Reconstruction Congress, the key ques-
tion was whether public education was a civil right.
a. The Concept of "Civil Rights"
The most important member of the forces opposing Sumner's
civil rights bill in the early years was Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois. 363 Trumbull, a highly respected constitutional lawyer and
former state supreme court justice, had begun his career as a Free
Soil Democrat but had shifted parties to become one of the leading
Republicans in the Senate during the Lincoln administration. As
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, he had introduced the reso-
lution that became the basis for the Thirteenth Amendment, sup-
ported the Freedmen's Bureau, and been the principal author of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. By 1872, however, he was shifting
back to the Democratic fold: he supported Greeley in 1872, was
counsel to Tilden in 1876-77, and ran for governor of Illinois as a
Democrat in 1880. Trumbull's opposition to Sumner's bill was
instrumental in'preventing its consideration for almost two years,
362 See Maltz, supra note 13, at 68; supra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
363 For background on Trumbull's life, see 19 Dictionary of American Biography 19-20
(Dumas Malone, ed., 1936); Horace White, The Life of Lyman Trumbull (1913).
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from 1870 until late in 1871. Trumbull was joined in his opposition
by two other prominent Republicans, Lot Morrill of Maine364 and
Orris Ferry of Connecticut, whose arguments were similar to
Trumbull's.
Trumbull based his argument against the bill on the widely
accepted taxonomy of rights as civil, political, and social. It was
generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to "civil rights." Political
and social rights, it was agreed, were not civil rights and were not
protected.365 (The issue was complicated by the adoption of the
Fifteenth Amendment, which forbade racial discrimination with
respect to the quintessential political right, the right to vote, mak-
ing the lack of protection for lesser political rights anomalous.)
This taxonomy of rights is rooted in the relationship of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. The most funda-
mental conception of the Fourteenth Amendment was that it
would extend to the citizens of each state, without regard to race or
color, the same legal rights (privileges and immunities) that would
have been available to citizens of other states under Article IV.366
This included such civil rights as the right to contract, own prop-
erty, and sue, but not political rights such as the right to vote, hold
office, or serve on a jury. This explains why Section 2 of the Four-
teenth Amendment presupposes the rights of states to restrict the
364 This Morrill should not be confused with his cousin, Justin Morrill of Vermont. The
latter Morrill voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 39th Congress and
consistently supported Sumner's bill.
365 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) (civil rights legislation should be "confined exclusively to civil rights and nothing
else, no political and no social rights"). On the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not extend to social rights, see Mark Thshnet, Civil Rights and Social
Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1207 (1992);
supra notes 323-39 and accompanying text. On the proposition that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not protect political rights, see, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. 314 (May 22, 1874)
(statement of Sen. Merrimon); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 843 (Feb. 6, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Carpenter); id. at 844 (statement of Sen. Sherman). Thus, Senator
Carpenter opposed the jury provisions of Sumner's bill on the ground that jury service was
a political right. Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 827-28 (1872).
366 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 436 (Jan. 17, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Frelinghuysen). For a concise statement of my understanding of this relationship, see
Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth Amendment: A Second American Revolution or
the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1159, 1160-61 (1992).
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franchise, and why the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
were necessary to extend the right to vote to blacks and to women,
respectively.
This categorization of rights plays no part in current interpreta-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The distinction between civil
and political rights has been utterly obliterated. Rights of political
participation are now routinely litigated under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, and the right to vote is commonly said to be the most
"fundamental" of our civil rights, because it is "preservative of all
rights. '3 67 The problem of "social rights" is handled under current
law through a combination of the state action doctrine368 and asser-
tions of countervailing individual rights, especially privacy and
freedom of association.369 Nonetheless, this tripartite division of
rights forms the essential framework for interpreting the Amend-
ment as it was originally understood.
Trumbull based his opposition to the Sumner bill on the ground
that education was not a civil right. This became clear during collo-
quies with Senator Edmunds of Vermont and Senator Morton of
Indiana:
Mr. EDMUNDS. How about the right to go to a public school?
Mr. TRUMBULL. The right to go to school is not a civil right and
never was.
Mr. EDMUNDS. What kind of a right is it?
Mr. TRUMBULL. It is not a right.
Mr. EDMUNDS. What is it?
Mr. TRUMBULL. It is a privilege that you may have to go to
school.
Mr. MORTON. I ask the Senator if the right to go to school is not
a civil right, what kind of a right is it, or is it any right at all?
Mr. TRUMBULL. It is not any right at all. It is a matter to be
regulated by the localities.370
367 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964). For a theoretical exposition, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 116-25
(1980).
368 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
369 See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
370 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3189-90 (May 8, 1872).
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The logical implication of Trumbull's position was that the federal
government lacked any authority under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to interfere in state administration of public schools. Lot
Morrill made this explicit: "in reference to all rights with regard to
the matters of education, worship, amusement, recreation, enter-
tainment, all of which enter so essentially into the private life of the
people,.. they all belong exclusively to the State, of which the
Government of the United States has no right to take cogni-
zance." 71 Ferry argued that public schools are necessarily crea-
tures of local communities, which cannot be regulated or
controlled by federal legislation.3 7 These views were echoed by
many Democrats3 73 and were reinforced by the Slaughter-House
decision.3 74 As stated by Representative Durham of Kentucky,
"We have no more right to say that a particular class of individuals
shall have access to our public schools.., than we have to say that
a particular class of individuals shall have access to private schools.
These are matters purely of local legislation or of private
contract. '37
5
But what did Trumbull and his allies mean by the statement that
education is not a "civil" right? Neither he nor any other opponent
of the Sumner bill defined precisely what they meant by the
term.376 In the space of a single column of the Congressional
Globe, Trumbull defined civil rights variously as "rights pertaining
to the citizen as such," as "general rights that belong to mankind
everywhere," and as "a common law right. '377 Indeed, the debate
is all the more difficult to decipher because the various participants
seemed unaware that the term was being used in different ways.
There was no pretense of precision. We must therefore reconstruct
371 Id. at app. 5 (Jan. 25, 1872).
372 Id. at 3257 (May 9, 1872).
373 E.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 453 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Atkins); id. at 376 (Jan. 5,
1874) (statement of Rep. Harris); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 42-43 (Feb. 8,
1872) (statement of Sen. Vickers); see also 2 Cong. Rec. 419 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of
Rep. Herndon); id. at 405 (statement of Rep. Durham); id. at 385 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement
of Rep. Mills).
374 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
375 2 Cong. Rec. 405 (Jan. 6, 1874).
376 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (May 8, 1872).
377 See Id.
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this constitutional theory on the basis of mostly casual and some-
times incoherent statements.
It is useful to begin with the areas of agreement and move
toward the areas of controversy. At a minimum, we may be confi-
dent that the category of civil rights comprised the rights protected
by the Civil Rights Act of 1866: the rights to make and enforce
contracts; to buy, lease, inherit, hold and convey property; to sue
and be sued and to give evidence in court; to legal protections for
the security of person and property; and to equal treatment under
the criminal law.378 These were roughly the same rights that were
protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, which applied to citizens of other states.3 79 Some opponents,
including Trumbull, appeared to believe that the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 comprised an exhaustive list of the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens. As Trumbull explained:
In regard to the rights that belong to the individual as man and as a
freeman under the Constitution of the United States, I think we
had a right to pass the civil rights bill. I thought so then, and think
so now; but I think that we went to the verge of constitutional
authority, went as far as we could go.380
This was not, however, a logically satisfying position. There is
every reason to believe that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 encom-
passed the principal civil rights directly contemplated by the fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but much less reason to assume
that it exhausted those rights. Indeed, leading cases interpreting
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV made clear that
this list of rights was not exclusive. In Corfield v. Coryell, the lead-
378 Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
379 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); Douglass v.
Stephens, 1 Del Ch. 465 (1821); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 565 (Md. 1797);
Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91-92 (1827); State v. Medbury, 3 R.I. 138 (1855).
See generally Theodore Ullyot, The Understanding of the Phrase "Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens" in Antebellum Jurisprudence: Interpretive Essay (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (arguing that in antebellum
jurisprudence, "Privileges and Immunities of citizens" was clearly understood to
encompass purely personal rights only).
380 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 901 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see
id. at 3189 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull); see also 2 Cong. Rec. app. 1-3 (Jan.
4, 1874) (statement of Rep. Southard, maintaining that no protection of the rights of
colored people beyond the 1866 Act was required); Berger, supra note 13, at 22-36
(asserting that "fundamental rights" already received full protection).
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ing pre-War precedent interpreting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the court listed rights similar to those in the 1866 Act, and
then stated "[t]hese, and many others which might be mentioned,
are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities."' 38' Thus, Lot
Morrill was forced to define "privileges and immunities" as mean-
ing "those common privileges which one community accords to
another in civilized life." 382 The question becomes: how do we
determine what those privileges are?
At the heart of the question is a conceptual uncertainty, running
throughout the debates, over whether civil rights are those pro-
tected in the actual positive law of the states, or whether the cate-
gory refers to a set of rights inherent in a free society and therefore
beyond the reach of hostile legislation. The most common resolu-
tion of this ambiguity was probably a merger of these conceptions:
privileges and immunities were established by the positive law of
the state, but only those rights deemed "fundamental" were a privi-
lege or immunity of citizenship.38 3 What rights are "fundamental"?
The three most common criteria seemed to be that such rights were
uniform, not varying from state to state; that they were a perma-
nent and stable part of the American legal legacy, not subject to
the vicissitudes of legislative policy; and that they were legally
enforceable as a matter of right, as opposed to being privileges
allocated among the citizens by government officials at their discre-
tion.3 4 The leading exemplars were common law rights. That is
why the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which included the most basic
common law rights, defined the uncontroversial core of "civil
rights."
381 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52, No. 3230 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (emphasis added). Moreover, at
the time when Congress went to the verge of its constitutional authority (1866), the
Fourteenth Amendment had not been passed. Implicitly, Trumbull's position is that the
Fourteenth Amendment added nothing.
382 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 4 (Jan. 25, 1872).
383 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
384 See 2 Cong. Rec. 384-385 (Jan. 5,1874) (statement of Rep. Mills) (arguing that rights
under state law could not be privileges or immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment
because they are not "fixed and absolute," nor "uniform," but "changeable" and subject to
the "discretion of the state").
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Sumner stated that "all institutions created or regulated by
law"3 8 are within the civil sphere, but this should not be taken
literally. As Thurman asked rhetorically:
What is there, within the province of government, that is not regu-
lated by law? The Senator is regulated by law; I am regulated by
law; every man of us is regulated by law.... [D]oes that prove that
you have the right to interfere and say, "Under the pretense of
regulation we will deprive you of your liberty?" 386
Elsewhere, Sumner explained that he referred to businesses given
monopoly advantages or other "peculiar privileges and preroga-
tives" and that were subject to "peculiar responsibilities ... regu-
lated by law."3'87 This included entities having common carrier or
public accommodation responsibilities, but did not extend to such
private entities as ordinary businesses or corporations, even though
corporations are "created or regulated by law" in a certain sense.
The distinction corresponds roughly to the notion of businesses
deemed to be "affected with a public interest," which were subject
to economic regulation under the jurisprudence of the day.388
b. Access to Common Carriers and Public Accommodations
Trumbull, Ferry, Lot Morrill, and their Democratic allies
opposed the entire civil rights bill, but opposed the common carrier
and public accommodations provisions on different grounds than
the public schools provision. As to the former, opponents offered
two different arguments. Some, including Trumbull and Ferry, did
not deny that these provisions involved civil rights, but maintained
that the rights were already adequately protected under common
law. Ferry denied that there was any evidence that "colored peo-
ple any more than white people are by law or by custom denied the
accommodations furnished by innkeepers or common carriers. '389
Even if there were occasional cases of exclusion, whether of black
or of white, "in both instances the law as it now stands affords to
358 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382 (Jan. 15, 1872).
386 Id. at app. 29 (Feb. 6, 1872).
387 Id.
388 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1876). It is no coincidence that Munn, decided
in 1876, shares the world view of the Congress of 1871-75.
389 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3257 (May 9, 1872).
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each identically the same remedy."' 390 Similarly, Trumbull main-
tained that "the colored man has just the same right of action
against a railroad company or a hotel-keeper that a white man has
for a refusal to receive or entertain him or to transport him on the
cars. The rights are the same to all." 391 Opponents conceded that
federal legislation would be warranted if states were to enact stat-
utes discriminating on the basis of race.39
In the most systematic statement of this position, Thurman rea-
soned that even if common law rights, such as the equal benefit of
common carriage, were privileges and immunities of citizens, the
Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, applies only when a state
"makes or enforces" a "law" that abridges those rights. The civil
rights bill was therefore unconstitutional because it would provide
federal jurisdiction and a federal remedy to any person denied
access to hotels, railroads, and other covered facilities, whether or
not the state in which the act occurred provided an adequate rem-
edy for the violation. 393 Thurman used the example of Louisiana, a
state with a strong antidiscrimination law:
This bill says to a Louisianian, "Although your State has made a
law that negro men shall have equal privileges in theaters,
churches, and places of public resort with the white men in your
State; although you punish any one who shall deprive them of that
privilege or immunity, or refuse it to them; although your State has
made no law to deprive them of any such privilege or immunity;
although your courts enforce no law to deprive them of such privi-
leges and immunities; although just the contrary is the truth;... yet
we step in and take from your State courts the jurisdiction over this
subject and take it all into the Federal courts ....
... And yet it is said that this bill is constitutional under an
amendment to the Constitution which only gives you authority to
act where the State has made or enforced a law that deprived a
390 Id.; see also id. at 892-94 (Feb. 8, 1872) (argument by Sen. Ferry that blacks and
whites enjoy equal remedies under the laws of the states).
391 Id. at 3190 (May 8, 1872); accord 2 Cong. Rec. 429 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Buckner); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull).
392 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 454 (Jan. 7, 1874) (statement of Rep. Atkins).
393 2 Cong. Rec. 4085 (May 20, 1874); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (Jan. 22,
1872). Less sophisticated versions of this argument were offered by Rep. Atkins, 2 Cong.
Rec. 454 (Feb. 9, 1874), and Sen. Tipton, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 914 (Jan. 7,
1872).
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citizen of his privileges or immunities, which gives you no right to
act unless the State has made or enforced such a law as that!394
This argument anticipated the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Civil Rights Cases,395 which struck down the Act. Although often
read as holding that Congress has no power to regulate private
entities under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the opin-
ion actually held the legislation was defective because it was over-
broad in that it "applie[d] equally to cases arising in States which
have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and
whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those
which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the
amendment. ' 396 The problem was not the absence of "state
action" but the absence of state dereliction.
A more restrictive version of the argument was made by Senator
Gordon of Georgia. To Gordon, federal intervention could not be
based on the mere failure of the state to protect Fourteenth
Amendment rights; rather, there had to be an actual statute that
"den[ies] to one class of citizens rights which are guaranteed by the
Constitution to any other class of citizens. ' 397 If the state passed
such a law, Gordon was willing to
admit that under the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment
Congress may proceed by appropriate legislation to protect that
class of citizens so denied against such discrimination. Until that
law is passed, however-until by statute a State denies some rights
which belongs to all citizens of the United States as citizens...-
until this is done, I maintain that Congress has no power under the
fourteenth amendment to interfere.398
Similar arguments had been made regarding the power of Congress
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment: unless a state denied or
394 Cong. Globe, 42d ong., 2d Sess. 496 (Jan. 22, 1872); accord 2 Cong. Rec. 411 (Jan. 6,
1874) (statement of Rep. Blount).
395 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For discussion of the Civil Rights Cases, see infra notes 711-24 and
accompanying text.
396 109 U.S. at 14.
397 3 Cong. Rec. 1864 (Feb. 27, 1875).
393 Id.
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abridged voting rights, there would be no ground for federal
intervention.3 99
Others, including Lot Morrill, challenged the inclusion of inns,
theaters, and places of public amusement in the bill on the quite
different ground that these institutions are not subject to special
regulation and are indistinguishable from other private busi-
nesses.40 Representative William Phelps noted that "[w]e no
longer give to inn-keepers especial privileges-any monopoly in
the business; we cannot therefore burden their business with any
restrictions. ' 40 1 Senator Boreman stated that "cemetery compa-
nies owned by private stockholders... control their own property
as any private individual does.140 2  In Thurman's hands, this
became a broad argument for libertarian principle:
I say that it is in the interest of liberty that if any number of per-
sons in the land shall see fit to establish a theater or a place of
public amusement for a particular class, they shall have the right to
do it, and you abridge and restrain their liberty if you take from
them that right.40 3
Proponents countered that the bill covered only institutions whose
service obligations already were regulated by the common law.4°
Sumner declared to Thurman:
The Senator knows well that a hotel is a legal institution; I use the
term advisedly, and the Senator is too good a lawyer not to know
it. A railroad corporation is also a legal institution. So is a theater,
399 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3667 (May 20, 1870) (statement of Sen. Davis); id.
at 3608 (May 19, 1870) (statement of Sen. Schurz); id. at 3481 (May 16, 1870) (statement of
Sen. Vickers).
400 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 4 (Jan. 25, 1872) (statement of Sen. Morrill).
401 3 Cong. Rec. 1002 (Feb. 4, 1875); accord 2 Cong. Rec. app. 363 (May 22, 1874)
(statement of Sen. Hamilton); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 217 (Apr. 13, 1872)
(statement of Rep. McHenry); id. at app. 28 (Feb. 6, 1872) (statement of Sen. Thurman).
402 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (May 9, 1872).
43 Id. at app. 27 (Feb. 6, 1827). To similar effect, see 3 Cong. Rec. app. 156-57 (Feb. 3,
1875) (statement of Rep. Smith); 2 Cong. Rec. 4174-75 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen.
Sargent).
404 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Lawrence); id. at 340 (1874)
(statement of Rep. Butler on Dec. 19, 1873); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1872)
(statement of Sen. Sumner on Dec. 21, 1871).
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and all that my bill proposes is that those who enjoy the benefits of
law shall treat those who come to them with equality.4"5
Their point was not that the common law courts of the various
states had actually recognized the right of black Americans to ser-
vice without distinction of race. In fact, the common law courts
were divided on that question.406 Rather, the proponents' argu-
ment was that once the law had intervened to guarantee white citi-
zens the legally enforceable right of access to common carriers and
public accommodations without arbitrary or unreasonable distinc-
tions, 40 7 the principle of the Fourteenth Amendment required that
the same right be extended to black citizens.40 8 By virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment, states no longer had the authority to treat
race as a reasonable ground for separation or exclusion. Such dis-
tinctions, they said, were no proper part of the police power. Rep-
resentative Elliott put the point this way:
[I]s it pretended anywhere that the evils of which we complain...
are an exercise of the police power of the State? Is such oppres-
sion and injustice nothing but the exercise by the State of the right
to make regulations for the health, comfort; and security of all her
citizens? ... Are the colored race to be assimilated to an unwhole-
some trade or to combustible materials, to be interdicted, to be
shut up within prescribed limits? 4 9
Proponents of the bill also denied that Congress had to wait for
the states to enact discriminatory laws before it was able to inter-
405 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner on Dec. 21,
1871); accord 2 Cong. Rec. app. 305 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Alcorn); id. at 427
(Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stowell).
406 Compare West Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867) (allowing
separation) with Coger v. North W. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145 (1873) (requiring
desegregation). For a full discussion, see supra notes 155-77 and accompanying text.
407 See, e.g., Brown v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 5 F. 499, 500 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880)
(awarding $3000 in damages to a woman who was excluded from the ladies' car ostensibly
because of her reputation as "a notorious and public courtesan").
408 Charles Lofgren infers from the repeated statements that the bill would create no
new rights but only new remedies that the supporters may have intended to leave in place
common law rulings permitting segregated facilities. See Lofgren, supra note 9, at 137. But
this misconceives the way in which the common law was understood and employed by the
bill's supporters. The common law to which supporters referred was the common law
protection of white citizens from unreasonable discrimination-which they maintained was
extended by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to black citizens as well.
409 2 Cong. Rec. 408 (Jan. 6, 1874).
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vene. The Equal Protection Clause deals with "sins of omission as
well as commission," in the words of Representative Lawrence.410
"[I]f a State omits or neglects to secure the enforcement of equal
rights," he said, "it 'denies' the equal protection of the laws within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. ' 411 Federal remedies
were needed, proponents maintained, because state remedies were
so frequently inadequate-whether because they were too expen-
sive,412 because state processes of enforcement were infected with
racial prejudice,413 because common law rights and remedies were
not specific enough,414 or because they had been abrogated by law
or custom in the case of black citizens.415 Even if there were no
"positive statutes" abrogating common law rights, federal interven-
tion was deemed justified if state remedies were not effective.41 6
There was much discussion of whether federal intervention was
necessary, with many Southerners taking the position that blacks
already enjoyed equal rights in common carriers and public accom-
modations. Representative Lucius Q.C. Lamar, the very model of
postwar Southern gentility, stated that "throughout the length and
breadth of the southern section there does not exist in law ofne single
410 Id. at 412, 414.
411 Id. at 414. Contrary to some commentators (see Heyman, supra note 250, at 509),
this does not mean that the Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989), was inconsistent with the original understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's holding that the failure of the government to
protect Joshua DeShaney from his brutal father did not support an action for damages was
confined to the Due Process Clause. The Court explicitly noted that "[t]he State may not,
of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without
violating the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 197 n.3. The point is that the right to
"protection" is an equality right. Not all denials of protection are unconstitutional, just
those linked to invidious discrimination. Joshua DeShaney made no allegation of
discrimination.
412 2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Pratt).
413 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192 (Jan. 15, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman);
id. at 383 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
414 Representative Rainey stated:
[S]o far as the common law is concerned, although I am not a lawyer, I am aware,
however, that it contains remedial provisions; but they are so general in their
character as frequently to lose specific application and force unless wrought into
statutory enactment. Hence the necessity for this bill, which sets forth specifically
the offenses and the means of redress.
3 Cong. Rec. 959 (Feb. 3, 1875).
415 3 Cong. Rec. 940 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lawrence); Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3192 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
416 2 Cong. Rec. 416 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Walls).
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trace of privilege or of discrimination against the black race. If
there is," he said, "I know nothing of it." '417 A white representative
from Virginia maintained that he had seen black men and women
riding in railway cars with white passengers, without hindrance, "a
dozen of times," 418 yet Joseph Rainey of South Carolina, the first
black man to be elected to the House of Representatives, reported
his own experience of being excluded from streetcars in Richmond
other than those designated for colored passengers.41 9 John Lynch
of Mississippi reported that while traveling through the "God-for-
saken States of Kentucky and Tennessee" on his way to Washing-
ton he was "treated, not as an American citizen, but as a brute"-
forced to occupy a "filthy smoking-car" with "drunkards, gamblers,
and criminals." 420 Much was made of the inability of Frederick
Douglass-whose ability and character commanded great respect
across the spectrum-to dine with his fellow commissioners on a
Potomac riverboat during an official trip.4 21 Legal theory and
actual practice often diverged, as this exchange between Lamar
and two Republicans illustrates:
Mr. HALE, of New York. Now, let me ask the gentleman whether
under the laws of the State of Mississippi it is possible for a colored
man to travel over the railroads or in any other public conveyances
in that State with the same facilities and the same conveniences
that a white man may travel?
Mr. LAMAR. I answer my friend from New York with all the
emphasis that I can give, that they do travel precisely with the
same facilities and with the same conveniences, and a great many
more, as there are more of them, than the white people of
Mississippi.
Mr. McKEE. Let me say that my colleague is correct. In Missis-
sippi, under the laws and under the constitution-republican laws
and republican constitution-the colored man has the same rights
that a white man has. My colleague is legally correct, but practi-
417 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (Feb. 4, 1875).
418 Id. at 955 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Whitehead).
419 Id. at 955, 957.
420 Id. at 945.
421 Id. at 979 (Feb. 4, 1875) (colloquy between Reps. Rainey and Sener).
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cally my colleague is mistaken. I refer to the treatment of colored
people on steamboats, in hotels, theaters, &c. 42
c. Access to Common Schools
Neither of the opposition's arguments regarding common carri-
ers and public accommodations could be applied to public schools.
Even opponents of the civil rights bill recognized they could not
argue that the right to nondiscrimination in education was already
adequately protected under the common law of the states;423 nor,
of course, could they argue that public schools were merely private
businesses. Instead, they based their arguments about schools on
the theory that civil rights were "fundamental rights"-a category
distinct from the positive law as it exists in any particular state-
and that education was not such a right.
One major strand of the argument was that public schooling can-
not be deemed a fundamental right because it is subject to the
vagaries of state law. Trumbull explained that the right to go to
school "is not any right at all" because it "depends upon what the
law of the locality is."'424 The people are entitled only to what they
are given by statute. By contrast, he explained:
The term civil rights, as I understand it, applies to the rights per-
taining to the citizen as such. There may be no schools at all in the
State of Indiana or the District of Columbia; and would there then
be any right appertaining to the individual as a citizen to go to
school?425
Similarly, Representative Roger Mills posed the question: "Are
these fundamental rights? Are they uniform everywhere? '426 Spe-
cifically with reference to schools, he asked, "Is the right one thing
in one State, another in another, and still different in a third? If
such are the privileges and immunities of citizenship, no man can
tell what they are." 427 The implicit comparison to common law
422 Id. at 980.
423 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 894 (Feb. 8, 1872) (argument by Sen. Kelly that
remedies are available for many instances of discrimination, but "in the matter of schools it
may be different").
424 Id. at 3190 (May 8, 1872).
425 Id. at 3191.
426 2 Cong. Rec. 385 (Jan. 5, 1874).
427 Id.
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rights reflects the nineteenth-century view that common law rights
transcend state boundaries-that they either are inherent in the
nature of things or are a product of general customs and under-
standings of the people, rather than being subject to the vicissi-
tudes of the positive law of the states.428
Other opponents relied on the fact that the right to attend public
school was largely subject to the "regulation" and discretion of
school authorities. Thus, Senator Eugene Casserly pointed to the
various distinctions school officials draw among their pupils, based
on sex, age, and educational level as well as race, and concluded
that "[n]o white parent has a right to claim for his child that he
shall be educated in a particular school-house to the exclusion of
all others." 429 Trumbull argued
that the right to go to school is not a civil right, and that the schools
are regulated all over the land, and must be, for the advancement
of education. We have graded schools. Boys of one class are kept
in one room; of another class in another; the girls are confined to
one room and the boys to another; but this is not a denial of civil
rights to either.430
In sum, Trumbull viewed education as a "right growing out of a
privilege created by legislation."4 31 A similar argument was made
about jury service. Senator Morton, a strong proponent of the bill,
seemed to concede that it would have no application if the local
officials charged with selection of the jury failed to choose black
jurors, so long as the laws of the state made no racial distinction;432
again, the apparent theory was that a privilege so subject to official
discretion cannot possibly be a legally enforceable right.433
428 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938); see James C. Carter, The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law 51-52
(New York, Banks & Bros 1889); William C. Chase, The American Law School and the
Rise of Administrative Government 16 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of
American Law: 1870-1960, at 120 (1992).
429 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3261 (May 9, 1872).
430 Id. at 3190 (May 8, 1872).
431 Id. at 3191; see also id. (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (calling education "a privilege
that is conferred by a corporation").
432 See 3 Cong. Rec. 1864 (Feb. 27, 1875).
433 In light of this theory, Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), was more
problematic than it may appear to us today. In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court held that the
San Francisco board of supervisors had violated the Fourteenth Amendment when it
systematically denied licenses to operate wooden laundries to Chinese while granting them
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The application of this theory to the issue of school segregation
was perhaps most clearly elaborated by counsel for the school
authorities in the 1874 California school desegregation case:434
The Fourteenth Amendment, while it raises the negro to the sta-
tus of citizenship, confers upon the citizen no new privileges or
immunities. It forbids any State to abridge by legislation any of
those privileges or immunities secured to any citizen by the second
section of the fourth article of the Federal Constitution. They are
those great fundamental rights which belong to the citizens of
every free and enlightened country, and are so defined in the deci-
sions of all the Courts.
The right of admission to our public schools is not one of those
privileges and immunities. They were unknown, as they now exist,
at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution; that instru-
ment is silent upon the subject of education, and our public schools
are wholly the creation of our own State Constitution and State
laws.
The whole system is a beneficent State institution-a grand
State charity-and surely those who create the charity have the
undoubted right to nominate the beneficiaries of it.435
Other opponents of the bill drew a distinction between rights that
may be pursued at the individual's "own expense"-what we
would now call "negative rights"-and rights that require the
financial support of government.436 Although they did not explic-
itly draw the connection, this distinction has roots in the jurispru-
dence of privileges and immunities under Article IV: citizens of
other states are fully entitled to the rights and protections of state
law (such as tort and contract), but are not ordinarily entitled to
participate in the benefits of programs funded from state taxa-
to whites, notwithstanding that the decision to grant or deny licenses was within the
unfettered discretion of the board. See id. at 374. Doctrinally, the analysis was surely
affected by the decline of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as the principal focus of the
Amendment and the rise of due process jurisprudence, with its emphasis on the arbitrary
exercise of discretion. In an interesting sense, therefore, the too-narrow interpretation in
Slaughter-House, see supra notes 236-42 and accompanying text, paved the way for a more
expansive interpretation in Yick Wo.
434 Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
435 Id. at 40 (argument for defendant) (citation omitted).
436 E.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 42 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Vickers). See David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 864 (1986).
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tion.437 Senator Vickers, a proponent of this theory, was particu-
larly offended that black citizens would share in the school fund
when "[colored people] do not pay one fiftieth part of the taxes
necessary for the maintenance of your institutions of learning. '438
There was considerable force to the claim that public school sys-
tems in the South, which were the focus of attention in the debates,
were too informal and rudimentary to support the notion that
there was an established, legally enforceable right to attend public
school. No comprehensive public school systems existed at all in
the Southern states before the War, and progress after the War was
fitful. According to Senator William Stewart, as of 1874 several
states continued to lack "an efficient and adequate system of com-
mon schools whereby every child may be educated." 439 He thought
a constitutional amendment requiring the states to "have an effi-
cient system of common schools" would be more useful than a bill
mandating desegregation.440 Public schools in the Southern states
served only a fraction of the school-age population. As of 1872,
only half the children of Texas attended school; Mississippi, Flor-
ida, and South Carolina did not reach fifty percent participation
until 1875, after the Civil Rights Act was passed.441 Other states
lagged even farther behind. In Virginia, according to Representa-
tive William Stowell, the public schools remained open only five
months a year, and only fifteen percent of the black population
attended.442 Moreover, there continued to be significant resistance
to taxation for education. Senator Henry Cooper of Tennessee
elaborated on this point:
In many of our States in the South it has always been difficult to
maintain a system of common-school education at all. Many of our
people, long before the war as well as since, argued that the power
437 See Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 487, 491-92, 522-23 (1981).
438 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 42 (Feb. 8, 1872); accord 2 Cong. Rec. 405
(Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Durham).
439 2 Cong. Rec, 4167 (May 22, 1874).
440 Id.
441 See Foner, supra note 21, at 366.
442 2 Cong. Rec. 426 (Jan. 6, 1874). Similarly, in Alabama official reports (which were
probably exaggerated) showed that black school enrollment declined from 32% in 1870 to
24% in 1873. Bond, supra note 65, at 100.
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did not exist in the State to tax the property of the people of the
State for the education of the children." 3
Although a public school system was established in Arkansas in
1868, tax support was so meager that the new schools had closed by
1873 except where supported by private contributions.4'" In Ala-
bama, the large majority of funds appropriated for education were
diverted to other uses, and by 1872 the state Superintendent of
Public Instruction reported that the system was barely operative.445
Although much of the rhetoric by Southern politicians prophesying
the destruction of the public schools if desegregation were required
was undoubtedly bluster, it reflected a reality that the public school
systems of the South were fragile and insecure.
Moreover, the line between public free schools and privately
supported charity schools was blurred. "Public" schools relied
heavily on private contributions and support,446 and full tax sup-
port for Southern public education was not achieved until years
after passage of the Act.447 The most common form of education
in the South was the "academy"448-an independent, fee-charging
school that sometimes received grants of public land or money.
This type of school defies modern categories of "public" and "pri-
vate."449 The prevalence of academies meant that public funds
often went to schools that retained their legal right to selective
admission. None of this comported with the classical conception of
a "civil right."
Proponents of school desegregation legislation were not much
concerned by the argument that education was subject to the
vagaries of state political action. Their understanding of civil rights
443 2 Cong. Rec. 4155 (May 22, 1874); accord Bond, supra note 65, at 101.
444 Thomas S. Staples, Reconstruction in Arkansas: 1862-1874, at 315, 326 (1923).
445 See Bond, supra note 65, at 98-99.
446 Much of the financial support for education in the South, especially for black
children, came from private sources. See Foner, supra note 21, at 98-99. The George
Peabody Educational Fund was a particularly important source of educational funding
throughout the South. See Staples, supra note 444, at 321; Frank & Munro, supra note 9, at
466.
447 See Kaestle, supra note 79, at 117.
448 Id. at 193. By 1850, more academies were operating in the South than in either New
England or the Middle Atlantic region. Id.
449 Id. at 119; see also id. at 203 (discussing the distribution of state funds to private
academies in antebellum North Carolina). For a detailed description of antebellum
academies in Georgia, see Dorothy Orr, A History of Education in Georgia 19-49 (1950).
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was based not so much on the proposition that certain rights were
stable, uniform and fundamental as on the proposition that the
states must extend to their black citizens the "same rights that are
secured by law to white people."450 The measure of civil rights was
thus determined not by transjurisdictional criteria of fundamental-
ity, but by the rights accorded under positive law to the most
favored class of citizens. Senator Morton explained that the civil
rights bill "does not say that schools shall be kept at all, but it con-
templates this: that where there are free schools kept at public
expense,... in such cases there shall be an equal right to partici-
pate in the benefit of those schools created by common taxa-
tion."451 The states are not required to establish schools, agreed
Senator Edmunds, but may not discriminate if they choose to do
so:
[W]hen the law sets up a common school, which is the creature of
the law, there cannot be equality of protection and equality of right
when the law of the State... declares that a man of one color of
hair or of skin may send his children, and the man of another color
of hair may not send his. 452
To the argument that the right to an education was subject to
various regulations and limitations, the proponents responded that
the Constitution places only one restriction on the power of the
states to regulate education: that they may not discriminate on the
basis of race. Other forms of regulation were of no constitutional
concern. Senator Edmunds, for example, said that it had always
been "[p]erfectly consistent" with the understanding of "funda-
mental privileges" that the states could attach "certain qualifica-
tions" such as sex, age, learning, or experience. 453 The declarations
of the Constitution, he argued, "only say that these common rights
... shall not be invaded on the pretense that a man is of a particu-
450 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sherman)
(emphasis added); accord 3 Cong. Rec. 1793 (Feb. 26, 1875) (statement of Sen. Boutwell);
2 Cong. Rec. 426 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stowell) (arguing that black citizens are
entitled to "the same rights everywhere in our broad land" as those accorded to white
citizens).
451 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3191 (May 8, 1872).
452 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 26 (Feb. 6, 1872).
453 See 3 Cong. Rec. 1870 (Feb. 27, 1875).
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lar race or a particular religion.' '454 In a reference to the common
carrier and public accommodations provisions, but which was
equally applicable to the schools provision, Frelinghuysen noted
that the proprietor's "discretion as to the particular accommoda-
tion to be given to the guest, the traveler, and the visitor is quite
wide. ' 455 "But," he said, "the law demands that the accommoda-
tion shall be good and suitable, and this bill adds to that require-
ment the condition that no person shall, in the regulation of these
employments, be discriminated against merely because he is an
American or an Irishman, a German or a colored man."456
Finally, to the argument that civil rights do not include entitle-
ment to benefits funded by the state, proponents countered that
the tax-supported character of the schools is a strong additional
reason to insist upon equality of treatment within them. "[W]here
schools are maintained and supported by money collected by taxa-
tion upon everybody," Morton averred, "there is an equal right to
participate in those schools. ' 457 Indeed, he said, if school authori-
ties draw distinctions on the basis of color, "I say that is a fraud
upon those who pay the taxes." 458 "All contribute to the taxes for
[support of the schools]; all are benefited by the education given to
the rising generation; and therefore all are entitled to equal privi-
leges in the public schools," Sherman agreed.459
Even some opponents of the bill repudiated the argument that
education is not a civil right, preferring to rest on the separate-but-
equal argument. "One of the civil rights of the colored man
undoubtedly is the right to be educated out of moneys raised by
taxation," stated Representative Robert Vance of North Caro-
lina.46° Senator Merrimon said that he "admit[ted] ... with all its
force" the proposition that "if the State law excludes the colored
454 Id. Representative Lynch made a similar point in the House debates. See id. at 943
(Feb. 3, 1875).
455 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
456 Id.
457 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d sess. 3191 (May 8, 1872).
458 Id.
459 Id. at 844 (Feb. 6, 1872); accord 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Lawrence).
460 2 Cong. Rec. 555 (Jan. 10, 1874).
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children from the schools entirely, that is a violation of the four-
teenth amendment." 461
3. Concern That Desegregation Would Imperil Public Education
in the South
Almost as common as the constitutional arguments was the
claim that desegregation would imperil or destroy the fledgling
public school systems of the Southern states. A universal system of
free public education was a relatively recent development even in
most of the Northern states,462 and it was virtually nonexistent in
the South prior to the Civil War.463 The creation of common
schools was one of the most important endeavors of the Recon-
struction governments of the South.464 But a lack of facilities,
resources, and teachers, aggravated by the uncooperative attitude
of many of the Southern people, greatly impeded this effort. The
Freedmen's Bureau and various private philanthropic organiza-
tions concentrated on forming schools for the newly emancipated
freedmen, who had no opportunity of education under the slavery
regime. Although open to white children, these schools were
almost invariably attended solely by black children. Efforts to
establish a comprehensive, state-financed system for all children
were somewhat haphazard. Opponents of the civil rights bills
warned that desegregation would be fatal to these efforts.
The stock rhetoric of the opponents was that the bill would
"destroy" public education. 465 Senator Thurman, for example,
reminded the Republicans that if there were to be public schools in
the Southern states, "those schools must be set up and maintained
by the State Legislatures and paid for out of the property of the
461 Id. app. at 359 (May 21, 1874).
462 See Kaestle, supra note 79, at 62-63, 104-35, 182-92 (summarizing the origins of
public education in the antebellum North and Midwest).
463 See id. at 192-216; see also 2 Cong. Rec. 456 (Jan. 7,1874) (statement of Rep. Butler)
(recounting the history of public education in the South).
464 See Foner, supra note 21, at 365-66.
465 The comments to this effect were so numerous that it would be pointless to cite more
than a small sampling. See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 318 (May 22, 1874) (statement of
Sen. Merrimon); 2 Cong. Rec. 4155 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Cooper); id. at 4145
(May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Stockton); id. at 421 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Herndon); id. at 411 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Blount); id. at 385 (Jan. 5, 1874)
(statement of Rep. Mills); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3262 (May 9, 1872) (statement
of Sen. Alcorn); id. app. at 11 (Jan. 30, 1872) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
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white people of those States. ' 466 The result of a desegregation law,
he warned, "will be that schools will not be established; the taxes
will not be laid; the laws for the common-school system will be
repealed or rendered nugatory; and the consequence will be that
both the negro children and the poor white children too will go
without education."' 7 Representative Mills of Texas predicted
that if the desegregation bill were passed, the common schools
would be "broken up in all the Southern States, and private schools
established," which would leave the "children of the colored peo-
ple" to "grow up in ignorance and vice. ' 468 Representative Dur-
ham of Kentucky, after reminding his audience that Kentucky had
not ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and bragging of the State's
"liberality" in providing "a good system of common schools, which
is supported by a direct tax upon the property of the white people
of that State," opined:
Should this bill pass, and the children of freedmen demand admis-
sion into these schools, I believe the system in Kentucky will be so
injured as to become worthless, and the thousands of children who
thus receive a good common-school education, and who are unable
to pay in the private schools, will go uneducated. Poor as they are,
they will not accept of an education upon such degrading terms.46 9
Supporters of school desegregation responded in various ways to
these arguments. Some interpreted the warnings as threats, and
stood them down. General Butler, for example, said:
Again, we are told that if we do pass this bill we shall break up
the common-school system of the South. I assume this is intended
as a threat. If so, to that I answer, as Napoleon did, "France never
negotiates under a threat."... "Break up the common-school sys-
tem of the South!" Why, sir, until we sent the carpet-baggers down
there you had not in fact a common-school system in the South.
[Laughter.]47
466 2 Cong. Rec. 4089 (May 20, 1874).
467 Id.
468 Id. at 385 (Jan. 5, 1874). Consequently, Mills warned, "[tihe great evil this bill has in
store for the black man is found in the destruction of the common schools of the South."
Id.
469 Id. at 406 (Jan. 6, 1874).
470 Id. at 456 (Jan. 7, 1874). For a similar, if less colorful reaction, see id. at 426-27 (Jan.
6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Stowell).
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Some-in particular Republicans from Southern states-stoutly
denied that desegregation would have such dire consequences.
Senator Henry Pease, who had served for five years as Superinten-
dent of Education in Mississippi, stated that "none of the difficul-
ties that have been portrayed will obtain in the South."471 He said
that the people had so come to understand the importance of pub-
lic education that "there is not a State south of Mason and Dixon's
line that will abolish its school system." 472 Still others argued that
considerations of "expediency" were irrelevant to Congress's
responsibility to enforce the Constitution. "Let justice be done
though the common schools and the very heavens fall," declared
Senator Howe of Wisconsin, from a safe distance.473 "It is always
expedient to do right," agreed Representative Lawrence of Ohio.
"Equality of civil and political rights... is simple justice. The four-
teenth amendment was designed to secure this equality of rights;
and we have no discretion to say that we will not enforce its provi-
sions." 474 School desegregation "may cause temporary strife,"
Representative Williams suggested, "but better this than that grow-
ing prejudice and growing hate should rend and distract this coun-
try ever again." 475 Senator Pratt said to "[p]ass this bill and all
471 Id. at 4153 (May 22, 1874).
472 Id.; see also 3 Cong. Rec. 960 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Rainey) (referring to
"satisfactory results" in the states where school desegregation had been inaugurated); id. at
945 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch) (referring to experience in Southern states
with desegregated education clauses in their constitutions); 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 478-79
(June 16, 1874) (statement of Rep. Darrall) (discussing the success of desegregation in
Louisiana); 2 Cong. Rec. 565 (Jan. 10, 1874) (statement of Rep. Cain) (citing experience
with integrated public schools in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York, and with the
University of South Carolina); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3193 (May 8, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) (describing experience with integrated schools in Ohio).
473 2 Cong. Rec. 4151 (May 22, 1874); see also 3 Cong. Rec. 1005 (Feb. 4, 1875)
(statement of Rep. Garfield) (stating "in the long run it is safest for a nation, a political
party, or an individual man to dare to do right, and let consequences take care of
themselves").
474 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (Jan. 6, 1874). Rep. Monroe echoed this sentiment:
If we fail to secure equal protection under the laws, we fail wholly; and it is the
duty of Congress, whatever else it may or may not do... that it shall leave no doubt
in the mind of any human being in the land as to the question whether equal
protection of the laws shall be extended to all classes of citizens.
Id.
475 3 Cong. Rec. 1002 (Feb. 4, 1875).
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opposition will cease in a few months, when it is known that the
question is settled .... "476
The predictions of catastrophe nonetheless affected some mem-
bers of Congress who were generally sympathetic to civil rights.
Representative Ellis H. Roberts of New York, for example, could
sound almost Sumneresque in his support of equality under both
the recent Amendment and the Declaration of Independence. But
during the final deliberations in the House he attempted to per-
suade his fellow Republicans to make peace with the idea of segre-
gated education, citing threats that "if we do insist upon mixed
schools, then in certain States of the South schools will be aban-
doned altogether. '477 Even General Butler, in his final speech on
the subject, when defeat was in the air, expressed concern that
"there is such a degree of prejudice in the South that I am afraid
that the public-school system, which has never yet obtained any
special hold in the South, will be broken up .... "478
4. Hostility to Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
For the most part, opposition to school desegregation in the
debates of 1871-75 was framed-whether sincerely or not-in
terms of either the practical effect on education or the theory that
separate education is not unequal or unconstitutional. But some
speeches betrayed a hostility to the very ideal of equality under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Representative William Robbins of
North Carolina boldly stated that it was "time to recur to the doc-
trine in which is bound up the salvation of this country-the doc-
trine that this is the white man's land and ought to be a white
man's government." 479 He regretted that it was "impossible to
476 2 Cong. Rec. 4083 (May 20, 1874).
477 3 Cong. Rec. 981 (Feb. 4, 1875). Roberts advocated a policy of "equal privileges," as
opposed to mandatory integration of public schools, so that "in certain localities they can
have the same schools for blacks and whites if so desired" without risking the backlash
threatened by opponents of desegregation. Id.
478 3 Cong. Rec. 1005 (Feb. 4, 1875).
479 2 Cong. Rec. 900 (Jan. 24, 1874); see also id. at 419 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Herndon) (criticizing the Fourteenth Amendment for "trench[ing] upon the reserved rights
of the independent sovereign States" and commenting that the loss of state power "has
been a loss to liberty itself"); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3251 (May 9, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Blair) (criticizing the Fifteenth Amendment for conferring the vote
"upon a mass of ignorant, uneducated, semi-barbarous people").
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undo what has been done" in furtherance of racial equality-pre-
sumably a reference to the Reconstruction Amendments and legis-
lation enforcing them-and was adamantly opposed to doing
more. Senator Eli Saulsbury of Delaware questioned whether the
Fourteenth Amendment had any "legal or binding force in law," 4 0
and declared:
I am placed under the most binding obligation to maintain for my
race that superiority to which it is entitled by the decrees of God
himself, and here in the council of my country I proclaim that no
act of mine shall assist to drag it down and place it on an equality
with an inferior race.4"
He called support for the bill "treason to the white race."'482
Some Southern opponents purported to be speaking for their
black as well as their white constituents, 483 but others frankly spoke
in the name of the white population of their states, with thinly
veiled threats of violence or even genocide. Senator Saulsbury pre-
dicted "hatred and animosity" between the races, if not "public dis-
order and conflict," if the civil rights bill were to pass.48 A
Democratic congressman from Kentucky made a speech in which
he asked the Republican supporters of the bill "in behalf of the
white children of my district" not to destroy their schools. Passage
of the desegregation bill would disturb the "quiet" that then
existed between the two races, he stated, "perhaps ending in a war
of the races; and when that occurs, the black race in this country
will be exterminated."485  Senator Blair intermixed advocacy
480 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 9 (Jan. 30, 1872). This criticism was a
reference to the irregularities in the ratification process. For a recent discussion of those
irregularities, see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 44-46 (1991). Ackerman
observes that "[t]he Reconstruction amendments-especially the Fourteenth-would
never have been ratified if the Republicans had followed the rules laid down by Article
Five of the original Constitution. The Republicans were entirely aware of this fact, as were
their conservative antagonists." Id. at 44-45.
481 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 9 (Jan. 30, 1872).
482 Id.
483 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 316 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon); 2
Cong. Rec. at 555 (Jan. 10, 1874) (statement of Rep. Vance); id. at 381 (Jan. 5, 1874)
(statement of Rep. Stephens); Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3262 (May 9, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Alcorn).
484 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 11 (Jan. 30, 1872).
485 2 Cong. Rec. 406 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Durham).
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against the bill with statements in favor of removing blacks from
American society and transporting them to the tropics.486
Republican supporters of the bill were quick to claim that the
entire opposition was motivated by such sentiments and to ques-
tion the credibility of constitutional arguments made by opponents
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Senator Morton stated derisively
that Blair's "reactionary" and "antediluvian" views were represen-
tative of his political party.' Senator Pratt commented: "I regret
to say that the argument [against the bill] begins and ends in preju-
dice-a prejudice as unreasonable as it is unjust ... ."488 Senator
Pease said that these arguments "might have been expected" from
"a party which has opposed every measure looking to the protec-
tion and elevation of a certain class of American citizens."48 9 Sena-
tor Edmunds dismissed the constitutional arguments of Senator
Thurman-the leading Democratic opponent of the bill in the Sen-
ate-with the gibe that
nobody would doubt what is the attitude of my friend from Ohio
upon the constitutionality of this provision. Nobody can doubt
what his attitude would have been on the civil rights bill [of 1866]
had he been here. Perhaps nobody doubts what his attitude is as to
the constitutionality of the fourteenth amendment itself.490
Representative Stowell of Virginia commented on a resolution by
his state's legislature opposing the bill: "[I]t looks very much as if
the democratic Legislature of Virginia was willing to recognize the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States if
Congress would only prevent it from being carried into execution
"491
It is impossible to tell what proportion of the opposition to the
school desegregation bill was based on a hostility to the idea of
legal equality altogether. Republican supporters suggested it was
large. They are a biased source; but they also were in a position to
486 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3251-52 (May 9, 1872).
487 Id. at 3253. Blair's comments also elicited strong retorts from Senators Wilson, id.,
and Flanagan, id. at 3255-56.
488 2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (May 20, 1874).
489 Id. at 4153 (May 22, 1874); see also id. at 409 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep.
Elliott) (denouncing the "vulgar insinuations" and "illogical and forced conclusions" of the
opposition and stating that "[r]eason and argument are worse than wasted" on them).
490 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 731 (Jan. 31, 1872).
491 2 Cong. Rec. 426 (Jan. 6, 1874).
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions
know. Whether large or small, this element of the opposition
should be disregarded when attempting to discern the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. That some leading citi-
zens opposed the Amendment and all that it stood for does not tell
us anything about what the Amendment meant. Indeed, the pres-
ence of this body of opinion shows that the size of the vote against
the civil rights bill, minority though it was, overstates the strength
of the position that segregated schools were deemed, in good faith,
to be consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. VOTES ON THE DESEGREGATION MEASURE
The previous Part recounted the constitutional (and other) theo-
ries of the proponents and opponents of what would become the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.492 Even without more, this history would
suffice to show that a substantial number of the leading supporters
of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that segregated education
was unconstitutional. This Part will recount the progress of the bill
through Congress and the many votes on the measure. It provides
the basis for evaluating the prevalence of the opinion that segrega-
tion is unconstitutional.
When analyzing the votes, I will sometimes use partisan affilia-
tion as a proxy for support or opposition to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Support for the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866 was
almost exclusively a Republican phenomenon. In the House of
Representatives, the Amendment carried by a vote of 120-32.493
Every Democrat, and only one Republican, voted against it. In the
Senate, the Amendment carried by a vote of 33-11.4 94 Republicans
supplied 32 of the 33 votes. In the absence of contrary evidence, I
will therefore assume that Republicans were supporters, and Dem-
ocrats opponents, of the Amendment.
A. Attachment of the Civil Rights Bill as a Rider to Amnesty
Sumner's initial proposal would "secure equal rights in railroads,
steamboats, public conveyances, hotels, licensed theaters, houses of
public entertainment, common schools, and institutions of learning
492 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
493 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (June 13, 1866).
494 Id. at 3042 (June 8, 1866).
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authorized by law, church institutions, and cemetery associations
incorporated by national or State authority; also on juries in courts,
national and State. '495 The bill clearly took a sweeping view of the
authority of Congress to forbid discrimination in private institu-
tions, even including churches. Apparently, Sumner's understand-
ing of "state action" encompassed any association incorporated
under law, and the provision pertaining to jury service may have
suggested application to political (in addition to civil) rights. In
these respects, Sumner went well beyond the prevailing under-
standing of the reach of the Amendment.
In the course of the deliberations, supporters of the bill per-
suaded or forced Sumner to narrow its coverage in several impor-
tant respects. In Sumner's original proposal, private schools were
covered if they enjoyed the benefits of incorporation; but on Sum-
ner's own motion (made at the suggestion of Senator Roscoe
Conkling), this feature of the bill was struck, leaving within the
ambit of the bill only those schools that were supported by "gen-
eral taxation" or "authorized by law."'496 Later in the debate, he
accepted a similar amendment as applied to cemeteries and benev-
olent institutions, limiting coverage to those "of a public charac-
ter. '497 Application of the Act to churches came in for particular
criticism on religious freedom grounds,498 but Sumner defended it,
with support from Senator Sherman of Ohio.499 Senators Freling-
495 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (May 13, 1870) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
496 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
497 Id. (statement of Sen. Boreman).
498 See id. at 897-98 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Corbett); id. at 897 (Feb. 8, 1872)
(statement of Sen. Anthony); id. at 847-48 (Feb. 6, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Frelinghuysen); id. at 759 (Feb. 1, 1872) (statement of Sen. Carpenter); id. app. at 10 (Jan.
30, 1872) (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); id. app. at 5 (Jan. 25, 1872) (statement of Sen. Lot
Morrill).
499 See id. at 823-26 (Feb. 5, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner) ("Here is nothing of
religion-it is the political law, the law of justice, the law of equal rights." ); see also id. at
896 (Feb. 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Sumner); id. at 843 (Feb. 6, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Sherman) (saying that it is "dividing hairs" to extend coverage to railroads and inns but not
to churches, and that "[a]ny church association that would exclude a man because of his
color from worshiping God within its walls is a heathen church; it is not a Christian
church"). Sherman later voted to drop the reference to churches in deference to the
arguments of colleagues and to strengthen support for the remainder of the bill. Id. at 897
(Feb. 8, 1872).
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huysen,500 Morton501 and Carpenter5 2 argued that application of
the civil rights bill to a church that sought to exclude persons of a
different race would violate the First Amendment. This argument
is particularly interesting in light of the Supreme Court's 1990
holding that the First Amendment, as applied to the states through
the Fourteenth, does not protect churches from neutral laws of
general applicability inconsistent with the tenets of their faith.5 0 3
Churches eventually were eliminated from the bill.5°
As discussed above, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, opposed Sumner's proposal.05
Under his leadership in both the Second and the Third Sessions of
the Forty-first Congress, the Judiciary Committee reported
adversely on Sumner's bill,5°6 apparently unanimously,507 and it
died. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that Trumbull's
constitutional reservations necessarily were shared by the rest of
the Committee. Two members of the Committee, Conkling and
Edmunds, later stated that the bill had been rejected "chiefly on
the ground that the civil rights bill [of 1866] was adequate to
accomplish the protection which the citizen was entitled to"-a
position they soon became convinced was wrong.508
500 Id. at 847-48 (Feb. 6, 1872); id. at 896 (Feb. 8, 1872).
501 Id. at 898 (Feb. 8, 1872).
502 Id. at 759 (Feb. 1, 1872).
503 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-82 (1990); see also Ira C. Lupu,
Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 391, 416-31 (1987) (arguing that churches are not entitled
to absolute exemption from antidiscrimination laws). The 1875 Act debates support the
argument in Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious
Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1106 (1994), that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment understood free exercise as a substantive liberty
rather than merely a protection from discrimination or prosecution.
504 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 899 (Feb. 8, 1872). The vote was 29-24. Id. Much
of the opposition to this change came from opponents of the entire measure, who hoped to
defeat it by making the bill as "obnoxious" as they could. See, e.g., id. at 896 (statement of
Sen. Trumbull); id. at 897 (statement of Sen. Thurman).
505 See supra text accompanying notes 317-77.
506 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5314 (July 7, 1870); Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d
Sess. 1263 (Feb. 15, 1871).
507 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 730 (Jan. 31, 1872) (statement of Sen. Lot Morrill).
508 Id. at 731 (statement of Sen. Edmunds). Senator Thurman, a Democratic member of
the Committee, challenged their account and stated that his opposition had been based on
constitutional grounds. Id.
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Whatever the grounds of its opposition, the Committee's action
forced Sumner to seek an alternative procedural vehicle. Accord-
ingly, Sumner proposed his civil rights bill as a rider to a popular
"amnesty" bill, lifting political and civil disabilities from former
officers of the United States or of the states who had engaged in
rebellion against the Union. Under Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, various persons were excluded from public office if
they had previously violated their oath to support the Constitution
by backing the Confederate rebellion, but Congress was permitted
to lift this disability by a two-thirds vote.5 °9 It was to such a bill
that Sumner attached his civil rights measure. The advantage of
this strategy, in addition to bypassing Trumbull's committee, was
that it would place Sumner's Democratic opponents in the embar-
rassing position of either voting for Sumner's civil rights bill or
against the amnesty measure. The disadvantage was that legisla-
tion containing the amnesty provision required a two-thirds vote
from both houses of Congress; thus, a mere one-third of either
house, adamantly opposed to desegregation, could defeat the
measure.
It must be noted, moreover, that this linkage of the civil rights
bill and the amnesty bill complicates using the deliberations as a
source of information about the understood meaning of the Four-
teenth Amendment. It has been suggested that some opponents of
amnesty supported Sumner's proposal as a clever strategy for
defeating the otherwise popular amnesty bill, without necessarily
sharing Sumner's views on segregation. Historian Alfred Kelly
attributes the "extraordinary popularity" of Sumner's proposal
among the Senate Republicans to the fact that "they now saw in
Sumner's rider a delightful weapon to deal with th[e] menace [of
the amnesty bill]. '510 However, this conjecture appears to be
incorrect. More likely, the votes on the rider understated the depth
of support for desegregation; several senators expressed their sup-
port for Sumner's position, but opposed the rider because it was an
impediment to amnesty, which they also supported. Kelly claims
that Senators Morton, Conkling, Edmunds, Nye and Chandler
were "'suddenly converted to Mr. Sumner's way of thinking,
So U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 3.
510 Kelly, supra note 21, at 547.
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because it is the only way amnesty can be defeated without appear-
ing to oppose the President.' "511 But with the exception of Nye,
who lost his Senate seat in 1873, each of these men voted or spoke
in favor of desegregation after these strategic considerations had
passed.5 12 Indeed, not a single senator who voted in favor of Sum-
ner's rider voted against Sumner's later freestanding desegregation
legislation. By contrast, at least four senators opposed the rider
despite their support for desegregation, because of the impact on
amnesty,5 3 and at least one senator who was opposed to amnesty
voted for the combined bill as a result of the rider.514 Moreover,
when it became evident that the rider would have the effect of
blocking the amnesty bill and that neither measure would pass,
Sumner's Republican supporters deserted him and voted for
amnesty.515 This course of events casts serious doubt on Kelly's
thesis.
The first test of senatorial support for Sumner's rider came in
December 1871. Opponents challenged Sumner's motion to attach
the civil rights bill as a rider to the amnesty bill on the (not implau-
sible) ground that amnesty bills, which were a special creation of
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, were not ordinary legisla-
tion and thus could not be combined with extraneous legal provi-
511 Id. at 547 n.43 (quoting N.Y. Trib., Jan. 24, 1872).
512 See 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 358-61 (May 21, 1874) (statement of Sen. Morton); 2 Cong.
Rec. 4176 (May 22, 1874) (reporting votes by Sens. Conkling and Edmunds in favor of a
freestanding civil rights bill, with Sen. Chandler paired in favor of the bill).
513 These were Senators Sawyer, Robertson, Fenton, and Cragin. See Cong. Globe, 42d
Cong., 2d Sess. 272-73 (1872) (Dec. 21, 1871) (statement of Sen. Sawyer that he supported
the principles of Sumner's bill but would vote against the amendment because it would "be
absolutely fatal to the amnesty bill"); id. at 918 (Feb. 9,1872) (statement of Sen. Robertson
that "I am still ready and willing to vote for the Senator's proposition as a separate
measure, but not to attach it to this bill"); id. at 3263 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Fenton to similar effect); id. at 3196 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Cragin explaining
that he voted for the civil rights rider initially "hoping that both measures might be passed
at the same time," but failing that, "being in favor of both these measures, I go for the one
that is most likely to pass and become a law, and then, when the proper occasion arises, I
shall go for the other"); see also id. at 3251 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Blair that both
senators from South Carolina, plus others, would vote for the bill as a separate measure
but not as an amendment to the amnesty bill).
514 See id. at 3734 (May 21, 1872) (statement of Sen. Hamlin).
515 See infra text accompanying notes 543-59.
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sions.516 This point of order was rejected by a vote of 28-26.5'7 At
least one strong supporter of Sumner's bill voted in favor of the
point of order on parliamentary grounds.518 Immediately thereaf-
ter, however, Sumner's amendment was rejected by a vote of 29-
30.519 Of those senators who had voted in favor of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Sumner's proposal carried a majority of 9-3; of those
who had voted against the Amendment, Sumner's proposal lost by
a vote of 2-0.520
Sumner reintroduced his civil rights rider to the amnesty legisla-
tion later the same day, the last day before the Christmas recess.
When the Senate reconvened in January 1872, Sumner's proposal
received detailed consideration over several weeks of extended
debate. This time, the proposal carried, though by the slimmest of
margins. On February 9, 1872, the Senate divided evenly on the
proposal, by a vote of 28-28, and Vice President Schuyler Colfax
cast the deciding vote in favor, stating that he was "[v]oting upon
this amendment as a whole, without concurrence with all the fea-
tures contained in it."'5 2 1 Colfax had been Speaker of the House
when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and he was well
known for his support of Negro suffrage.5 22 Supporters of the
Fourteenth Amendment voted for Sumner's rider by a margin of
10-1 (not counting Colfax); the exception was Trumbull.523 None
of the opponents of the Amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress
516 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 263 (1872) (Dec. 21, 1871) (statement of Sen.
Thurman); id. app. at 1 (Jan. 25, 1872) (statement of Sen. Lot Morrill).
517 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 274 (1872) (Dec. 21, 1871).
518 Id. at 3183 (May 8, 1872) (subsequent statement of Sen. Hamlin).
519 Id. at 274 (D~c. 21, 1871).
520 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 274 (1872) (Dec. 21, 1871) (reporting the Senate vote on the civil rights bill).
521 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 919 (Feb. 9, 1872). Interestingly, the Vice
President's vote ran contrary to the policy of the Administration. President Grant favored
the amnesty bill and opposed the Sumner rider. Kelly, supra note 21, at 547 & n.44.
522 4 Dictionary of American Biography 297-98 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone, eds.,
1943).
523 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 919 (Feb. 9, 1872) (reporting the Senate vote on the civil rights bill).
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remained in the Senate. Republicans supported the measure by a
margin of 28-16; all twelve Democrats voted against.524
As amended, the amnesty bill lost the support of some of its
most ardent advocates, especially among the Democrats. The mea-
sure attained 33 "ayes" and 19 "nays," two votes short of the neces-
sary two-thirds.525 All but one of the negative votes came from
senators who had opposed Sumner's rider.526
Three months later, in May 1872, the debate recurred, with simi-
lar arguments and an identical result. This time, Sumner proposed
his civil rights bill as a substitute-rather than a rider-to the
House-passed amnesty bill. Late in the debate, moderate Republi-
can Orris Ferry of Connecticut, an opponent of school desegrega-
tion, recoupled amnesty and the civil rights bill by amending
Sumner's amendment to include the first section of the original
amnesty measure as an additional section.527 This motion was
adopted, 38-14, with some supporters of school desegregation join-
ing the affirmative vote.52 The bulk of the debate, however, took
place while Sumner's civil rights bill was decoupled from the
amnesty bill. The complicating factors present in the. February
vote therefore do not plague us here, and the almost identical out-
come further confirms that the votes were dictated by the merits of
the civil rights bill rather than by the politics of amnesty.
The debates in May 1872 presented senators with the opportu-
nity to vote on proposals embodying both of the constitutional the-
ories of the opposition-that education is not a civil right and is
therefore not protected by the Amendment, and that segregation
does not offend the principle of equality. Orris Ferry's proposed
amendment to delete the clause in Sumner's proposal pertaining to
524 All partisan affiliations in this Article are derived from Congressional Quarterly,
Guide to U.S. Elections (2d ed. 1985) and Congressional Quarterly, Guide to Congress
(4th ed. 1991).
525 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 928-29 (Feb. 9, 1872).
526 Compare id. at 919 (Feb. 9, 1872) (reporting the Senate vote on the desegregation
amendment) with id. at 928-29 (Feb. 9, 1872) (reporting the Senate vote on passage of the
amnesty bill). Only Senator Wright voted in favor of the desegregation amendment, yet
subsequently voted against the amnesty bill.
527 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3262 (May 9, 1872). This move casts further
doubt on the hypothesis that the support for coupling the two measures came from
opponents of amnesty. See supra notes 510-15 and accompanying text.
528 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3263 (May 9, 1872). The remainder of the amnesty
bill was subsequently added by amendment. Id.
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common schools reflected the constitutional theory that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not affect local control over education.529
The motion lost, 25-26.530 The second constitutional theory of the
opposition was reflected in the amendment to the Sumner bill pro-
posed by Francis Blair of Missouri, who suggested adding the fol-
lowing proviso: "Provided, however, That the people of every city,
county, or State shall decide for themselves, at an election to be
held for that purpose, the question of mixed or separate schools for
the white or black people. '' 531 This proviso suggests that segrega-
tion is not inconsistent with the equality of rights demanded by the
Amendment. Blair's motion also lost, by a vote of 23-30.532 These
votes may suggest that support for the former constitutional theory
was stronger than that for the latter-a supposition ultimately
borne out by the final shape of the 1875 Act.
Of the eleven senators who had voted in the Thirty-ninth Con-
gress in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment, ten voted against the
Ferry and Blair amendments and in favor of Sumner's bill, and
only one-Trumbull-voted the other way.533 The rejection of
these amendments shows that a majority of the Senate-and an
even larger majority of Fourteenth Amendment supporters-
agreed with Sumner that segregated schooling is inconsistent with
the constitutional demand of equality.
Having survived hostile amendment, the Sumner bill underwent
a complicated series of votes, ultimately leading to the same divi-
sion as in February. First, as noted above, the Senate adopted a
motion to recouple amnesty and civil rights by attaching the
amnesty bill as an amendment to Sumner's amendment."3 Then,
529 See id. at 3256.
530 Id. at 3258.
531 Id.
532 Id. at 3262. The Senate also rejected an amendment proposed by Senator Carpenter
to delete the jury provisions from the bill, by a vote of 16-33. Id. at 3263.
533 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3258 (May 9, 1872) (reporting the Senate vote on the Ferry amendment) and id. at
3262 (reporting the Senate vote on the Blair amendment). The members who supported
the Fourteenth Amendment and opposed the Ferry and Blair amendments were Anthony,
Chandler, Cragin, Edmunds, Justin Morrill of Vermont (who had voted for the
Amendment as a member of the House of Representatives), Pomeroy, Ramsey, Sherman,
Sumner and Wilson.
534 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3262-63 (May 9, 1872).
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on a motion by Trumbull to delete the entire substance of Sumner's
rider (which would restore the bill to its original form as solely an
amnesty measure), the Senate voted 29-29, and the Vice President
cast the deciding vote in the negative.535 The stronger showing of
opposition here (as compared to the Ferry and Blair amendments)
is attributable to the votes of those like Carpenter, who supported
Sumner on school desegregation but not on juries,536 and of those
like Cragin, Sawyer, Robertson and Fenton, who supported Sum-
ner on the merits but did not want to endanger amnesty.5 37 Had
they voted in favor of the bill, it would have carried by a much
wider margin.
The Sumner amendment as amended (that is, a motion to
replace the amnesty bill by the civil rights bill supplemented by the
amnesty bill) then failed, surprisingly, by a single vote, 27-28.538
That left the original House-passed amnesty bill on the floor. Sum-
ner promptly reopened the issue by moving to amend the bill by
addition of the civil rights bill.53 9 Although in substance (though
not in form) this was the identical question on which he had just
lost, this time the outcome was reversed.540 The Senate divided
evenly, 28-28, and the Vice President broke the tie by voting in the
affirmative.541 So once again the Sumner bill was attached as a
rider to the amnesty bill-precisely the same procedural posture as
in February. But, as in February, the combined bill failed to obtain
the necessary two-thirds majority. This time the vote was 32-22.542
535 Id. at 3264-65.
536 Id. at 3196 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen. Carpenter).
537 See supra note 513 and accompanying text. Senator Scott also voted against both the
Blair amendment, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3262 (May 9, 1872), and the Sumner
amendment, id. at 3264 (May 9,1872), but he did not explain these apparently inconsistent
votes. Perhaps he too was influenced by the political context of amnesty.
538 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3268 (May 9, 1872).
539 Id.
540 The change is attributable to Senator Wright, who voted "nay" the first time and
"aye" the second. Id. Wright had voted in support of Sumner and his rider the previous
February, id. at 919 (Feb. 9, 1872), and he rejected the Ferry and Blair amendments. Id. at
3258, 3262 (May 9, 1872). Most likely Wright's initial vote against Sumner's bill was a
mistake. Senator Lewis of Tennessee, who had been absent for the first vote, appeared and
voted "nay." Id. at 3268.
541 Id. at 3268.
542 Id. at 3270.
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Both sides were stymied by the two-thirds requirement. A
majority of the Senate (counting the Vice President) insisted on
supporting legislation based on the premise that school segregation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Between one-third and one-
half were adamantly opposed to it. The effect was to defeat both
amnesty and the civil rights bill, even though both measures com-
manded majority support. As Senator Edmunds explained to a
weary Senate in the early hours of the morning after an all-night
debate: "[T]his subject of civil rights and of amnesty... has been
before the Senate three or four times, and both bills finally failed
because gentlemen who were in favor of each separately would
vote against both together. ' 543 The Republicans were under
intense pressure to enact the amnesty measure, which was a lead-
ing campaign issue in the 1872 elections, especially in the South.
The Democrats engaged in a filibuster to prevent consideration of
the civil rights bill.544 It looked as if neither measure would pass
the Senate before the summer recess, or in time for the fall
campaign.
The impasse was broken on the morning of May 22, while Sum-
ner was absent from the chamber. Edmunds, speaking for the
Republicans, announced that they had decided to separate the two
measures,5 45 in exchange for which the Democrats would agree to a
vote on a watered-down civil rights measure, introduced by Car-
penter, without further dilatory tactics.546 The Carpenter bill pro-
hibited inns, places of amusement for which a public license was
required, and common carriers from making "any distinction as to
admission or accommodation therein, of any citizen of the United
States, because of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
543 Id. at 3729 (May 21,1872) (The actual date of Senator Edmunds' speech was May 22,
but because the Senate did not adjourn, the Congressional Globe continued to report the
debate as occurring on the legislative day May 21.); see also id. at 3740 (statement of Sen.
Sawyer) (noting that "the moment [Sumner] links his civil rights proposition with the
amnesty proposition, they are both defeated"); id. at 3260 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Logan addressed to Sen. Sumner) ("For several months this [civil rights] bill has lain upon
your table. There has not been a time that it could not have been passed by a majority of
this Senate if you would take it up alone .... ").
544 See id. at 3730-31 (May 21, 1872) (colloquy between Sen. Casserly and Sen. Conkling
concerning the civil rights filibuster).
545 Id. at 3729.
546 See id. at 3734 (statements of Sens. Blair, Carpenter, and Davis).
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tude."547 It deleted references to schools and juries, the two most
controversial features of Sumner's legislation.548 After debate, the
Carpenter bill was substituted for the Sumner bill by a vote of 22-20.549
Some supporters of Sumner's original bill protested the compro-
mise, and came close to defeating the Carpenter substitute. Sena-
tor Spencer said he considered it "emasculating the bill entirely"
and hoped "that every genuine friend of civil rights will vote
against it."' 550 Senator Frelinghuysen commented that "the opinion
of the Senate has been expressed over and over again in favor of
retaining the provisions in reference to public schools," and that
the omission "very much impairs the effect of the bill."55 Senator
Clayton predicted that if the substitute were adopted, "this vexed
question will be still before the country, a source of trouble in
future legislative bodies."552 Other supporters of Sumner's bill
argued that the Carpenter substitute, while not all that they hoped
for, nonetheless "secured a considerable share of the benefits we
hoped to obtain by the passage of [Sumner's] own bill. '553 Sumner
later attributed his loss to the fact that the attendance in the Senate
was sparse. 4 Others said "it was all we could get at this session of
Congress. ' 5 5 In any event, Carpenter's modified civil rights bill
passed by a vote of 28-14.556
A controlling group of Sumner's supporters on the desegrega-
tion rider, including Edmunds, Carpenter, Hamlin, Wilson, and
Conkling, thus abandoned Sumner's strategy; but they continued
547 Id. at 3730,3734-35 (statements of Sen. Carpenter). A motion to delete references to
places of public amusement was defeated, 14-29. Id. at 3735.
548 See id. at 3737-38 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (protesting the deletion of public
schools and juries, which rendered the substitute "an emasculated civil rights bill").
549 Id. at 3735.
550 Id.
551 Id.
552 Id.
553 Id. at 3740 (statement of Sen. Sawyer); accord id. at 3738 (statement of Sen.
Conkling).
554 See id. at 3738, 3739 (statements of Sen. Sumner) (urging that his motion to
reconsider the Carpenter substitute be postponed for decision by the "full Senate").
5s5 Id. at 3739 (statement of Sen. Sawyer); accord id. (statement of Sen. Anthony).
556 Id. at 3736.
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to profess support for his ultimate objective.5 5 7 When Sumner
arrived on the Senate floor later that morning, he attempted to
rally the Republicans to his original strategy, and once more
offered his civil rights bill as a rider to the amnesty bill. This time
he was voted down, 13-29,558 and the amnesty bill passed almost
unanimously (with only Sumner and Nye voting against).55 9
Events in the House of Representatives turned this compromise
into a total defeat for the civil rights advocates. Although the
amnesty bill easily cleared the House, Carpenter's civil rights bill
was bottled up. A two-thirds majority was required to suspend the
rules to take up the bill on the floor of the House. On May 28, a
vote to consider the bill carried a majority of 114-83, a comfortable
majority but well short of the necessary two-thirds.5 60 In two votes
taken on June 7, the bill again obtained a majority but not two-
thirds. 6' The Carpenter bill never again saw the light of day.
B. Desegregation Efforts in the House, 1872
While the amnesty rider effort occupied the attention of the Sen-
ate, the opponents of school segregation in the House of Repre-
sentatives attempted to enact a civil rights bill similar to the
Sumner measure as freestanding legislation. The bill, H.R. 1647,
was introduced by Representative William Frye, Republican from
Maine, on February 19, 1872.562 Applicable to inns, common carri-
ers, theaters and places of public amusement, common schools and
other public institutions of learning supported by moneys derived
from general taxation or authorized by law, and incorporated cem-
eteries and benevolent institutions, the bill guaranteed to every cit-
izen "the full and equal enjoyment of any accommodation,
557 Several of these senators made speeches emphasizing that their decision to separate
the civil rights bill from the amnesty measure did not suggest any lack of commitment to
the civil rights bill on their part. See, e.g., id. at 3730 (statements of Sen. Edmunds and
Sen. Hamlin); id. at 3732 (statement of Sen. Wilson); id. at 3738 (statement of Sen.
Conkling); id. at 3739-40 (statement of Sen. Sawyer).
558 Id. at 3737-38.
559 The vote was 38-2. Id. at 3738.
560 Id. at 3932 (May 28, 1872).
561 Id. at 4322 (June 7, 1872). The first vote, on an amended version of the bill containing
a maximum penalty for violations and no minimum penalty, was 86-73; the second vote, on
an amended version reducing the maximum penalty, was 83-73. Id.
562 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1116 (Feb. 19, 1872).
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advantage, facility, or privilege" furnished by the covered enti-
ties. 63 The bill specifically provided that private schools, ceme-
teries, and institutions of learning maintained by voluntary
contributions could remain segregated, but that no new such insti-
tutions could be created.564 It also forbade racial discrimination in
jury service.565
From the sparse debate on the bill,5 66 we can tell that it was
understood to require desegregation of the covered institutions.
Representative H.D. McHenry, of Kentucky, stated that the bill
was "the same" as that presented in the Senate by Sumner,567
and-as was shown above-the Sumner bill was understood to
require desegregation. McI-enry, a strident opponent of the bill,
described the bill as "giv[ing] the negro the right.., to eat at the
same table with the most favored guest,"-568 and "forc[ing] [the
white] child to sit on the same seat with the negro, and to be raised
up in fellowship with him."569 Representative Harper of North
Carolina, another opponent, described the bill as saying to the
white people, "'You must ride in the same car, eat at the same
table, and lodge in the same room with a negro ... . " ,,570 It is
obvious that separate but equal accommodations were not thought
permissible under the bill.
The bill was scheduled for consideration during the Monday
"morning hour," when the rules of the House precluded debate or
amendment. Thus, the opinion of the members must be divined
from a series of procedural votes rather than from statements on
the floor or more definitive votes on the merits. The Democratic
strategy was to prevent an up-or-down vote. Representative
Hooper, one of the principal sponsors, complained that the bill
"would be acted on at once if gentlemen on the other side would
563 Id.
564 See id.
565 Id.
566 The bill was not debated directly, but several representatives made comments on it
during time devoted to general remarks. See, e.g., id. at 1116-17 (statements of
Representatives Dawes and Cox).
567 Id. app. at 217 (Apr. 13, 1872).
568 Id.
569 Id. at 218.
570 Id. at 372 (May 4, 1872).
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not filibuster. ' 571 On February 19, 1872, the first test of support
was on a motion to reject the bill, which failed by a vote of 89-
116.572 There was a perfect congruence between support for the
Fourteenth Amendment and support for the bill on this vote. All
eleven members of the House who had voted in favor of the Four-
teenth Amendment voted in favor of the bill; the three who had
voted against the Amendment opposed it.573 Similarly, the break-
down was almost entirely on party lines. Only three votes in favor
of the bill (out of 116) came from Democrats and only three votes
against (out of 89) came from Republicans.
The next test, March 25, 1872, was on a motion by Representa-
tive Robert Elliott, a black Republican lawyer from South Caro-
lina, to suspend the rules and take up consideration of the bill.
This would require a two-thirds majority. Elliott's motion won the
votes of 98 members, with 80 opposed, far short of the necessary
two-thirds. 574 On April 1, opponents attempted to kill the measure
by tabling it, but the effort failed, 73_99.575 On April 8, proponents
moved an additional step toward passage by successfully moving
for engrossment and third reading. This motion passed by a vote of
100-78.576 At this point, opponents of the bill became alarmed. In
a speech delivered April 13, 1872, Representative McHenry inter-
preted the previous vote as "a test vote" on the degree of support
for the bill and stated, "I presume in a short time it will be passed
by the same vote which ordered its third reading. '577 He also
warned that "[t]his measure was adopted in the Senate as an
amendment to the amnesty bill at this session, and it is a well-ascer-
tained fact that if we pass it here it will pass that body and become
a law."5 78
571 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2441 (Apr. 15, 1872).
572 Id. at 1117 (Feb. 19, 1872).
57 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (June 13, 1866) (reporting the
House vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1117 (Feb. 19, 1872) (reporting the House vote on the motion to reject the civil rights
bill).
574 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (Mar. 25, 1872).
575 Id. at 2074 (Apr. 1, 1872).
576 Id. at 2270 (Apr. 8, 1872).
577 Id. app. at 217 (Apr. 13, 1872).
578 Id.
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On April 15, opponents began a strategy of filibustering the bill
by offering a series of motions to table the bill or to adjourn, and
demanding roll call votes. 579 This tactic was sufficient to block
action during the limited time available during the "morning
hour." Their apparent purpose was to force the Republican major-
ity to remove the bill from the morning hour and consider it under
a rule that would allow amendment and debate, a course which
Republican strategists rejected.580 The Republicans could summon
a clear majority in support of the bill, but not the two-thirds neces-
sary to suspend the rules. Eventually, they gave up in frustration
and devoted their energies to a different vehicle for achieving their
objective.
C. Renewed Attempts to Pass the Bill, 1873-74
In December 1873, Senator Charles Sumner and the flamboyant
former Union General Benjamin F. Butler, now a Representative
from Massachusetts and chairman of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee, introduced civil rights bills in their respective chambers.581
The House bill ultimately would be enacted, in modified form, as
the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Both bills required desegregation of
common schools, as well as of common carriers, inns, theaters,
cemeteries, and places of public amusement, and guaranteed the
right of jury service without discrimination on the basis of race.5s8
The regulation of privately owned facilities such as inns and com-
579 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 2441 (Apr. 15, 1872).
590 See id. (statement of Rep. Eldredge).
581 2 Cong. Rec. 2 (Dec. 2, 1873) (Senate); id. at 318 (Dec. 18, 1873) (House).
Representative Frank Morey, a Louisiana Republican, also introduced a bill, H.R. 473,
which was identical to Sumner's. See id. at 97 (Dec. 8, 1873). The bill was referred to the
Judiciary Committee, id. at 98, which-not surprisingly-voted out the chairman's bill
rather than Morey's.
582 Sumner's bill, S. 1, provided, inter alia:
That no citizen of the United States shall, by reason of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude, be excepted or excluded from the full and equal enjoyment
of any accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished by innkeepers; by
common carriers, whether on land or water; by licensed owners, managers, or
lessees of theaters or other places of public amusement; by trustees, commissioners,
superintendents, teachers, and other officers of common schools and public
institutions of learning, the same being supported by moneys derived from general
taxation or authorized by law; also of cemetery associations and benevolent
associations supported or authorized in the same way: Provided, That private
schools, cemeteries, and institutions of learning established exclusively for white or
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mon carriers, which would later be its constitutional downfall in the
Civil Rights Cases,583 was the least controversial aspect of the bill.
The jury provisions generated the most serious qualms among con-
stitutionally scrupulous members generally sympathetic to the civil
rights cause.584 But it was the schools provision that generated the
most intense opposition and dominated the debates, and only the
schools and cemetery provisions that ultimately failed to be
enacted.
The Sumner bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee for a
thorough examination of its constitutionality, in light of the
recently decided Slaughter-House Cases.58 5 Sumner expressed
some concern that the Judiciary Committee would kill the bill, as it
colored persons, and maintained respectively by voluntary contributions, shall
remain according to the terms of the original establishment.
Id. at 945 (Jan. 27, 1874). In addition, Section 4 of the Sumner bill prohibited racial dis-
crimination in jury service. Id. Butler's bill, H.R. 795, provided, inter alia:
That whoever, being a corporation or natural person, and owner, or in charge of any
public inn; or of any place of public amusement or entertainment for which a license
from any legal authority is required; or of any line of stage-coaches, railroad, or
other means of public carriage of passengers or freight; or of any cemetery, or other
benevolent institution, or any public school supported, in whole or in part, at public
expense or by endowment for public use, shall make any distinction as to admission
or accommodation therein, of any citizen of the United States, because of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude, shall, on conviction thereof, be fined not
less than one hundred nor more than five thousand dollars for each offense; and the
person or corporation so offending shall be liable to the citizens thereby injured, in
damages to be recovered in an action of debt.
Id. at 378 (Jan. 5, 1874) (quoted by Rep. Stephens).
583 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
584 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. 948 (Jan. 27, 1874) (colloquy between Sen. Sumner and Sen.
Edmunds regarding jury provision). This debate recalled Senator Carpenter's earlier
position in favor of school desegregation but opposed (on constitutional grounds) to the
jury provisions. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3196 (May 8, 1872). The problem
was that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected "civil" rights but not "political" or
"social" rights. Jury service was most commonly understood as a political right, and thus as
not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment, but supporters could make a plausible
argument that the jury provision was an indirect means of protecting the "civil" right of
parties to a lawsuit to have their case tried by a jury that was selected without
discrimination on the basis of their race. See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 848 (Feb. 6,
1872) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("I do not understand that it is the right of a man
to be a juror, but that it is the right of a large class that their whole class shall not be
excluded from the jurybox."); see also 3 Cong. Rec. 1794 (Feb. 26, 1875) (statement of Sen.
Morton) (arguing that racial discrimination in jury service denies equal protection of the
laws).
585 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); see 2 Cong. Rec. 946 (Jan. 27, 1874) (statement of Sen.
Ferry); id. (statement of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 947 (statement of Sen. Stewart).
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had in earlier Congresses under former chairman Lyman Trumbull,
but the new chairman, George Edmunds, assured Sumner that that
was not his intention, and Sumner assented to the referral.5 86
The Butler bill was taken up by the House and debated for three
weeks. The House debate was extraordinarily partisan and sec-
tional. Fourteen congressmen spoke in favor of the bill. All four-
teen were Republicans, two of whom (Lawrence and Poland) had
voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sixteen congress-
men spoke against the bill. All sixteen were Democrats; fourteen
were from the South and none had supported the Fourteenth
Amendment. Butler commented scathingly on the lack of North-
ern support for the opposition:
[T]he only argument which has been'introduced here [is] the argu-
ment to prejudice.... To show how deep that prejudice is in the
South, and that it is not shared by the North, I call the attention of
the House that there has yet, in these two days of fruitless debate,
been no man from the North who calls himself a democrat who has
risen to oppose this bill or make a speech against its provisions. 87
When Butler asked if he was correct, only one Northern Democrat
admitted to opposition to the bill.-""
The principal speaker against the bill was Alexander H. Ste-
phens of Georgia, the Vice President of the Confederate States of
America, now eligible to hold office because of the amnesty bill
passed by the previous session of Congress. Stephens was consid-
ered by many to have been the most eloquent defender of slavery
in the later years of the antebellum period. In his famous "Corner-
Stone" speech at Savannah, Georgia in March 1861, Stephens had
declared that the new Confederate government was based on" 'the
great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slav-
ery-subordination to the superior race-is his natural and normal
condition.' ",589 After the War, Stephens urged acquiescence in the
abolition of slavery and good will toward the freedmen, but he
opposed both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.59 The
586 2 Cong. Rec. 945-49 (Jan. 27, 1874) (colloquy between Sen. Sumner and Sen.
Edmunds).
587 Id. at 457 (Jan. 7, 1874).
588 See id. (statement of Rep. DeWitt).
589 17 Dictionary of American Biography 573 (Dumas Malone, ed., 1935).
590 See id. at 574.
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symbolism of his leadership in the debate was powerful, for it asso-
ciated opposition to the. civil rights bill with the heritage of slavery,
the Confederacy, and opposition to the Reconstruction Amend-
ments. His actual constitutional argument was primarily a plea for
a very narrow construction of the Section 5 power, arguing that a
more expansive construction "would entirely upset the whole
fabric of the Government, the maintenance of which in its integrity
was the avowed object of the war. 5 91
In one of the most compelling moments in the entire debate,
Robert Elliott, a black lawyer from South Carolina, rose to
respond to Stephens. The descendant of slaves faced the former
leader of the slaveholders. Elliott began by stating that he shared
"in the feeling of high personal regard for [Stephens] which per-
vades this House," referring to Stephens' "years, his ability, and his
long experience in public affairs." But, he said, "in this discussion I
cannot and I will not forget that the welfare and rights of my whole
race in this country are involved." Thus, Elliott did not "shrink
from saying that it is not from [Stephens] that the American House
of Representatives should take lessons in matters touching human
rights or the joint relations of the State and national govern-
ments. '' 592 He continued:
[Stephens] now offers this Government, which he has done his
utmost to destroy, a very poor return for its magnanimous treat-
ment, to come here and seek to continue, by the assertion of doc-
trines obnoxious to the true principles of our Government, the
burdens and oppressions which rest upon five millions of his coun-
trymen who never failed to lift their earnest prayers for the success
of this Government when the gentleman was seeking to break up
the Union of these States and to blot the American Republic from
the galaxy of nations.593
The Congressional Record reports that Elliott's speech was greeted
with loud applause.594
The transcript of the debate leaves the distinct impression that
opposition to the bill was not based on a genuine interest in faithful
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment but was a rearguard
591 2 Cong. Rec. 380 (Jan. 5, 1874).
592 Id. at 409 (Jan. 6, 1874).
593 Id. at 409-10.
594 Id. at 410.
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action by Southern conservatives who had supported slavery,
opposed Reconstruction, and now were opposing desegregation on
much the same ground. One particularly egregious example bears
mention. John Harris of Virginia stated that "there is not one gen-
tleman upon this floor who can honestly say he really believes that
the colored man is created his equal." He was interrupted from the
floor by Alonzo Ransier, a black congressman from South Caro-
lina, who stated, "I can," to which Harris retorted: "Of course you
can; but I am speaking to the white men of the House; and, Mr.
Speaker, I do not wish to be interrupted again by him."595 Shortly
thereafter, Harris responded to the argument that Southern senti-
ments against desegregation were a product of "prejudice":
Mr. HARRIS, of Virginia.... Admit that it is prejudice, yet the
fact exists, and you, as members of Congress and legislators, are
bound to respect that prejudice. It was born in the children of the
South; born in our ancestors, and born in your ancestors in Massa-
chusetts-that the colored man was inferior to the white.
Mr. RANSIER. I deny that.
Mr. HARRIS, of Virginia. I do not allow you to interrupt me. Sit
down; I am talking to white men; I am talking to gentlemen.596
Republicans capitalized on Harris' breach of decorum by implying
that it was typical of the "spirit that still animates" the Democratic
Party.597 Representative Elliott responded directly to Representa-
tive Harris' "diatribe," stating:
[Harris] so far transcended the limits of decency and propriety as
to announce upon this floor that his remarks were addressed to
white men alone[.] I shall have no word of reply. Let him feel that
a negro was not only too magnanimous to smite him in his weak-
ness, but was even charitable enough to grant him the mercy of his
silence. [Laughter and applause on the floor and in the
galleries.] 598
The House debate was ultimately inconclusive. On January 7,
1874, Butler withdrew the bill to the Judiciary Committee to con-
595 Id. at 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (colloquy between Rep. Harris and Rep. Ransier).
596 Id. at 377 (colloquy between Rep. Harris and Rep. Ransier).
597 Id. at 567 (Jan. 10, 1874) (statement of Rep. Mellish); accord id. at 426 (Jan. 6, 1874)
(statement of Rep. Stowell).
598 Id. at 410 (Jan. 6, 1874).
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sider various amendments that had been offered on the floor.599
When it was reported back, it had been stripped of its school
desegregation provision.600 Historian Alfred Kelly attributes But-
ler's withdrawal of the motion from the floor to pressure from
Barnas Sears, an officer of the Peabody Education Fund, which
was a principal source of school funding for black and white chil-
dren in the Southern states, and which threatened to cut off fund-
ing if the schools were desegregated.6°1 Although this may be true,
Butler's statements to the House at the time of recommittal betray
no change of heart on the schools issue or anything else. Butler
delivered a fiery speech in full-throated support of the measure,
which was interrupted so many times by laughter and applause
from the spectators that the Speaker had to threaten to clear the
galleries. 60 2 His only specific reference to the schools question was
the sarcastic statement, with regard to an amendment to allow sep-
arate but equal schools, that he wished to "consider whether upon
the whole it is just to the negro children to put them into mixed
599 Id. at 458 (Jan. 7, 1874). Many of the amendments were directed to the segregation
issue, and they confirmed that the bill was understood to outlaw segregated facilities. For
example, Rep. Eldredge proposed the following amendment: "That nothing in this act shall
be so construed as to prevent any person or corporation from making any separate
arrangement or provision for the accommodation, convenience, or comfort of the white
citizens of the United States." Id. at 339 (Dec. 19, 1873). Similarly, Rep. Beck proposed:
That nothing herein contained shall be so construed as to require hotel-keepers to
put whites and blacks into the same rooms, or beds or feed them at the same table,
nor to require that whites and blacks shall be put into the same rooms or classes at
school, or the same boxes or seats at theaters, or the same berths on steamboats or
other vessels, or the same lots in cemeteries.
Id. at 405 (Jan. 6, 1874). Rep. Durham, a Democrat from Kentucky, also proposed an
amendment, which, if adopted, would have authorized the segregation of schools:
[S]hould the trustees or other persons having control over the free or common
schools in their respective districts cause to be taught a separate school in said dis-
trict for the negro and mulatto children therein for the same length of time the other
free or common school is taught, thei said negroes or mulattoes shall have no right
under this bill to admission to or accommodation in schools wherein white children
are taught.
Id. at 406. See also id. at 407 (amendment by Rep. Lowndes) (providing "[t]hat where
separate schools are provided for white and colored children, the children of each race
shall have admission only to the schools for that race").
6w0 See infra notes 666-69 and accompanying text.
601 Kelly, supra note 21, at 553-54; see also Frank & Munro, supra note 9, at 466
(concluding that the threat to withdraw school funding "materially contributed to the
change in the bill").
6m02 See 2 Cong. Rec. 458 (Jan. 7, 1874).
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schools, where, being in the same classes with the white children,
they may be kept back by their white confreres."6 3 These would
not seem to be the remarks of a man who had been persuaded to
abandon support for school desegregation.
D. Passage by the Senate, 1874
Action on the civil rights bill moved back to the Senate. On
April 29, 1874, the Judiciary Committee reported favorably on a
revised version of Sumner's bill.6°4 In the meantime, Sumner him-
self had died, so leadership in support of the measure passed to
Judiciary Committee member (and future Secretary of State) Fred-
erick Frelinghuysen of New Jersey. Section I of the bill as reported
from committee was as follows:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; and
also of common schools and public institutions of learning or
benevolence supported, in whole or in part, by general taxation; and
of cemeteries so supported, subject only to the conditions and limi-
tations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every
race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.' 5
Section 4 guaranteed the right of every qualified citizen to serve on
juries without regard to race, and other sections of the bill specified
enforcement and penalties. 606 This proposal-minus the italicized
portion respecting schools and cemeteries-ultimately became the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.
Because the Judiciary Committee draft contained language ulti-
mately enacted into law, we must pause to consider whether it
required access to the covered facilities on a desegregated basis, or
merely on a separate-but-equal basis. In the years following enact-
ment, several lower federal courts interpreted the Act to permit
separate but equal facilities, albeit without reference to (and likely
6m Id. at 457.
604 2 Cong. Rec. 3450-51 (Apr. 29, 1874).
605 Id. at 3451 (Apr. 29, 1874) (emphasis added).
606 Id.
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without access to) the legislative history.607 Furthermore, histori-
ans have expressed doubt about the Act's intended meaning. °8
Frelinghuysen explained that his bill "followed the language of
the original bill as introduced by Mr. Sumner," changed only "in
the manner in which it is presented. ' 60 9 This would, of course,
mean that the bill forbade segregation of the covered facilities,
because this was the clear import of Sumner's bill. But in fact the
committee had subtly altered Sumner's language to reflect the revi-
sionist equal protection rationale for the bill, as a response to the
Slaughter-House decision.61 ° Whereas the Sumner bill had begun
with the words "no citizen of the United States shall," the Freling-
huysen bill applied to "all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States."' 611 This revision reflected the doctrinal shift from
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the Equal Protection
Clause. Moreover, in shifting from a negative proscription ("no
citizen of the United States shall") to an affirmative protection
("all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall"),
the committee had to drop the word "any" that had appeared in
Sumner's text. Where Sumner's bill had provided that no citizen
shall be "excepted or excluded from the full and equal enjoyment
of any accommodation, advantage, facility, or privilege furnished
607 See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1001
(C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875) (No. 18,258); United States v. Dodge, 25 F. Cas. 882,883 (W.D. Tex.
1877) (No. 14,976); see also Gray v. Cincinnati S. Ry. Co., 11 F. 683, 685-86 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1882) (noting in dictum that the obligation to provide equal accommodations may sanction
segregation).
608 See, e.g., Lofgren, supra note 9, at 137 ("As adopted, the equal accommodations
section [of the 1875 Act] may have guaranteed more than simply a right of access to
equally good facilities, enforceable in federal court, but this interpretation was ensured
neither by its language nor by its legislative history."). Herbert Hovenkamp has stated:
The Civil War Amendments and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were designed to give
blacks "equal" access to certain institutions and facilities-but in 1875 equal access
did not mean integrated access.... In fact, the outcome in Plessy v. Ferguson would
have been the same even if the Civil Rights Act of 1875 had been upheld by the
Supreme Court.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.J. 624,
642-43. Neither Lofgren nor Hovenkamp analyzed the legislative history in any detail, and
they did not present any evidence in support of their reading of the Act that is not ana-
lyzed in this Article.
609 2 Cong. Rec. 4169 (May 22, 1874). Sumner's bill is quoted in full at supra note 582.
610 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
611 Compare 2 Cong. Rec. 945 (Jan. 27, 1874) (Sumner bill) with id. at 3451 (Apr. 29,
1874) (Frelinghuysen bill).
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by ... superintendents, teachers, and other officers of common
schools," the revised bill provided that all persons "shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advan-
tages, facilities, and privileges of ... common schools. '6 12 The
right to equal accommodation in any school is not necessarily the
same as the right to equal accommodation in the schools. The
change thus introduced an ambiguity that had not been present in
the Sumner bill. In light of Frelinghuysen's explanation, the ambi-
guity was apparently both unnoticed and unintended, but it none-
theless generated questions.
George Boutwell of Massachusetts, a dedicated proponent of
racially integrated schools and former member of the Joint Com-
mittee on Reconstruction, perceived that omission of the word
"any" could obscure the meaning of the bill:
[T]here are Senators who say, and there are persons outside who
will say,.., that if a school-house is set up on one side of a street
for black children and another on the opposite side set up for white
children and they are compelled respectively to go to the schools
established, and it turns out that the appropriation made for each
school is equal to the appropriation made for the other, that the
teachers are of equal capacity, that the same branches are taught,
then equal facilities are furnished, which is the expression
employed by the committee.6 13
He therefore moved to amend the bill to refer to "every common
school and public institution of learning or benevolence. '614 Bout-
well explained that his amendment was purely for purposes of clar-
ification: "I only wish to say that this amendment is designed to
make clearer than the text of the bill seems to do what I suppose is
the intention of the committee, and the intention of the Senate
"615
Others did not see the ambiguity, and suspected that Boutwell's
intention was to require the states to compel attendance at racially
612 Compare id. at 945 (Jan. 27, 1874) (Sumner bill) (emphasis added) with id. at 3451
(Apr. 29, 1874) (Frelinghuysen bill).
613 Id. at 4168 (May 22, 1874).
614 Id. at 4167 (emphasis added).
615 Id.
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integrated schools. 616 Frelinghuysen insisted that under the bill as
reported by the committee "a colored child has a right to go to a
white school, or a white child to go to a colored school," 617 and
thus that Boutwell's amendment was unnecessary. He pointed out
that Boutwell's amendment, in addition to being unnecessary,
would literally mean that "all persons shall be entitled to the
accommodations of every common school," which would make no
sense, because no child could attend more than one school at a
time.618 He also reminded the Senate (inaccurately) that the lan-
guage had been taken from Sumner's legislation, which should
have assured them that it could not reasonably be interpreted to
allow separate but equal schools. The principal spokesman for the
opposition, Senator Allen Thurman, former Chief Justice of the
Ohio Supreme Court, similarly interpreted the bill as requiring
desegregation. "I know that the first section of the bill may to a
careless reader seem ambiguous," he commented, "but I do not
think there is one member of the majority of the Judiciary Commit-
tee who will not say, if the question is put directly to him, that the
meaning of the section is that there shall be mixed schools. ' 619 A
number of other congressmen in both houses likewise commented
that though the text was ambiguous the intent was clear.620 An
616 See id. at 4168 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (stating that Boutwell's amendment
would "require the children of colored people and white people to go to the same school,
whether they desire it or not"); id. (colloquy between Sen. Frelinghuysen and Sen.
Boutwell).
617 2 Cong. Rec. 4168 (May 22, 1874); accord id. (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen)
(stating that "the bill as it stands.., does give any person a right to any of these schools")
(emphasis added).
618 Id. (emphasis added). Frelinghuysen also pointed out that other language in
Boutwell's amendment would make the bill applicable to private schools that received any
form of state "endowment" in the future. He stated that "I do not think we ought to put it
in the power of a State by making an endowment to an institution to change it from a
private to a public institution." Id. This position accords with the Supreme Court's later
holdings that the mere receipt of governmental financial assistance by a private institution
does not render its actions "state action" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982). But cf. Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455, 463-68 (1973) (striking down state provision of textbooks to racially
discriminatory private schools in context of state-encouraged movement to abandon public
schools).
619 2 Cong. Rec. 4088 (May 20, 1874).
620 See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. 981 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Ellis Roberts) (stating
that he "understand[s] the Senate bill to insist upon the same schools for the colored
children as for the white children"); 2 Cong. Rec. 4158 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen.
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identical ambiguity in a law prohibiting discrimination by a railroad
had been interpreted by a unanimous Supreme Court the previous
year as forbidding segregation.621 Boutwell's amendment was
defeated by a vote of 5-42.622
Subsequent debate further confirms that the bill was understood
to require not just equality of facilities but desegregation, for that
was the predominant focus of the senators' remarks. Far more
than in earlier debates, opponents pressed the argument that sepa-
rate facilities of equal quality would suffice to satisfy the dictates of
the Constitution.61a Perhaps the clearest statement of this argu-
ment was by Augustus Merrimon, a North Carolina Democrat,
who reasoned:
[T]he State Legislature cannot pass a law providing that white chil-
dren should be educated and that colored children should not be,
because that would deny the equal protection of the laws. But
when it affords the same provision, the same measure, the same
character for the colored race that it afforded for the white race,
there is no more discrimination against one race than there is
against the other; and therefore it is competent for the Legislature
to do it, there being no restriction on such a power in the Constitu-
tion of the United States.624
On the proponents' side, Edmunds denounced a proposed amend-
ment that would authorize separate facilities: "If there is anything
in the bill," he said, "it is exactly contrary to that. If there is any-
thing in the fourteenth amendment it is exactly opposite to that."6 5
To be sure, Republican supporters of the bill not infrequently
denied that it would bring about "mixed schools," which has led
some historians to question whether these speakers understood it
Saulsbury) (stating that, despite Boutwell's comments, he interprets the bill as prohibiting
separate schools); id. at 4154 (statement of Sen. Cooper) (noting that the text of the bill is
ambiguous but that the intent is clear).
621 Railroad Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445,452-53 (1873). For fuller discussion of
the case, see infra text accompanying notes 792-805.
622 2 Cong. Rec. 4169 (May 22, 1874).
623 See, e.g., id. at 4144 (statement of Sen. Stockton); id. at 4154-55 (statement of Sen.
Cooper); id. at 4158 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury); id. at 4167 (statement of Sen. Stewart);
id. app. at 321 (statement of Sen. Bogy); id. at 368 (statement of Sen. Hamilton); id. at 359,
360 (May 21, 1874) (statements of Sen. Merrimon).
624 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 359 (May 21, 1874).
625 2 Cong. Rec. 4171 (May 22, 1874).
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to require desegregation.626 In context, however, these comments
had an entirely different meaning. Supporters of the bill were
divided into two camps, which we might call (using modem termi-
nology) "desegregationists" and "integrationists." Desegregation-
ists, the larger group, maintained that all children should have the
right to attend any public school without discrimination on the
basis of their race, but that individuals of both races could (and
probably would) choose to attend separate schools. Frelinghuysen
explained that "[w]hen in a school district there are two schools,
and the white children choose to go to one and the colored to the
other, there is nothing in this bill that prevents their doing so."627
He predicted that "this voluntary division into separate schools
would often be the solution of difficulty in communities where
there still lingers a prejudice against a colored boy."628 Separate
schools, however, would be confined to those localities in which a
large number of black children resided, and where sentiment in
favor of separation was strong enough among both races to make it
practical.629
The issue of principle, according to the desegregationists, was
equality of rights before the law rather than the actual pedagogical
or moral consequences of mixed schooling. Senator Edmunds
called desegregated schools "a matter of inherent right, unless you
adopt the slave doctrine that color and race are reasons for distinc-
tion among citizens. ' 63 0  Representative John Lynch, a black
Republican from Mississippi, put the point in this way:
The colored people in asking the passage of this bill just as it
passed the Senate do not thereby admit that their children can be
626 See Lofgren, supra note 9, at 137.
627 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
628 Id.; accord id. at 4082 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Pratt) ("Where the colored
people are numerous enough to have separate schools of their own, they would probably
prefer their children should be educated by themselves, and there is nothing in this bill
which prohibits this."). Similarly, Sen. Alcorn stated:
Every child in [Mississippi] has the benefit of a common-school education, we have
no prohibition declared. You have a right to send your child to any school you
choose. That is the citizen's right; but it is simply a right that the colored people
exercise by sending their children to the colored school; it is a right that the white
people enjoy by sending their children to the white school.
Id. app. at 305 (May 22, 1874).
629 See 2 Cong. Rec. 4082 (May 20, 1874) (statement of Sen. Pratt).
630 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3260 (May 9, 1872).
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better educated in white than in colored schools; nor that white
teachers because they are white are better qualified to teach than
colored ones. But they recognize the fact that the distinction when
made and tolerated by law is an unjust and odious proscription;
that you make their color a ground of objection, and consequently
a crime. This is what we most earnestly protest against. Let us
confer upon all citizens, then, the rights to which they are entitled
under the Constitution; and then if they choose to have their chil-
dren educated in separate schools, as they do in my own State,
then both races will be satisfied, because they will know that the
separation is their own voluntary act and not legislative
compulsion. 631
In an earlier debate, Senator Hiram Revels, a black Republican
from Mississippi, predicted that black children would be "very
slow" about actually attending white schools. But, he said, laws
requiring racial separation "increase that prejudice which is now
fearfully great against them.... I repeat, let no encouragement be
given to a prejudice against those who have done nothing to justify
it." 6
32
A much smaller group, led by Senator Boutwell of Massachu-
setts, stressed that the goal should be actual integration:
To say... that equal facilities shall be given in different schools, is
to rob your system of public instruction of that quality by which
our people, without regard to race or color, shall be assimilated in
ideas, personal, political, and public, so that when they arrive at the
period of manhood they shall act together upon public questions
with ideas formed under the same influences and directed to the
same general results .... 63
He explained that the "theory of human equality cannot be taught
in families," but that "in the public school, where children of all
classes and conditions are brought together, this doctrine of human
equality can be taught, and it is the chief means of securing the
perpetuity of republican institutions. ''634
Both camps clearly agreed, however, that the bill would and
should give all schoolchildren a legally enforceable remedy if they
631 3 Cong. Rec. 945 (Feb. 3, 1875).
632 Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1059 (Feb. 8, 1871).
633 2 Cong. Rec. 4116 (May 21, 1874).
6 Id.
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were excluded from any school on the basis of race-the very issue
that would later reach the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education.635 Senator Timothy Howe of Wisconsin, for example,
disputed Boutwell's contention that the public schools should be
used to "unteach this [racial] prejudice" and insisted that voluntary
separation of the races was both likely and desirable.636 At the
same time, however, he stressed that the choice must be left to
"individuals and not the superintendent of schools" and that the
"law" should not be allowed to "say that they shall not be educated
together.
637
The difference between these camps has a modem analogue in
controversies that arose in the decades after Brown. In the fields
of higher education and noncompulsory educational activities, the
Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional obligation
to require actual integration, provided the facilities are equal and
open to students of all races and the state maintains no policies
that perpetuate segregation.638 But in the context of primary and
secondary education, the Court has held that voluntary choice pro-
grams are constitutionally inadequate and that previously segre-
gated school districts must take affirmative steps to integrate their
student bodies, by race-conscious student assignment and transpor-
tation if necessary.639 The latter position goes farther than even
Boutwell thought he could go:
635 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
636 2 Cong. Rec. 4151 (May 22, 1874).
637 Id.
638 See United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992) (higher education); Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (extracurricular activities). In Fordice, the Court recognized
that merely because "an institution is predominantly white or black does not in itself make
out a constitutional violation," but held that "[b]ecause the former de jure segregated
system of public universities in Mississippi impeded the free choice of prospective students,
the State in dismantling that system must take the necessary steps to ensure that this choice
now is truly free." Fordice, 112 S. Ct. at 2743; see also id. at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that the Court's decision "portends neither the destruction of historically black
colleges nor the severing of those institutions from their distinctive histories and
traditions").
639 See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437-42 (1968); see also Freeman v. Pitts,
112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443 (1992) (citing Green for the proposition that former de jure
segregated school districts must enact affirmative desegregation measures designed to
create "a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch").
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Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wish to ask the Senator from Mas-
sachusetts a question. I ask whether he proposes by his amend-
ment to compel colored children to go to white schools?
Mr. BOUTWELL. That I cannot do; but I will do everything
which the Constitution authorizes to be done-to see to it that the
children are trained together for purpose of life, and education is
the fitting for it.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. You do not propose to compel them?
Mr. BOUTWELL. I do not contemplate that. I cannot do
that.?4
When supporters of the bill denied that it would necessarily require
"mixed schools," then, they did not mean that it would counte-
nance de jure segregation. They meant only that genuine freedom-
of-choice plans would be permissible and that compulsory integra-
tion was unnecessary.
The choice between desegregation and separate but equal was
squarely presented. Again amendments were proposed that
reflected each of the two principal constitutional claims of the
opposition: that education is not a protected civil right and that
segregated schools are "equal." Senator Aaron Sargent, a Repub-
lican from California, proposed to amend the bill to provide:
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prohibit any
State or school district from providing separate schools for persons
of different sex or color, where such separate schools are equal in
all respects to others of the same grade established by such author-
ity, and supported by an equal pro rata expenditure of school
funds.641
The amendment failed by a vote of 21-26.642 All the negative votes
were from Republicans. Of the senators who had voted for the
Fourteenth Amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress, eight voted
against the amendment and two voted in favor.6 43 One of the two
exceptions, William Stewart of Nevada, later voted for the bill.
640 2 Cong. Rec. 4168 (May 22, 1874).
641 Id. at 4167.
642 Id.
643 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with 2 Cong. Rec. 4167 (May 22,
1874) (reporting the Senate vote on the Sargent amendment).
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John Gordon, Democrat from Georgia, suggested striking the
entire school clause, but this motion was defeated, 14-30.644
Another amendment, to exclude already established schools, gar-
nered only 11 votes.645 Sargent then proposed another version of
his separate-but-equal amendment, in somewhat more ambiguous
language. 6 46 This time he lost, 16-28.647 A motion to delete the
jury clause was also defeated, 15-28. 8
The meaning of the bill having been clarified, its constitutionality
thoroughly debated, and attempts to amend it to allow separate but
equal school laws defeated, the civil rights act came up for a final
vote on May 22, 1874. It passed by a margin of 29-16.649 Only four
members of the Senate who had voted for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as members of the Thirty-ninth Congress were present for the
vote; all four voted in favor of the bill.650 It carried among the
Republican senators by a margin of 23-3. Senators Boreman, Car-
penter, and Lewis were the only Republicans to vote against. 651
E. Failure in the House, 1874
The Senate bill now went to the House, where under House
rules it could not be reported by the Judiciary Committee that ses-
sion without a motion to suspend the rules, which required a two-
thirds majority. House support for the bill must therefore be mea-
sured by the results of a series of procedural votes. Three times
General Butler moved to suspend the rules to allow the Committee
to consider and report the bill. On May 25, just three days after
the bill had passed the Senate, he garnered 152 votes, with 85 vot-
644 2 Cong. Rec. 4170 (May 22, 1874).
645 Id. at 4171.
646 Id. Sargent's amendment would have guaranteed each schoolchild the right to the
equal benefit and enjoyment "of the common-school system." Id. (statement of Sen.
Sargent). This proposal was immediately recognized as "authoriz[ing] States on account of
color to deny the right to... go to a particular common school." Id. (statement of Sen.
Edmunds).
647 Id. at 4175.
648 Id.
649 Id. at 4176.
650 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Aniendment) with 2 Cong. Rec. 4176 (May 22,
1874) (reporting the Senate vote on passage of the civil rights act).
651 2 Cong. Rec. 4176 (May 22, 1874).
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ing "nay. ' 652 That is a very substantial majority, but less than two-
thirds. One week later, on June 1, he tried again. This time, he
reported that he had been "instructed by the Committee on the
Judiciary to allow a motion in the House to strike out the school
clause of that bill. ' 653 Upon questioning, however, he refused to
agree to support striking out the clause, but only to allow a vote.654
Apparently, the Democrats were not confident that they could pre-
vail on such a vote without an agreement in advance, so they did
not accept Butler's offer and instead attempted to run out the clock
by a series of procedural votes. The key vote that day was on a
motion to adjourn, which failed by a margin of 72-141.655 If this
vote was a proxy for the merits, as it appears to have been,656 the
shift of a single vote would have produced Butler's necessary two-
thirds, and the Sumner bill would have been assured of passage.
As a Southern Republican opponent of the bill commented later:
"The majority of this House, yea nearly two-thirds, in June last sol-
emnly voted that they would not only take up but they would pass
the civil-rights bill as it came from the Senate. ' 65 7 But Butler could
not capitalize on this support that day; the time came for recess and
the House moved on to other business. 658 He tried again on June
8, this time summoning a margin of 138-88, far short of the neces-
sary two-thirds. 659 On June 18, Butler announced that he had con-
cluded that the bill could not get the necessary two-thirds, a
conclusion that was disputed by his political ally, George Hoar.66 °
Butler then asked for unanimous consent to refer the bill to the
Committee on the understanding that it would not be reported out
in that session. 61
652 Id. at 4242-43 (May 25, 1874).
653 Id. at 4439 (June 1, 1874).
654 Id. Alfred Kelly's claim that Butler "promised the House to strike out the mixed
school clause" is not accurate. See Kelly, supra note 21, at 555 n.97.
655 2 Cong. Rec. 4439 (June 1, 1874).
656 With only six exceptions (which split evenly in the two directions), every negative
vote on the motion to adjourn supported Butler's position on the motions to suspend the
rules, and every affirmative vote opposed.
657 3 Cong. Rec. 978 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Sener).
658 2 Cong. Rec. 4439 (June 1, 1874).
659 Id. at 4691 (June 8, 1874).
660 Id. at 5162-63 (June 18, 1874).
661 Id.
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F. The Elections of 1874, Deletion of the Schools Provision,
and Passage of the Act
The events of May and June represented the high point of sup-
port for school desegregation legislation. The congressional elec-
tions of November 1874 were a disaster for the Republican Party,
which lost eighty-nine seats in the House. 2 Even General Butler
lost his seat in the landslide. From holding less than a third of the
House seats in the Forty-third Congress, the Democrats achieved a
majority of sixty seats in the Forty-fourth.663 Civil rights was the
principal issue in the campaign, though corruption and recession
played a major role.664 When the lameduck Forty-third Congress
convened in December, the leadership of the civil rights bill was
demoralized. Democrats claimed a mandate against the bill.665
The House Judiciary Committee broke into internal dissent,
requiring more than 20 votes to reach a conclusion about the bill.666
Eventually, the committee reported a bill that required desegrega-
tion of inns, common carriers, and other public accommodations,
but permitted "separate schools and institutions giving equal edu-
cational advantages in all respects for different classes of persons
entitled to attend such schools. ' 667 Even that was denounced by
Democrats as "defiance of the clear, distinct, and overwhelming
verdict of the people at the elections."' 668 While lameduck Repub-
licans continued to support the measure, those who would have to
face the voters again in 1876 deserted the cause in droves. Repub-
lican Simeon Chittenden, of New York, frankly admitted that he
was going to vote against the bill despite its "justice" and its "con-
formity... with the late constitutional amendments" because "I do
662 See Gillette, supra note 18, at 246.
663 See id.
664 For a detailed account of the election, see id. at 211-58.
665 See, e.g., 3 Cong. Rec. app. at 17 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. A. White); 3
Cong. Ree. 1001 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Phelps); id. at 949 (Feb. 3, 1875)
(statement of Rep. Finck); id. at 951 (statement of Rep. Storm); id. at 952 (statement of
Rep. Whitehead); accord id. at 978-79 (statement of Rep. Sener). But see id. at 1005 (Feb.
4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Garfield) ("The recent disasters of the republican party have
not sprung from any of the brave acts done in the effort to do. justice to the negro.").
666 Kelly, supra note 21, at 558 n.113.
667 3 Cong. Rec. 939 (Feb. 3, 1875).
668 Id. at 949 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Finck).
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not want to go down with my party quite so deep as the bill will
sink it if it becomes the law. '669
Deliberations on the civil rights bill began on Wednesday, Janu-
ary 27, 1875. Opponents of the bill embarked on a ferocious fili-
buster, with repeated roll call votes on various motions to adjourn,
all of them soundly defeated only to be made again.670 The House
remained in continuous session until Friday morning, and marshals
were dispatched to summon weary members from their homes to
maintain a quorum. Eventually, after some 48 hours of monoto-
nous parliamentary maneuvering, proponents of the bill gave up
and the House adjourned.671
The time had come to change the rules. On January 23, the
Republican caucus had proposed a rule that henceforth, a majority
vote would suffice to suspend the rules to bring business to the
floor. Members of the majority party thought it intolerable that a
minority of one-third plus one could tie up legislative business
indefinitely. The civil rights filibuster clinched support for the
change. After heated and tumultuous debate, and compromise
revision to guarantee the minority reasonable time for legislative
deliberation, the rules were amended to empower a majority to
act.672 The abolition of the filibuster in the House remains the
most enduring legacy of the struggle over the 1875 Act.
On February 3, the House took up the bill under the revised
rules. As reported by the Judiciary Committee, the bill applied to
schools, but expressly permitted the schools to be separate but
equal. Other facilities covered by the Act would be desegregated.
By prearrangement, the Judiciary Committee permitted votes to be
taken on three amendments to the bill.673 The first, by Representa-
tive Cessna of Pennsylvania, would restore the language of the
Senate bill and thus forbid segregated schools. 6 74 The second, by
669 Id. at 982 (Feb. 4, 1875).
670 See id. at 785-829 (Jan. 27, 1875).
671 Id. at 829.
672 The rules change debate is described in Gillette, supra note 18, at 266-69.
673 See 3 Cong. Rec. 938 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Butler) (explaining that this
procedure had been adopted "in order that all shades of republican opinion may be voted
upon").
674 See id. (statement of Rep. Cessna). The Cessna substitute, according to its author,
"is not only substantially, but it is without any alteration, the bill as finally passed by the
Senate." Id.
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Representative White of Alabama, would permit separate accom-
modations in all the facilities and institutions covered by the Act.675
The third, by Representative Kellogg of Connecticut, would strike
out the entire schools provision but leave the public accommoda-
tion provisions intact.676
There ensued two days of acrimonious debate, during which
John Y. Brown of Kentucky was censured677 for his description of
General Butler as
one who is outlawed in his own home from r6spectable society;
whose name is synonymous with falsehood; who is the champion,
and has been on all occasions, of fraud; who is the apologist of
thieves; who is such a prodigy of vice and meannesses that to
describe him would sicken imagination and exhaust invective.678
That set the tone.
When time came to vote, Kellogg's amendment striking the
school clause passed, 128-48.679 White's amendment allowing sep-
arate but equal facilities for all the institutions covered by the Act
675 See id. at 939. The White substitute followed the language of the Senate bill,
including "common schools and public institutions of learning or benevolence supported in
whole or in part by general taxation," but added a proviso:
Provided, That nothing in this act shall be construed to require mixed
accommodations, (by sitting together,) facilities, and privileges at inns, in public
conveyances on land or water, theaters, or other places of public amusement, for
persons of different race or color, nor to prohibit separate accommodations,
facilities, and privileges at inns, in public conveyances on land or water, theaters, or
other places of public amusement; such separate accommodations, facilities, and
privileges being equal in equipment and kind for persons of every race and color,
regardless of any previous condition of servitude: And provided further, That
nothing in this act shall be construed to require mixed common schools and public
institutions of learning and benevolence for persons of different race or color, nor to
prohibit separate common schools for different races or colors, provided the
facilities, duration of term, and equipments of such common schools and public
institutions for both races in the town, city, school district, or other topographical
division shall be equal in facilities and equipments for both races for the purposes
for which such institutions are established.
Id.
676 See id.
677 Id. at 992 (Feb. 4, 1875).
678 Id. at 985. Brown also stated that "[i]f I wished to describe all that was pusillanimous
in war, inhuman in peace, forbidden in morals, and infamous in politics, I should call it
'Butlerism.' " Id.
679 Id. at 1010.
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failed, 91-114.6s° Cessna's motion to restore the school desegrega-
tion provision by adopting the language of the Senate bill then
failed, 114-148.681 All 114 members who voted for the Cessna
amendment were Republicans. Fear of political fallout seems to be
the reason for the decline in Republican support, as compared to
the previous year. Among lameduck Republicans, who would not
have to face the voters again, the Cessna amendment carried by a
margin of 73-10. Among those who had been reelected the amend-
ment failed by a margin of 41-53. This defeat was the first time a
significant number of Republicans failed to support school deseg-
regation in the House. All of the Democrats voted "nay." The
final bill, shorn of the schools provision, then passed the House by
a vote of 162-99. 682 Again, all affirmative votes were from
Republicans.
These votes require explanation. Advocates of school desegre-
gation realized that they no longer had the votes to pass their
desired legislation, even by a simple majority. They were thus
faced with a choice between a civil rights bill with an explicit
authorization for separate but equal schools and a bill that did not
apply to schools whatsoever. With some exceptions, they con-
cluded that a separate-but-equal provision was worse than no pro-
vision at all. Many supporters of school desegregation therefore
680 Id.
681 Id. at 1010-11.
682 Id. at 1011. Historian Charles Lofgren speculates that the 1875 Act passed the
House of Representatives only because "many House Republicans found themselves lame
ducks after the autumn election of 1874, and hence unencumbered by worries about
constituents who cared little for civil rights." Lofgren, supra note 9, at 137. This
interpretation is not borne out by the facts. The Act won the support not only of almost all
the lameduck Republicans, but of 48 out of 60 (80%) of the Republicans who had been
reelected. (A larger number of reelected Republicans abandoned school desegregation,
the most controversial feature of the bill, by voting against the Cessna amendment; but
they voted for the final Act.) More to the point, every lameduck Republican who voted in
favor of the 1875 Act, without a single exception, had voted the previous May to suspend
the rules to take up and pass the bill. Compare 2 Cong. Rec. 4242-43 (May 25, 1874)
(reporting the House vote on the motion to suspend the rules) with 3 Cong. Rec. 1011
(Feb. 4, 1875) (reporting the House vote on passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875).
Lofgren does not explain why, if they were trying to avoid offending their constituents,
large majorities of the House Republicans voted over and over again to bring the measure
to the floor before the election. Contrary to Lofgren, the 1874 elections diminished support
for the bill among Republicans who had been reelected; it did not increase support among
the lame ducks.
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voted in favor of the Kellogg amendment, as well as the Cessna
amendment. 3 Kellogg, who had supported school desegregation
in each of the previous efforts, stated that he offered his motion
because the separate-but-equal provision was "worse than noth-
ing." M ( "As the bill is now drawn," he explained, "we recognize a
distinction in color which we ought not to recognize by any legisla-
tion of the Congress of the United States."6 5 James Monroe, an
Ohio Republican, explained that he preferred the Senate bill but
would vote for the Kellogg amendment because the committee bill
"introduces formally into the statute law a discrimination between
different classes of citizens in regard to their privileges as citi-
zens." 6 This he regarded as "a dangerous precedent": "[I]f we
once establish a discrimination of this kind we know not where it
will end."687 Richard Cain, a black Republican from South Caro-
lina, stated: "If the school clause is objectionable to our friends,
and they think they cannot sustain it, then let it be struck out
entirely. We want no invidious discrimination in the laws of this
country, 1618 Julius Burrows, a Michigan Republican, made a pas-
sionate plea for restoring the Sumner bill-for what he called "free
schools." But he stated that "[i]f you cannot legislate free schools,
I prefer that the bill should be altogether silent upon the question
until other times and other men can do the subject justice." 9 If
the separate-but-equal compromise were enacted, he predicted,
"its pernicious influence would be felt in every State and Terri-
tory.'"690 Butler agreed.691 Even at the end, then, when the Repub-
w One hundred-fourteen members supported the Cessna amendment, 3 Cong. Rec.
1011 (Feb. 4, 1875), and only 48 opposed the Kellogg amendment. Id. at 1010. Even
assuming none of the opponents of the Kellogg amendment were opponents of
desegregation (which is unlikely), a majority of the desegregation faction supported
Kellogg's motion. It is necessary to rely on inference here, because the yeas and nays on
Kellogg's motion were not recorded.
684 Id. at 981.
685 Id. at 997. Kellogg also expressed concern that desegregation would "destroy the
schools in many of the Southern States." Id.
686 Id.
687 Id.
688 Id. at 981.
689 Id. at 1000.
690 Id.
691 Id. at 1006 (statement of Rep. Butler) (stating that "I should very much rather have
all relating to schools struck out than have even the committee's provision for mixed
schools").
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licans no longer had the votes to enact a school desegregation bill,
they refused to admit the legitimacy of the separate-but-equal prin-
ciple, and they were able to block it from enactment.
Four members of the House who had voted against the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1866 remained; and all four voted against
the Civil Rights Act,6 92 as well as against including school desegre-
gation in the final bill. 693 Fourteen members of the House who had
voted in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment (in one case as a Sen-
ator) remained. Ten voted in favor of including school desegrega-
tion in the bill and in favor of the bill.694 The other four (one of
whom had forgotten how he voted and now declared himself to
have "oppose[d] the fourteenth amendment by my vote and by my
voice ' 695) voted against including school desegregation but in favor
of the final bill.696 Three of these four had voted in favor of school
desegregation before the election,697 but they had abandoned the
cause.
692 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (June 13, 1866) (reporting the
House vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with 3 Cong. Rec. 1011 (Feb. 4,
1875) (reporting the House vote on passage of the civil rights bill). Representatives
Eldredge, Finck, Niblack and Randall opposed both measures.
693 3 Cong. Rec. 1011 (Feb. 4, 1875). This statement is based on their votes on the
Cessna amendment. Unfortunately, the yeas and nays on the Kellogg amendment were
not recorded.
694 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3149 (June 13, 1866) (reporting the
House vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with 3 Cong. Rec. 1011 (Feb. 4,
1875) (reporting the House vote on the Cessna amendment to require school
desegregation) and id. (reporting the House vote on passage of the civil rights bill).
Representatives Dawes, Garfield, Hooper, Kasson, Kelley, Lawrence, Myers, O'Neill,
Orth and Sawyer supported all three measures.
695 3 Cong. Rec. 979 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Hale). This was Robert S. Hale
of New York. In actuality, while Hale spoke against the Amendment, he was absent for
the first vote approving the Amendment, see Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (May
10, 1866), and voted in favor on the second vote. See id. at 3149 (June 13, 1866). Because
Hale made a point of associating his vote against the bill with his recollected opposition to
the Amendment, his vote might more accurately be deemed the vote of an opponent.
696 Compare 3 Cong. Rec. 1011 (Feb. 4, 1875) (reporting the House vote on the Cessna
amendment to require school desegregation) with id. (reporting the House vote on passage
of the civil rights bill). Representatives Bundy, Poland and Scofield opposed school
desegregation but supported the final bill.
697 All three had voted to suspend the rules to take up the Senate civil rights bill. See 2
Cong. Rec. 4242 (May 25, 1874). On June 1, Poland and Bundy voted against the motion
to adjourn; Scofield was not present. Id. at 4439. Poland and Scofield voted against
rejecting the Frye bill; Bundy was not a member of the House at that time.
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Support for the Kellogg amendment did not mean that desegre-
gation proponents had lost faith in their constitutional position,
only that they had concluded that litigation would be a more prom-
ising avenue for achieving those principles. Representative
Monroe reported that he had consulted upon this subject with
"influential colored gentlemen who are recognized as representa-
tive men of their people," as well as with Republicans "known as
men of radical opinions. ' 698 According to these informants,
Monroe told the House that:
[Blacks] would rather have their people take their chances under
the Constitution and its amendments; that they would rather fall
back upon the original principles of constitutional law and take ref-
uge under their shadow than to begin with this poor attempt to
confer upon them the privileges of education connected with this
discrimination.699
On this point Monroe was questioned by a fellow supporter of the
bill:
Mr. MERRIAM. Does the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Monroe]
wish the country to understand that in his opinion it would be
more satisfactory to the colored people of the South to have free-
dom of the theaters and of the cemeteries rather than freedom of
schools?
Mr. MONROE. They think their chances for good schools will be
better under the Constitution with the protection of the courts
than under a bill containing such provisions as this.700
The House bill returned to the Senate, where the political will of
the previous desegregation majority had similarly dissipated with
the election. No attempt was made to restore the schools clause,
and the bill passed the-Senate without amendment on February 27,
1875, one month before the Democratic majority would take
over.70 1 President Grant signed the bill on March 1.7 1
698 3 Cong. Rec. 997 (Feb. 4, 1875).
699 Id.
700 Id. at 998.
701 Id. at 1870 (Feb. 27, 1875).
702 Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
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G. Epilogue: Judicial Invalidation (1883) and Congressional
Failure (1884)
Between 1875 and 1877, blacks in both the North and the South
attempted to avail themselves of the protections of the bill, but
resistance was strong.70 3 Some proprietors closed down their facili-
ties in protest, some converted from being licensed public accom-
modations to being private clubs or boardinghouses, and many
more simply refused to comply, often enforcing their will with vio-
lence against the would-be black patrons.70 4 Tennessee went so far
as to pass a statute in 1875 abrogating the common law duty of
innkeepers, common carriers, and proprietors of public amuse-
ments to serve all persons, making their management's control
over who would use the services as "perfect and complete" as that
"of any private person over his private house, carriage, or private
theatre, or places of amusement for his family. '70 5 This reflected
the legislature's correct understanding that the constitutional basis
for the public accommodation and common carrier provisions of
the Civil Rights Act was the failure of states to accord the same
rights to black citizens as they did to whites. If Tennessee did not
enforce common carrier rights for the benefit of whites, there was
no constitutional basis for application of the 1875 Act in that state.
Some black plaintiffs obtained legal redress for exclusion from
segregated facilities.7°  More often their efforts were frustrated.
For many months, the Department of Justice failed to provide cop-
ies of the law to U.S. Attorneys and others in the field, leaving
703 For a detailed account of the enforcement experience under the Act, see John Hope
Franklin, The Enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 6 Prologue 225 (1974); see also
Gillette, supra note 18, at 276-78 (detailing the futility of enforcement efforts under the
1875 Act).
704 See Franklin, supra note 703, at 226-27; see also Gillette, supra note 18, at 276-77
(reciting Southern efforts to circumvent the Act).
705 Act of Mar. 24, 1875, ch. 130, § 1, 1875 Tenn. Acts 216,216-17. This statute was held
unconstitutional as applied to interstate travel in Brown v. Memphis & C. Ry. Co., 5 F. 499,
501 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1880).
706 See, e.g., Gray v. Cincinnati S. Ry. Co., 11 F. 683,686 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882) (charging
jury that defendant railroad company was liable under the Civil Rights Act if it denied
plaintiff seating in the ladies' car because of her color); United States v. Newcomer, 27 F.
Cas. 127, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1876) (No. 15,868) (charging jury that a hotel keeper who had
denied a traveler lodging because of his color violated the Civil Rights Act); see also
Franklin, supra note 703, at 229-34 (reviewing the history of the 1875 Act in the lower
courts).
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them ignorant of its content. Even after supplying the text of the
Act, the Department refused to provide interpretive guidance.7°7
The true import of the law, as reflected in its legislative history, was
therefore obscured. Many lower federal courts interpreted the Act
narrowly, either ruling that various facilities (such as barber shops,
saloons, or ice cream parlors) were not covered7°8 or that separate
but equal facilities were sufficient.70 9 And most of all, enforcement
of the Act was plagued by doubts about its constitutionality.
Lower courts were sharply divided on the question. After 1877,
the lower courts decided few cases under the Act; presumably they
were awaiting a decision by the Supreme Court on the fundamen-
tal question of whether the Act was constitutional. 1°
The first of the Civil Rights Cases,711 in which the Supreme
Court ruled on the constitutionality of the Act, involved a Kansas
innkeeper who was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney under the Act
for refusing to serve a black woman supper at the table of the
inn.7 l2 The constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act was squarely
raised as a defense, and the case reached the Supreme Court in
1876, just eighteen months after enactment of the Act. But the
Supreme Court dithered for seven years before rendering a deci-
sion-waiting until October 1883. We do not know the reason for
the delay. We can, however, surmise that the delay made a differ-
ence, for in the meantime the Compromise of 1877 had occurred
and the national commitment to civil rights enforcement had come
to an end.
After the disastrous Republican losses in the congressional elec-
tions of 1874, Republican Presidential candidate Rutherford B.
Hayes apparently lost to New York Democrat Samuel Tilden in the
707 See Franklin, supra note 703, at 228-29 (calling the Department "remarkably
derelict"); see also Gillette, supra note 18, at 277-78 (claiming that the federal government
"showed little interest" in enforcing the Act).
708 See Franklin, supra note 703, at 230 & n.34 (barber shops); id. at 232 & n.42
(saloons); id. at 232 & n.43 (ice cream parlors).
709 See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury-The Civil Rights Act, 30 F. Cas. 999, 1001
(C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875) (No. 18,258); United States v. Dodge, 25 F. Cas. 882,883 (W.D. Tex.
1877) (No. 14,976); see also Gray, 11 F. at 685-86 (noting in dictum that the obligation to
provide equal accommodations may sanction separate-but-equal segregation).
710 See Franklin, supra note 703, at 233.
711 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
712 See Franklin, supra note 703, at 233.
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election of 1876. Hayes was able to scrape together the appear-
ance of victory only by electoral fraud in the Republican-controlled
states of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.713 This precipi-
tated a political and constitutional crisis. Democrats held a major-
ity in the House of Representatives and had sufficient votes to
delay the official counting of electoral votes by filibuster and
repeated dilatory motions. If the votes could not be counted by
March 4, Hayes could not take office and the country would be
thrown into constitutional turmoil. Republicans and moderate
Southern Democrats (many of them former Whigs) struck a bar-
gain in which Republicans could proceed with the count and Hayes
could take office, but only if federal enforcement of the Recon-
struction Amendments ceased and control over their own affairs
(including the civil rights of their black citizens) were returned to
the electoral majorities of the Southern states. The Republicans
also agreed to fund major public works projects in the South and to
appoint Democrats to federal offices in place of the carpetbaggers
and scalawags who had previously been the backbone of the white
Republican Party in the South. Thus ended Reconstruction, in a
tawdry deal to steal an election.1 And with the end of Recon-
struction came a sea-change in public, intellectual, governmental
and legal opinion. Support and protection for the rights of black
citizens passed away and were replaced by the regime of Jim
Crow. 7 15 So deep and enduring was this change that no official
interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments or enforcement
legislation by legislative, executive, or judicial bodies after 1876 can
be assumed to be unaffected by it.
Thus, the legal and intellectual climate had changed dramatically
between passage of the Act in 1875 and decision of the Civil Rights
Cases in 1883. By the time of oral argument, five cases raising the
identical constitutional issue were on the Court's docket. Each
involved exclusion from various facilities (inns, theaters, and rail-
713 Historian C. Vann Woodward concludes: "The consensus of recent historical
scholarship is that Hayes was probably entitled to the electoral votes of South Carolina and
Louisiana, that Tilden was entitled to the four votes of Florida, and that Tilden was
therefore elected by a vote of 188 to 181." C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction:
The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction 19 (1951).
714 For an account of the Compromise of 1877, see Michael W. McConnell, The
Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 Const. Commentary 115, 127-29 (1994).
715 See id. at 130-33.
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roads); in none of them were the separate accommodations
"equal." In an opinion by Justice Joseph P. Bradley, the Court
held the Civil Rights Act of 1875 unconstitutional in every feature
except the jury provision, which was not at issue.716 The Four-
teenth Amendment, according to the Court, does not apply directly
to the discriminatory acts of private persons; the Constitution is not
"violated until the denial of the right has some State sanction or
authority. '717 This does not mean-as is often thought-that Con-
gress lacks the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
against discrimination at the hands of private parties. It means,
rather, that Congress lacks the power to protect against discrimina-
tion at the hands of private parties if the laws of the state provide
equal protection for all persons without regard to race.
Thus, the vice of the 1875 Act, according to the Court, was that it
was overbroad: "It applies equally to cases arising in States which
have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and
whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those
which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the
amendment. ' 718 If the law had been confined to those cases in
which state law did not provide redress, it would have been consti-
tutional. "Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the
States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their
facilities, to furnish proper accommodation to all unobjectionable
persons who in good faith apply for them," the Court noted, in an
exposition of the common law not dissimilar to that of Charles
Sumner.719 "If the laws themselves make any unjust discrimina-
tion," the Court continued, "Congress has full power to afford a
remedy under [the Fourteenth] amendment ... ."720 But if states
do their duty, the Court held, the federal government has no power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to interfere. This, it will be
recalled, tracks arguments made by Senator Allen Thurman during
the debates.72
716 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
717 Id. at 24.
718 Id. at 14.
719 Id. at 25.
720 Id.
721 See supra text accompanying notes 393-95.
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Under current approaches to constitutional adjudication, the
Civil Rights Cases would not be decided the same way (even
assuming the validity of the Court's substantive analysis of the
"state action" issue). In a facial challenge to the constitutionality
of an act of Congress, the statute must be sustained if it is suscepti-
ble to constitutional application in a significant number of cases.7 2
In an "as applied" challenge, a statute cannot be invalidated on the
basis of possible defects unless those defects are present in the case
itself.723 The problem with the Civil Rights Act of 1875, according
to the Court, was that it exceeded federal power as applied to
states with just and equal laws, though it would be constitutional as
applied in states that fail to provide equal protection to black citi-
zens with respect to the common law right of common carriage in
covered institutions. Under the modem approach, the Act would
thus be sustained on the facial challenge (because it is constitu-
tional in some applications). In an "as applied" challenge, the
Court would examine whether, in each of the five cases brought to
it, the states in question in fact provided effective legal redress for
violations of* the rights of black patrons. In all likelihood, that
inquiry would reveal that the Act was constitutional as applied.
Had Sumner been a more cautious draftsman, the 1875 Act
could easily have been written to avoid the constitutional problem
without losing any of its force.724 But by the time the Act was
invalidated in 1883, the political will to protect civil rights had
evaporated, and an avoidable error in drafting left the problem
unaddressed for over 80 years.
The year after the Civil Rights Cases were decided, the issue of
segregation came before Congress again. During debates over the
proposed Interstate Commerce Act, the first comprehensive fed-
eral regulatory statute governing a major industry (railroads),
James E. O'Hara, a black congressman from North Carolina, pro-
posed an amendment as follows:
And any person or persons having purchased a ticket to be con-
veyed from one State to another, or paid the required fare, shall
722 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
723 See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 612 (1988).
724 For example, as a predicate to federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff could have been
required to allege and prove that state law did not provide equal legal redress to black and
white patrons.
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receive the same treatment and be afforded equal facilities -and
accommodations as are furnished all other persons holding tickets
of the same class without discrimination.7
Both supporters and opponents interpreted the last two words of
the amendment ("without discrimination") as forbidding segrega-
tion, and they assumed that without these words the railroads
would be permitted to maintain separate but equal accommoda-
tions.726 The proposal was adopted on one day by a vote of 134-
97,727 but the result was reversed the next day by a vote of 137-
127.728
The episode shows both a continuity and a break from the expe-
rience of ten years before. As in 1871-75, members of Congress
understood the concept of racial "discrimination" to encompass
segregation as well as exclusion or inequality of facilities. Thus, at
the level of understanding of legal ideas and terminology, the dis-
criminatory character of segregation was still accepted. But this
time, unlike in 1871-75, the political forces favoring segregation
outnumbered those opposing it. By 1884, a majority of the House
of Representatives was willing to admit that segregation consti-
tuted "discrimination"-but vote for it nonetheless.
H. Analysis
Congress debated the constitutionality of school segregation and
ultimately decided not to interfere. If Congress's failure to enact
725 16 Cong. Rec. 296-97 (Dec. 16, 1884).
726 A congressman from Georgia moved to amend the motion to allow railroads to
provide "separate accommodations for white and colored persons," saying that there is no
"good reason.., why either the colored man or the white man should object" to a rule
permitting separate but equal accommodations. Id. at 316 (Dec. 17, 1884) (statement of
Rep. Crisp). A supporter of this motion, Representative Herbert, commented that if it
were adopted, the provision "will mean exactly what it would have meant if the words
'without discrimination' in the concluding part of that amendment had been omitted." Id.
Herbert maintained that "the words 'without discrimination' were inserted carefully for
the purpose of compelling certain gentlemen on this side to vote against the bill ...." Id.
"We have no objection," he continued, "to declaring that all men shall have equal facilities
and equal accommodations; but we do object to any law that compels a common carrier to
put all classes of people in the same cars .... ." Id. at 316-17. See also id. at 319 (statement
of Rep. Brumm) (repeating that the only ground of objection was to the phrase "without
discrimination").
727 Id. at 297 (Dec. 16, 1884).
728 Id. at 320 (Dec. 17, 1884).
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legislation were dispositive-as it would be if Congress had exclu-
sive authority to interpret and enforce the Amendment-that
would be the end of the matter. But if instead we assume that the
courts must interpret the Amendment in light of its most probable
understood meaning at the time it was enacted, and if we treat the
opinions of the congressmen as evidence of the opinions of
informed people of the day, what should we make of this debate?
That is, viewing this episode not as an act of lawmaking but as
evidence of contemporaneous interpretation, what do we learn
about the meaning that people at that time attached to the words
of the Fourteenth Amendment?
As an initial matter, it is clear beyond peradventure that a very
substantial portion of the Congress, including leading framers of
the Amendment, subscribed to the view that school segregation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. At a minimum, therefore,
the scholarly consensus must be corrected to admit that this inter-
pretation is within the legitimate range of interpretations of the
Amendment on originalist grounds.729 But is it possible to say
more: that this interpretation was the prevailing, or preponderant,
view, and thus the best understanding of the original meaning?
This question can be addressed from two perspectives. First, what
were the specific intentions and understandings of the framing gen-
eration regarding the issue of public school segregation? Second,
and more important, what was their understanding of the relevant
constitutional issues-the permissibility of segregation and the sta-
tus of education as a civil right?
1. Specific Intentions Regarding School Segregation
This is what we know: (1) on ten recorded votes in the Senate
and eight recorded votes in the House between 1871 and 1875, a
majority (but always less than two-thirds) voted for legislation pre-
mised on the unconstitutionality of school segregation; (2) efforts
to approve separate-but-equal requirements for education were
invariably defeated; and (3) there was a high correlation between
votes on the Fourteenth Amendment and votes in favor of school
729 H. Jefferson Powell makes the point in his Rules for Originalists, 73 Va. L. Rev. 659,
690 (1987), that history sometimes reveals a "range of 'original understandings'" rather
than a single answer.
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desegregation. The following chart summarizes every vote during
this period that was in favor of school desegregation or opposed
to separate-but-equal. 730 Defeats for the forces supporting school
desegregation are printed in italics:
VOTES ON CIVIL RIGHTS BILL, INCLUDING
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PROVISION
House or
Date Senate Description of vote Outcome+
12/21171 Senate To attach CRA as rider to amnesty 29-30
219/72 Senate To attach CRA as rider to amnesty 28-28*
2/19/72 House To reject H.R. 1647 116-89
3/25/72 House To suspend the rules 98-80
4/1/72 House To table H.R. 1647 99-73
4/8/72 House To engross and for third reading 100-78
519/72 Senate To delete school provision from amnesty rider 26-25
5/9/72 Senate To delete CRA from amendment to amnesty 29-29*
5/9172 Senate To attach CRA as rider to amnesty 27-28
5/9/72 Senate To attach CRA as rider to amnesty 28-28*
5/22172 Senate To delete schools & juries from rider 22-20
5/22172 Senate To reconsider prior vote 29-13
5/22/74 Senate To delete school provision from CRA 30-14
5/22/74 Senate To exclude already-established schools t-11
5/22/74 Senate To enact CRA 29-16
5/25/74 House To suspend the rules 152-85
6/1/74 House To adjourn 141-72
6/8/74 House To suspend the rules 138-88
2/4/175 House To restore Senate language on schools 114-148
+ To facilitate comparison, outcomes are reported in terms of support for the school
desegregation bill, regardless of the form of the vote. For example, the Feb. 19, 1872
motion to reject H.R. 1647 was defeated by a vote of 89-116. This is reported in the table
as a vote of 116-89 in favor of the bill.
* Tie broken by vote of the Vice President in favor of the bill (or against rejecting the bill).
t Opposition to the motion was so overwhelming that the Chair did not count "nay" votes.
This chart shows that the civil rights bill, containing a school
desegregation provision, commanded a majority in both houses
every time there was a vote, whether on the merits or on a proce-
dural test-except when it was caught up in the politics of amnesty
(December 21, 1871 and May 22, 1872)-until after the election of
1874. Margins of victory were as high as 29-16 in the Senate and
141-72 in the House. Opponents and proponents alike noted that
730 The'chart does not include votes on repetitive dilatory motions in the House, of
which there were close to a hundred during the course of deliberations over the Act, see
supra text accompanying notes 579-80, 670-71, nor a vote on a point of order in the Senate
that may have been resolved on its own merits, see supra text accompanying notes 516-17.
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majorities favored the bill and attributed its failure to procedural
obstacles, including supermajority vote requirements and filibuster
tactics.73 '
Significantly, these numbers aggregate the votes of proponents
and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment. As has been seen,
opposition to the civil rights bill came not just from those (like
Trumbull and Lot Morrill) who believed it went beyond the dic-
tates of the new Amendment, but even more so from Democrats
who had opposed the Amendment in 1866 and now sought to block
all serious efforts to enforce it.732 If the question is what the
Amendment was thought to mean, then it is essentially irrelevant
that a large group of senators and representatives continued to be
unreconciled to it. Thus, although evidence that opponents of the
Amendment thought that it would require school desegregation
might be significant, their opposition to school desegregation is
not.
The following chart shows that there was a high correlation
between votes on the Fourteenth Amendment and votes on school
desegregation:
731 E.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 477 (June 16,1874) (statement of Rep. Darrall) (attributing
the failure of the bill to parliamentary maneuvering); 2 Cong. Rec. 4083 (May 20, 1874)
(statement of Sen. Thurman) ("I know that [the civil rights bill] is to pass this body .... );
id. at 383 (Jan. 5, 1874) (statement of Rep. Mills) ("It is, therefore, with no hope of success
that we interpose our opposition[ to the bill]."); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3735
(May 21, 1872) (statement of Sen. Frelinghuysen) ("[T]he opinion of the Senate has been
expressed over and over again in favor of retaining the provisions in reference to public
schools."); id. at 3260 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Logan) ("There has not been a time
that [Sumner's civil rights bill] could not have been passed by a majority of this Senate if
you would take it up alone .... ."); id. at 3251 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Blair)
("[J]udging from the votes which have been taken in the Senate, it is easy to perceive that
there is a majority in this body for the measure proposed by the Senator from
Massachusetts."); id. app. at 217 (Apr. 13, 1872) (statement of Rep. McHenry, an
opponent, predicting that "in a short time [the civil rights bill] will be passed by the same
vote which ordered its third reading" and saying that its prospective passage in the Senate
is "a well-ascertained fact").
732 See supra notes 479-91 and accompanying text.
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VOTES BY 14th AMENDMENT SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS ON CIVIL
RIGHTS BILL, INCLUDING SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PROVISION
House or 14th A. 14th A.
Date Senate Description of vote Supporters+ Opponents
12/21/71 Senate To attach CRA as rider 9-3 0-1
2/9/72 Senate To attach CRA as rider 10-1 0-0
2119172 House To reject H.R. 1647 13-0 0-4
312572 House To suspend the rules 12-0 0-5
4/1/72 House To table H.R. 1647 8-0 0-5
4/872 House To engross * *
5/972 Senate To delete school provision 10-1 0-0
519172 Senate To delete CRA 9-1 0-0
5/9172 Senate To attach CRA as rider 7-2 0-0
5/9172 Senate To attach CRA as rider 7-2 0-0
5122172 Senate To delete schools & juries 6-0 0-0
5122/72 Senate To reconsider prior vote 5-0 0-0
5/22/74 Senate To delete school provision 4-0 0-0
5/22/74 Senate To enact CRA 4-0 0-0
5/25/74 House To suspend the rules 13-0 0-3
6/1/74 House To adjourn 11-0 0-2
6/874 House To suspend the rules 11-0 0-4
2/4/75 House To restore Senate language 10-3 0-4
+ To facilitate comparison, outcomes are reported in terms of support for the school
desegregation bill, regardless of the form of the vote. For example, the Feb. 19, 1872
motion to reject H.R. 1647 was opposed by all thirteen supporters of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and supported by the four opponents of the Amendment. This is reported in
the table as a vote of 13-0 in favor of the bill and 0-4 in opposition, respectively.
* No roll call vote.
Defeats for the forces supporting school desegregation are printed in italics.
In the House of Representatives, until after the elections of 1874,
there was a perfect correlation between votes on the Fourteenth
Amendment and votes on school desegregation: every representa-
tive who had voted in favor of the Amendment in the Thirty-ninth
Congress voted in favor of Butler's school desegregation bill, and
every representative who had voted against the Amendment voted
against it. (After the electoral debacle of 1874, some supporters
voted to jettison the schools provision.) In the Senate, only Lyman
Trumbull broke this uniform pattern. Except when the bill was
caught up in the controversy over amnesty, every senator except
Trumbull who had voted for the Amendment now voted for school
desegregation. That is highly suggestive.
It might be said that the sample of those who voted on the Four-
teenth Amendment in the Thirty-ninth Congress and also on the
school desegregation bill is too small to support an inference
regarding the meaning of the Amendment. One way to supple-
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ment this information is by examining the partisan breakdown on
the bill, remembering that the Amendment was supported almost
unanimously by Republicans and opposed almost unanimously by
Democrats. Party affiliation can serve as a proxy for support or
opposition to the principles of the Amendment.733 The following
chart summarizes the partisan breakdown on the key votes in the
Senate and House during the three main periods of legislative
activity on the bill: in 1872, 1874, and during the lameduck session
in early 1875. In order to correct for the four Republican senators
(Cragin, Fenton, Robertson, and Sawyer) who supported the
desegregation bill on the merits but opposed coupling it with the
amnesty measure,734 and for Senator Carpenter, who supported the
desegregation provisions of the bill (later changing his mind, after
Slaughter-House) but thought the jury provision unconstitu-
tional,735 the last column realigns their votes according to their
views on the merits.736 There are no countervailing adjustments,
because no senator can be found who voted for the rider without
sharing Sumner's view on the merits.737 There is no test of support
for school desegregation in the Senate in 1875 because the bill, as it
came back to the Senate, did not apply to schools and there were
no amendments. Democrats at all times voted unanimously
against the bill, so only Republican votes are analyzed.
The results are as follows:
REPUBLICAN SUPPORT FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
LEGISLATION, 1872, 1874, 1875
Actual Adjusted
Total vote Repub. breakdown Repub. breakdown
1872
Senate 28-28 28-16 31-13 (70%)
House 116-89 113-3 113-3 (97%)
1874
Senate 29-16 28-3 28-3 (90%)
House (May 25) 152-85 152-10 152-10 (94%)
House (June 1) 141-72 141-10 141-10 (93%)
1875
House 114-148 114-63 114-63 (64%)
733 See supra text accompanying notes 493-94.
734 See supra note 513 and accompanying text.
735 See supra note 536 and accompanying text.
736 This does not result in the switching of four votes, because Senators Sawyer and
Robertson were absent on May 9 and Cragin and Fenton voted in favor of the rider on
February 9 (though Cragin voted against the rider on May 9). Effectively, two votes
against the rider, each time, came from supporters on the merits. Carpenter makes three.
737 See supra text accompanying notes 511-13.
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This chart shows that school desegregation legislation consistently
won the support of at least 70%-and more often in excess of
90%-of the Republicans until the elections of 1874, when civil
rights became a campaign issue for the Democrats. Even then, the
bill carried the allegiance of 64% of the Republican congressmen.
It can therefore be said that the predominant understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment among Republicans-the party that sup-
ported the Amendment-was that it authorized legislation outlaw-
ing school segregation.
Moreover, we must not forget that the Court in Brown v. Board
of Education was faced with two interpretative choices: desegrega-
tion or separate but equal. We have assumed that the proper ques-
tion is whether the original understanding supports the position of
the plaintiffs in Brown. But what of the converse question: does
the original understanding support the position of the defendants in
Brown? Which interpretation of the Amendment was shared most
widely? Every effort to adopt a separate-but-equal standard was
defeated. Senator Blair's attempt in May 1872 lost by a vote of 23-
30. Of the twelve Fourteenth Amendment supporters, ten opposed
the separate-but-equal proposal (the exceptions being Trumbull
and Sprague).738 Senator Sargent's attempt in May 1874 lost by a
vote of 21-26. Again, two of the ten surviving Fourteenth Amend-
ment supporters (Stewart and Allison) voted for the separate-but-
equal proposal.7 39 Sargent's second attempt failed, 16-28.740 Even
after the 1874 elections, when it was evident that school desegrega-
tion legislation would not be passed, a separate-but-equal proposal
offered by Representative White of Alabama lost 91-114.7 1 Sup-
porters of the civil rights bill preferred to trust to the courts rather
than accept separate-but-equal laws. These results can be summa-
rized in tabular form as follows:
738 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3262 (May 9, 1872) (reporting the Senate vote on the Blair amendment).
739 Compare Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (June 8, 1866) (reporting the
Senate vote on passage of the Fourteenth Amendment) with 2 Cong. Rec. 4167 (May 22,
1874) (reporting the Senate vote on the Sargent amendment).
740 2 Cong. Rec. 4175 (May 22, 1874).
741 3 Cong. Rec. 1010 (Feb. 4, 1875).
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VOTES ON MOTIONS TO ALLOW SEPARATE-BUT-EQUAL FACILITIES
House or 14th A.
Date Senate Description of vote Outcome Supporters
51972 Senate To allow segregated schools: local option 23-30 2-10
5/22/74 Senate To allow separate schools if equal 21-26 2-8
5/22/74 Senate To make deseg. language ambiguous 16-28 1-8
2/4/75 House To allow separate-but-equal facilities 91-114 *
* The Congressional Record does not report the votes of individual representatives on this
motion.
This is powerful evidence that separate but equal facilities were not
understood at the time to comport with the equalitarian principles
of the new Amendment.
This conclusion is confirmed when we look to the partisan break-
down, as the following chart shows:
PARTISAN SPLIT ON MOTIONS TO ALLOW
SEPARATE-BUT-EQUAL FACILITIES
House or
Date Senate Total vote Democrats Republicans
5/9/72 Senate 23-30 14-0 9-30 (77%)
5/22/74 Senate 21-26 14-0 7-26 (79%)
5/22/74 Senate 16-28 13-0 3-28 (90%)
2/4/75 House 91-114 * *
* No roll call vote recorded.
Significantly, Republican opposition to segregation never fell
below 77%. It should be noted, too, that much of the opposition to
desegregation legislation was predicated on the theory that "social
rights" and "social equality" are not fitting subjects for regula-
tion-a position that, logically, extends to statutes mandating, as
well as statutes prohibiting, segregation. Thus, the actual degree of
support for state-mandated segregation laws was rather small.
In short, there are ambiguities; there was confusion and disa-
greement. But the weight of the evidence supports the proposition
that segregation was understood in the years prior to the end of
Reconstruction to be unconstitutional, especially by those who had
supported the Fourteenth Amendment. In his study of the 1875
Act, De Facto and De Jure School Segregation: Some Reflected
Light on the Fourteenth Amendment from the Civil Rights Act of
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1875,742 Alfred Avins presented a very different analysis of these
votes. He argued strenuously against the result in Brown, basing
his conclusion on the fact that the desegregation forces "never
obtained a two-thirds vote in either House, which would have been
necessary to embody it in a constitutional amendment. ' 743 But
Avins asked and answered the wrong question. If the question
were, "did opponents of school segregation have the votes to pass a
constitutional amendment specifically directed to that end?" Avins
might well have a point. Such an amendment almost certainly
would not have garnered the two-thirds support in both houses
needed for submission to the states. The Sumner bill never did.
But that is not the question. The Fourteenth Amendment meant
many different things. Its application to school desegregation was
only one of them, and not necessarily the most important. (The
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and hence the
unlawfulness of the Black Codes, was foremost on the framers'
minds.) It is perfectly possible that Congress proposed and the
states ratified an amendment that accomplished many popular
objectives, even though it was understood to have potential conse-
quences that Congress and the states would not independently
enact (at least not by two-thirds). To use an analogy from recent
times, polls regularly showed strong majority support for the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment,74" even though it might well have
led to drafting women into military combat,745 which an over-
whelming majority of the population opposed.746 The real question
is not whether two-thirds of Congress supported school desegrega-
tion, but whether the Amendment, which was passed by the neces-
sary two-thirds vote, was understood to outlaw public school
segregation. That seems to be the case.
742 Supra note 7.
743 Avins, supra note 7, at 245.
744 In May 1982, polls indicated that support for the ERA stood at 63%-34%, a high
point. Washington News, UPI, May 7, 1982, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
745 In hearings on the impact of the proposed amendment, most witnesses testified that
it would eliminate sex-based criteria for military service. See The Impact of the Equal
Rights Amendment: Hearings on SJ. Res. 10 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 254-439 (1984).
746 See Jane J. Mansbridge, Why We Lost The ERA 64-65, 81 (1986) (reporting that
surveys indicated that only 22 percent of the public thought that women should be drafted
into combat).
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2. Constitutional Principles
It is widely agreed among originalists that the intentions or
understandings of the framers regarding a specific issue, while
informative, are not ultimately authoritative, for it is their under-
standing of the constitutional principles embodied in the constitu-
tional provision-not their analysis of a particular legal
phenomenon-that is controlling. To determine those principles,
we must divide the question of school segregation into two: (1) is
separation by race inconsistent with the requirement of equality,
and (2) does the equality requirement of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment apply to public education? There were many who answered
"yes" or "no" to both questions, but there were some who divided
their answers. Indeed, the collective judgment of the Congress in
1875 seemed to be "yes" to the first question and "no" to the
second.
The Senate answered "yes" to both questions on a number of
occasions, most clearly in May 1874, when it passed Sumner's bill
by a vote of 29-16. Votes in the House of Representatives, how-
ever, determined the ultimate shape of the legislation. On that
fateful day in February 1875, after years of deliberation, the House
of Representatives reached three decisions about the civil rights
bill. First, by a vote of 162-99, it outlawed segregation in inns, pub-
lic conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of pub-
lic amusement. The language employed to achieve this end was the
proposition that "all persons" have the right to "the full and equal
enjoyment" of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges provided by the covered services "subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike
to citizens of every race and color."747 This vote reflected both a
normative-constitutional judgment that segregation is/ought to be
unconstitutional, which was contested, and a verbal-interpretive
judgment that segregation is a denial of the "full and equal enjoy-
ment" of the covered facilities (and not an instance of conditions
"applicable alike" to all citizens). The latter judgment was not con-
tested: opponents as well as proponents of the Act understood that
it proscribed segregation. Interestingly, this interpretive judgment
survived for another decade, to the debate over the proposed
747 See 3 Cong. Rec. 939 (Feb. 3, 1875).
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Interstate Commerce Act, when the term "without discrimination"
was again understood by all sides to outlaw segregation; by this
time, however, the normative-constitutional judgment had
switched.
Second, the House voted, 114-91, to reject an amendment that
would have allowed "separate common schools for different races
or colors," as well as "separate accommodations, facilities, and
privileges" in common carriers and public accommodations, so
long as the separate facilities were "equal in facilities and equip-
ments for both races." 74 This confirms and extends the normative-
constitutional judgment already noted. Not only did Congress vote
in favor of legislation demanding "full and equal enjoyment" of the
covered facilities, but it voted against the alternative, which would
have permitted separate facilities so long as they were "equal" in
material respects. Further, Congress made clear that the objection
to formal recognition of the separate-but-equal principle extended
to schools.
Third, the House voted, 128-48, to eliminate common schools
and cemeteries from coverage of the bill. As explained above, this
reflected a combination of a political and a normative-constitu-
tional judgment: first, that a majority would not extend the princi-
ple of desegregation to public education, and second, that it was
preferable that the law be silent than that it countenance the prin-
ciple of separate but equal.749 If school segregation is consistent
with the original understanding as reflected in this history, there-
fore, it must be because of the special status of schools. It is not
because segregation was deemed to be a form of equality.
There are two possible interpretations of Congress's ultimate
decision to pass a desegregation bill that did not apply to schools.
First, it might be understood as nothing more than an unprincipled
accommodation to popular sentiment. This was the opinion of
many congressmen of both parties. For example, Representative
John B. Storm, Democrat from Pennsylvania, observed that if one
believed "that in order to enjoy his equal rights with the white man
the colored man must enjoy those rights in the same railroad car, in
the same theater, and at the same table in the hotel or public inn,"
748 See supra notes 675, 680 and accompanying text.
749 See supra text accompanying notes 683-91.
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as the final version of the Act provided, "I should certainly insist
upon his enjoying the right to an education in the same school-
room with the white children. I regard the right to an education
the most sacred one which the colored man can enjoy," he contin-
ued, "and yet gentlemen on the other side who expect to pass this
bill intend... to strike out the provision with regard to schools. If
they are consistent I cannot see how they can do this .... 750 Rep-
resentative Ellis Roberts, Republican from New York, stated: "For
one, sir, I am not willing to legislate that colored men shall have
their rights in the theater and to refuse to legislate that they shall
have their rights in the schools."75 1 Under this interpretation, the
1875 Act shows that segregation was understood to be inconsistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, but that Congress flinched when
it came to applying that principle to the controversial area of public
education. This interpretation provides no principled support for
the defendants in Brown.
A second interpretation of Congress's actions is that education
might not have been thought to be a civil right. This position was
championed in the Senate by Lyman Trumbull, whose credentials
as a supporter of the goals of the Fourteenth Amendment were
impeccable, and gained the backing of respectable Northern
Republicans Lot Morrill and Orris Ferry. Moreover, it explains the
shape of the final Act as it emerged from the House in 1875: for-
bidding segregation in common carriers and public accommoda-
tions, but leaving the issue of schools to the states. Sumner and his
allies articulated powerful legal responses to this position, to be
sure, and defeated it in a number of tests of strength in nonfinal
votes in the House and Senate, but they did not prevail in the end.
But taking this to be an authoritative reading of the original
understanding, it does not follow that public education could not
be deemed a civil right as of 1954, for the original understanding of
the legal concept, "civil right," introduces a degree of contingency.
The Fourteenth Amendment did not create new rights, but only
extended the established privileges and immunities of the most
favored class of citizens to all citizens, without discrimination on
the basis of race. If white children had no firmly established,
750 3 Cong. Rec. 951 (Feb. 3, 1875).
751 Id. at 980 (Feb. 4, 1875).
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legally enforceable right to a public education, then denial of a sim-
ilar right to black children was not an inequality. If even a substan-
tial number of states lacked a legally enforceable right to
education, this undermined the claim that public education was a
"civil right" or a "privilege or immunity of citizenship." Not all
positive law rights in each state were civil rights for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment; according to many, that status was
reserved for rights that were sufficiently widespread and
entrenched that they had come to be understood as privileges and
immunities of citizenship. As has been noted, there was a substan-
tial basis for uncertainty about the legal status of public education
as late as the 1870s.752 Education was then at a time of transition,
and it was far from clear that any child had a legally enforceable
"right" to it, at least in most states. By the turn of the century,
however, this uncertainty had been resolved. Every state in the
Union had established a universal system of compulsory education
funded by public taxation. 3 The right to publicly funded educa-
tion was embedded in the constitutions of the states, and the com-
mon school had attained its modem role as the principal institution
for the inculcation of American ideals of citizenship-a role envi-
sioned, perhaps prematurely, by proponents of the Sumner bill. It
had become unthinkable that any state would abolish its schools-
as unthinkable as it was, in 1871-75, that any state would abrogate
the common law rights of its white citizens. By the turn of the
century-and certainly by the time of the Brown decision in
1954-there could be little doubt that schools satisfied the criteria
even the opponents of the 1875 Act understood for the existence of
civil rights. The right to education had become stable, uniform,
and legally enforceable.
Far from confirming the conventional wisdom that school segre-
gation was tolerated or even approved by the generation that
framed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, the history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in fact refutes it. The Act constitutes an
official declaration by the body entrusted with enforcement of the
Amendment that segregation is a form of inequality. Moreover, a
752 See supra text accompanying notes 439-49.
753 See John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? A Working
Hypothesis (January 31, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
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large majority of the party that supported the Amendment-per-
haps three-fourths-was willing to apply that principle to public
schools. That application was defeated, but the constitutional prin-
ciple that explains the ultimate resolution of the segregation ques-
tion in the 1875 Act-requiring desegregation of common carriers
but not of public schools-was based on the rudimentary character
of public education at that point in history. Applying the legal
understanding of civil rights that prevailed in 1875 to the institution
of public education as it existed by the turn of the century, one can
conclude only that the principle of equality in civil rights leads
directly to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
3. Caveats
Although the deliberations over the 1875 Act provide the best
evidence of what the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to
mean on the question of segregation, there are certain inherent
limitations in the argument. To prove that a majority of the mem-
bers of Congress between 1871 and 1875 supported legislation pre-
mised on the unconstitutionality of school segregation does not
conclusively prove that this was the predominant understanding of
those who drafted and ratified the Amendment in the period 1866
to 1868. In this Subsection I will address the three most troubling
potential pitfalls in the analysis, and ask how probable it is that
they affect the ultimate conclusion.754
a. Changes in Popular Opinion
My argument depends on a continuity in opinion during the
nine-year period from the proposal of the Fourteenth Amendment
through the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. There is much
to support a claim of such continuity: the Reconstruction period is
ordinarily understood by historians as a distinct political era in
which a particular political faction, with a particular political and
constitutional agenda, dominated the federal government and pur-
sued a consistent and coherent program. Many of the leaders of
the movement to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment went on to
lead the movement for the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The support-
754 I am particularly grateful to Michael Klarman for raising some of the points
addressed in this Subsection.
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.ers of the Act understood it to be a mere extension of the princi-
ples of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. The arguments regarding
Reconstruction measures, pro and con, show a striking similarity
throughout the period.
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that public opinion-including the
opinions of leading supporters of civil rights-changed between
the periods 1866-68 and 1871-75. Opinions held during the latter
period therefore are not a wholly reliable indicator of the opinions
held during the former. An analogy might be drawn to the shift of
opinion on affirmative action that occurred among supporters of
civil rights between passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (when
affirmative action was explicitly disavowed) 75 5 and a decade later
(when affirmative action was firmly entrenched). In much the
same way, Republican attitudes toward the race question may have
become more radical as Reconstruction proceeded. Indeed, the
attitude toward black suffrage suggests such a shift. In 1866, the
Radicals were unable to secure enough votes to guarantee black
political rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Republican
Party expressly disclaimed any commitment to black enfranchise-
ment in its 1868 party platform.5 6 By early 1869, however, the
political winds had changed and the Congress proposed the Fif-
teenth Amendment, which was quickly ratified by 1870. Perhaps a
similar shift explains the willingness to vote for desegregation legis-
lation after 1871.
The argument, however, cuts both ways. While Reconstruction-
ist fervor apparently increased between 1866 and 1870, there is rea-
son to believe that it cooled considerably in the years after 1870.
Southern treatment of the freedmen outraged the North in the late
1860s, but as Grant's second term wore on, civil rights increasingly
became a political liability for the Republicans.757 A nation that in
1868 voted overwhelmingly for the Republicans, the party of civil
rights, voted almost as overwhelmingly for their opponents in
1874.758 The declining enthusiasm for civil rights can be seen in the
755 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230-55 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
756 See National Party Platforms 1840-1972 39 (Donald Bruce Johnson & Kirk H.
Porter, compilers, 5th ed. 1973).
757 See Foner, supra note 21, at 524-25.
758 See id. at 523.
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careers of statesmen like Trumbull of Illinois, who was principal
sponsor of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 but who, by 1872, was a
Liberal Republican, and by 1877 a Democrat again. As Edmunds
derisively observed in 1872, Trumbull "seems to have.., spent all
the love for equal fights that he had."759 In 1875, Democratic Rep-
resentative Storm of Pennsylvania could say that General Ben But-
ler "did not represent any longer the moral and political sentiments
of the American people"760-as much an acknowledgment of past
Radical strength as it was a claim of present Radical decline. The
shift can be seen among Democrats, as well. In 1872, the Demo-
crats adopted a party platform pledging support for equal rights so
strong that Republicans insisted on attaching it as a preamble to
the 1875 Act.761 By that time, however, the Democrats were in
unanimous opposition to civil rights legislation, and they consid-
ered their 1872 platform an embarrassment.762
The shifts in public opinion between 1866-68 and 1871-75 thus
make any inference based on the latter period uncertain, but they
do not push in one direction or the other. In the end, reliance on
evidence from this period seems neither more nor less warranted
than the accepted practice of relying on evidence from the adminis-
trations of the early Presidents in interpreting the Constitution of
1787. If we were to reject this evidence, consistency would demand
that we cease looking to the practices of the Washington Adminis-
tration in interpreting separation of powers or to those of Presi-
dents Jefferson and Madison in interpreting the Religion Clauses.
b. Conflict Between Congressional and Popular Understandings
A second potential weakness in my argument is that popular
opinion, especially as reflected in the results of the election of 1874,
759 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3264 (May 9, 1872).
760 3 Cong. Rec. 951 (Feb. 3, 1875) (emphasis added).
761 Id. at 1011 (Feb. 4, 1875). The passage in question affirmed that:
Whereas it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men
before the law, and hold it is the duty of government in its dealings with the people
to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race, color, or
persuasion, religious or political ....
Id.
762 Representative Niblack, a Democrat from Indiana, protested the reading of the
platform provision on the ground that the Party had been "intimidated" into adopting it.
Id. at 1003 (Feb. 4, 1875).
1107
Virginia Law Review
may have conflicted with congressional opinion, and that it is the
understandings of "We, the People" that must control constitu-
tional interpretation. Why treat the congressional deliberations in
1874 as more authoritative than the elections of 1874? This, too, is
a serious point, and it undoubtedly weakens the thesis of this Arti-
cle-but not much. There are both empirical and theoretical rea-
sons not to view the 1874 elections as reflective of the authentic
voice of the Fourteenth Amendment.
It is a parlous enterprise to deduce popular understandings of
the meaning of a legal instrument from the results of an election,
which typically hinge on a number of issues. While school desegre-
gation was obviously unpopular, especially in the South, so was the
corruption, economic depression, and "Grantism" represented by
the Republican Party.763 To be sure, Democrats and some Repub-
licans interpreted the election of 1874 as a mandate against the civil
rights bill, and this perception undoubtedly played a major part in
determining the political fate of the proposed legislation. But
thoughtful legislators could, and did, interpret the results in a dif-
ferent way. Consider the following comments: James Garfield
remarked that "[t]he recent disasters of the republican party have
not sprung from any of the brave acts done in the effort to do jus-
tice to the negro. '' 764 John Shanks observed that Republican losses
were concentrated among the "timid" who had "been afraid to
stand up here and do right" and that forthright supporters of the
bill had been reelected.765 Finally, General Butler lamented "that
it is my deliberate conviction that the reason why some here have
not been sent back is because we did not pass this bill a year ago.
The people turned from us," he continued, "because we were a do-
nothing party, afraid of our shadows .... The republican party
763 Historians are divided on the relative importance of the economic and
Reconstruction issues to the election of 1874. William Gillette describes the election as "a
referendum not only on reconstruction but also on civil rights." Gillette, supra note 18, at
256. Eric Foner, however, maintains that "the depression far outweighed Reconstruction
as a cause of Republican defeat." Foner, supra note 21, at 524. See also Richard H.
Abbott, The Republican Party and the South, 1855-1877, at 230 (1986) ("The backlash
against civil rights, Northern dissatisfaction with the Grant administration's policy in
dealing with the Panic of 1873, and a growing disillusionment with Reconstruction and
Republican regimes in the South all led Northern voters to repudiate the Republicans.").
764 3 Cong. Rec. 1005 (Feb. 4, 1875).
765 Id. at 1003.
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being neither hot nor cold, the country rightly spewed us out of its
mouth.' '7 1 Of course, it is always possible for true believers to say
that the problem with an unpopular policy is that it was not taken
far enough. The difficulty for historical analysis is that sometimes
they are right.
A more fundamental reason to rely more heavily on the congres-
sional deliberations is that they were conducted in constitutional
terms by officers sworn to uphold the Constitution. Whether the
statements and votes of the representatives and senators were an
act of constitutional interpretation, as opposed to mere political
decisionmaking, will be considered below; but the voters in the
election of 1874 were almost surely acting on the basis of prefer-
ences and policy rather than conscientious reflection on the
demands of the new constitutional order.
Finally, far more than other amendments, the Fourteenth
Amendment was a congressional creation. The states and the peo-
ple exercised little control. The state ratification debates did not
dwell on the details of the proposed Amendment, and-an impor-
tant point-the margin of victory for the Amendment was attained
by coercion of the Southern states rather than by winning the sup-
port of the electorate in three-fourths of the States. When an
Amendment obtains its supermajority through congressional exer-
cise of its power to condition readmission of states to the Union, it
is a fiction to treat the opinions of the people of the various states
as controlling; it is Congress that effectively exercised the amenda-
tory power.
In any event, to the extent that the elections of 1874 represent a
backlash against civil rights and the congressional deliberations of
1874 represent a political view from an earlier stage, it is hard to
see why the later view-being more distant both in time and in
spirit from the Amendment-should be given more weight. The
elections of 1874 were the beginning of the end of Reconstruction.
The Reconstruction Amendments should not be interpreted to
conform to the preferences of those who halted their enforcement.
766 Id. at 1009.
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c. Interpretation and Policymaking
Even assuming that it has been established that a strong majority
of both houses of Congress in 1872-74 voted for legislation that
would desegregate public schools, the question remains: does this
demonstrate that they believed that the Fourteenth Amendment
compelled school desegregation, or was this merely their judgment
about wise public policy? Essential to my argument here is the
assumption that the members of Congress understood themselves
to be enforcing the dictates of the Constitution and not merely
deciding whether they believed public schools should be segre-
gated. This issue requires consideration of the nature of the
authority vested in Congress under Section 5 of the Amendment,
which reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article." 767
There are five possible constructions of the relationship between
legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 and the Amendment itself.
First, it might be thought that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
does not refer to any fixed set of rights (or even to a fixed method-
ology by which the interpreter can discern the set of protected
rights), but that Congress has the authority to determine, by legis-
lation, what are the "privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States." This interpretation would imply that, at least inso-
far as this Clause is concerned, Congress has the power not only to
"enforce" but also to define the substantive reach of the Amend-
ment. If, for example, Congress decided that the right to abortion
(or protection from abortion) were a privilege or immunity of
American citizens, then it could enact legislation to that effect,
without regard to whether the Constitution would have that mean-
ing of its own force. If this is the proper meaning of Section 5, then
the majority support in Congress for school desegregation in 1872-
74 does not imply that the courts had the authority to order school
desegregation in 1954.
Second, it can be said that congressional action is necessary only
to supplement the dictates of the Constitution itself-that is, to go
beyond the dictates of the bare Constitution. Thus, congressional
enactment of legislation to forbid a certain practice implicitly sug-
gests that Congress did not believe that practice to be indepen-
767 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5.
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dently unconstitutional. If the practice is already unconstitutional,
there is no need for legislation. If Congress perceives a need for
legislation, this suggests that Congress did not understand the prac-
tice to be unconstitutional. Thus, legal historian Bernard Schwartz
has argued with respect to the deliberations over the 1875 Act:
The 1874-75 debates on the proposed prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in schools are directly relevant to the question of the
intent of those who wrote the Fourteenth Amendment with regard
to segregation in education. One who reads what is said in the
debates... cannot help but conclude that the Congress that sat less
than a decade after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not think that the amendment had the effect of prohibiting school
segregation which the Supreme Court was to attribute to it in the
Brown v. Board of Education case of 1954. Certainly, if such effect
had been considered to flow from the amendment, the whole
debate on the proposed school provision in 1874-75 would have
been irrelevant, for integrated schools would have been constitu-
tionally required, regardless of any congressional provision in the
matter.76 s
Third, it can be said that the Fourteenth Amendment is enforcea-
ble only through Acts of Congress passed pursuant to Section 5. In
the words of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Virginia:769
It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall
extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights
and immunities guaranteed.... It is the power of Congress which
has been enlarged[.] Congress is authorized to enforce the prohibi-
tions by appropriate legislation. Some legislation is contemplated
to make the amendments fully effective.770
This construction would suggest that the courts are not empowered
to hold school segregation unconstitutional in the absence of an
Act of Congress to that effect. Since Sumner's efforts failed,
Brown was wrongly decided.
Fourth, it can be said that Congress has the authority under Sec-
tion 5 to provide remedies for the enforcement of the rights and
prohibitions of the Amendment, but not to expand or contract the
underlying rights. Under this theory, a majority vote of Congress
768 Schwartz, supra note 13, at 660.
769 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
770 Id. at 345.
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to provide a remedy for a particular practice demonstrates that the
majority deems that practice unconstitutional, but failure to pro-
vide a statutory remedy does not strip the courts of their inherent
authority to enforce the Amendment as a matter of judicial review.
Fifth, it might be said that Congress has not just the authority but
the duty to provide effective remedies for violations of the Amend-
ment. This is the strongest case for treating the deliberations over
the 1875 Act as a form of constitutional interpretation. For any
member holding this view, a vote in favor of the Act is tantamount
to a declaration that the practices forbidden by it are unconstitu-
tional, and a vote against the Act is tantamount to a declaration
that they are not.
Thus, under the first approach the history of the 1875 Act is not
directly relevant to the constitutional question, under the second
and third approaches the history is inconsistent with the result in
Brown, and under the fourth and fifth approaches the history sup-
ports the result.
The second and third approaches outlined in the previous
paragraphs are flatly wrong. If it were correct that a vote to outlaw
a practice under the Section 5 power is an implicit judgment that
the practice is not independently unconstitutional, then Congress's
reenactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in 1870 would be proof
that unequal protection of the rights of contract, property, and
security of the person was not viewed by the Congress of the day as
unconstitutional. This is obviously preposterous. The theory is
likewise inconsistent with Congress's enactment in 1870 of a statute
declaring that all otherwise qualified citizens are entitled to vote
without distinction based on race.77 Legislation passed for the
purpose of enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment typically will
outlaw practices deemed by Congress to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, as even a cursory glance at the legislative history of
any of the Reconstruction statutes will confirm.
The third position is closer to the truth, but still inaccurate. It is
true that supporters of Reconstruction distrusted the courts and
believed that congressional action would be needed to achieve the
77' See Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140. Under Professor Schwartz's
analysis, this statute would be proof that the Fifteenth Amendment did not outlaw racial
discrimination with respect to the franchise.
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promise of the new Amendments. It was not unnatural that they
would be skeptical of reliance on the institution that had produced
Dred Scott v. Sanford772 and Ex parte Milligan.773 Only a few years
before, Congress had felt it necessary to strip the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction to consider the legitimacy of Reconstruction gov-
ernment in Ex parte McCardle.7 Thus, Section 5 reflected the
common expectation that Congress, not the courts, would be the
principal agency for enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Senator Oliver Morton captured this understanding during the
debates over the 1875 Act in his remark that "the remedy for the
violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments was
expressly not left to the courts. The remedy was legislative,
because in each the amendment itself provided that it shall be
enforced by legislation on the part of Congress." 775
But it cannot seriously be maintained that the courts were
understood to have no authority to enforce the Amendment in the
absence of congressional action. The initial formulation of the
Fourteenth Amendment was simply a grant of additional authority
to Congress:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all priv-
ileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all
persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life,
liberty, and property.776
In that form, the Amendment would not have served as an
independent basis for judicial review. In its final version, by con-
trast, Section 1 imposes restraints on the states and Section 5 gives
Congress the authority to enforce them. Many supporters of the
Amendment stated that this would not only provide a firm consti-
tutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but would constitu-
tionalize it and thus prevent its repeal by future Congresses.
Representative Giles Hotchkiss of New York, who proposed this
change, explained that civil rights should be "secured by a constitu-
7m 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
M 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
774 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
775 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 525 (Jan. 23, 1872).
776 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1091 (Feb. 28, 1866).
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tional amendment that legislation cannot override. ' 777 Hotchkiss
added: "Then if the gentleman wishes to go further, and provide by
laws of Congress for the enforcement of these rights, I will go with
him. '778 This history shows that Section I has force independently
of acts of Congress and that congressional legislation is not a neces-
sary predicate to judicial enforcement; the very point of the change
was to ensure that future enforcement of the Amendment could
not be stymied by unsympathetic Democrat-controlled Congresses.
After collapse of support for school desegregation legislation in
1875, Representative James Monroe of Ohio voted to strike all ref-
erence to schools, in preference to a separate-but-equal provision,
largely on the expectation that the courts would intervene. Blacks
in the South, he said, "think their chances for good schools will be
better under the Constitution with the protection of the courts than
under a bill containing [separate-but-equal] provisions ....
This clearly indicated his belief that the courts have the power to
strike down school segregation even in the absence of congres-
sional legislation-though of course legislation would make that
result all the more secure.
The first approach is logically possible, but with one possible
exception,780 there is no evidence that any participant in the delib-
erations over the 1875 Act conceived of Congress's authority in
this way. If it were believed that Congress has discretion to deter-
mine what the civil rights of Americans should be (as opposed to
777 Id. at 1095; accord id. at 2459 (May 8, 1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens); id. at 2462
(statement of Rep. Finck); id. at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield); id. at 2498 (May 9,
1866) (statement of Rep. Broomall); id. at 2896 (May 30, 1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard).
778 Id. at 1095.
779 3 Cong. Rec. 998 (Feb. 4, 1875).
780 Robert Hale of New York claimed he had voted against the Fourteenth Amendment
solely on account of the excessive power given to Congress under Section 5. Id. at 979
(Feb. 4, 1875). Relying on McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), Hale
interpreted Section 5 as meaning that "within the grant of power by the Constitution to
Congress for purposes of legislation Congress are authorized to select in their own
discretion all measures appropriate to the end in view; that the question of fitness or
desirability is for Congress alone and not for the courts." Id. at 980. In context, it is not
clear whether Hale was referring to substantive rights or to remedies. In any event, Hale
voted against the Cessna amendment to restore the school provision, so it is not possible to
say that support for the school desegregation position was predicated on this constitutional
theory. More likely, by exaggerating the degree of congressional power, Hale was
retrospectively justifying his opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment.
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determining what they are, and insisting upon an equality of
enforcement), one would expect proponents of the Act to have
argued in those terms, for it would have pretermitted the compli-
cated constitutional argument about education and civil rights. No
one did. Instead, the predominant view among Republicans was
that the 1875 Act did not create new rights, but only created new
remedies.78 ' Representative Lynch commented that the bill "sim-
ply confers upon all citizens, or rather recognizes the right which
has already been conferred upon all citizens, to send their children
to any public free school .... ,7 Lynch explained, incidentally,
that his constitutional judgment was based on a strict construction
of congressional powers and the belief "that the Constitution as a
whole should be so construed as to carry out the intention of the
framers of the recent amendments .... ,,T
That leaves the fourth and fifth possibilities. While there were
more than a few comments about the policy and expediency of the
bill, the essential position of the proponents was that the bill was a
necessary and appropriate means of enforcing rights already estab-
lished by the Constitution. Senator Edmunds, for example, stated:
"This bill proceeds upon the idea that the Constitution does secure
to the citizen certain inherent rights, because they are rights, and
then it merely undertakes to enforce those rights... .,784 By the
same token, opponents thought they had refuted the proponents'
position when they showed that, in their opinion, "the fourteenth
amendment [does not] enjoin[ ] upon us that we shall have mixed
schools. ' 785 One thing on which "both sides agree," according to
Edmunds-and he went uncontradicted-was that the question
was one of constitutional interpretation, not of legislative policy:
[E]ither .... the democratic view of the [fourteenth] amendment is
right, that it does not touch these subjects at all, and therefore we
cannot interfere with the right of the State to regulate its common
781 See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3192 (May 8, 1872) (statement of Sen.
Sherman); id. at 3264 (May 9, 1872) (statement of Sen. Edmunds).
782 3 Cong. Ree. 945 (Feb. 3, 1875) (emphasis added).
783 Id. at 943.
784 2 Cong. Rec. 4172-73 (May 22, 1874).
785 Id. at 4171 (statement of Sen. Sargent).
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schools.., or else it does confer upon citizens of the United States
a right, and that right is inherent .... 786
It is not clear whether proponents felt under a constitutional
obligation to pass the bill (once they had concluded that it would
protect previously violated constitutional rights) or whether they
merely believed they had authority to do so. Many Republicans
argued that Congress had not just the power but the duty to enact
effective remedies. Senator Henry Pease commented that he
would vote for the Civil Rights Act of 1875 "because I believe that
it is the bounden duty of the American Congress to enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. '787
Representative Ransier said that Congress has a "duty" to pass
appropriate legislation to ensure a "full and complete" remedy for
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.788 Representative Wil-
liam Lawrence of Ohio, one of the original supporters of the Four-
teenth Amendment, delivered the Republicans' most extensive
disquisition on the significance of Section 5. Lawrence first argued
that the schools provision was constitutionally compelled, on the
ground that "equal privileges" in places and institutions supported
by public taxation are protected by the Equal Protection Clause.789
He then argued at length that Congress had the power to enforce
that right. "The fourteenth amendment was designed to secure this
equality of rights;" he maintained, "and we have no discretion to
say that we will not enforce its provisions. There is no question of
discretion involved except as to the means we may employ. 790
Democrats denied the existence of such a duty, arguing that "[a]s
legislators it is as much your duty to look to the expediency of a
law in reference to your constituents as to look to its constitutional-
ity." 7 9 1 It seems probable that many Republicans, as well as Dem-
ocrats, viewed the nature and extent of "appropriate" legislation as
a matter of legislative discretion rather than constitutional duty.
786 Id. at 4172.
787 Id. at 4153 (May 22, 1874).
788 Id. at 383; accord 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Hale); 2 Cong.
Rec. 410 (Jan. 6, 1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott).
789 2 Cong. Rec. 412 (Jan. 6, 1874).
790 Id. at 414.
791 3 Cong. Rec. 952 (Feb. 3, 1875) (statement of Rep. Whitehead).
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A vote in favor of legislation outlawing segregation was thus an
implicit (and often an explicit) statement regarding the congress-
man's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These
debates were as much acts of interpretation as they were of law-
making. Thus, if it is established that a majority supported legisla-
tion to forbid school segregation under Section 5, this proves that
the majority understood the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid the
racial segregation of public schools.
IV. Tm SUPREME COURT'S DESEGREGATION DECISIONS
Now we are able to examine the Supreme Court's principal deci-
sions regarding desegregation in light of the original understand-
ing, as revealed in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1875. I
consider only the most important decisions: one contemporaneous
with deliberations over the Act, one decided a generation later in
the heyday of Jim Crow legislation, and, finally, one that brought
the era of formal de jure segregation to an end.
A. The First Desegregation Decision
Surprisingly few people-even among constitutional lawyers-
have heard of the Supreme Court's first case involving the lawful-
ness of racial segregation.792 Yet in 1873, in Railroad Company v.
Brown,793 (a remarkable coincidence of names) the Supreme Court
unanimously held that the cars of a commuter railway must be
desegregated, on the ground that segregated facilities are inher-
ently unequal.794 This, according to the Court, was the prevailing
view in Congress in the mid-1860s.795
In 1863, Congress authorized the Alexandria and Washington
Railroad Company to extend its line northward to connect with
another rail line in the District of Columbia. In so doing, Congress
attached the condition "that no person shall be excluded from the
792 1 could find no reference to the case in Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law (2d ed. 1988), or in any of six leading constitutional law casebooks, and there is no
entry for the case in the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (Leonard W. Levy,
Kenneth L. Karst & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1986).
793 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 445 (1873).
794 Id. at 453.
795 Id.
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cars on account of color. '796 Notwithstanding this provision, the
Railroad instituted a policy of separate but equal transportation for
its route between Washington and Alexandria. In the run from
Washington to Alexandria, the front car was reserved for blacks
and the other car for whites; in the return run the placement was
reversed. In this way, the company guaranteed that the facilities
provided persons of the two races were identical, and "alike
comfortable."797
On February 8, 1868, just five months before the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment was complete, Catharine Brown, a
black employee of the United States Senate, attempted to board
the car reserved for whites. A railroad employee told her to go to
the other car, and when she demurred he "put her out with force,
and, as she alleged, some insult. '7 98 She sued. The railroad
defended on the ground that "it has literally obeyed" the congres-
sional conditions prohibiting exclusion of any person from the cars
on account of color "because it has never excluded this class of
persons from the cars, but on the contrary, has always provided
accommodations for them. ' 799 In other words, segregation was not
"literally" discrimination.
The case was argued to the Supreme Court and decided in 1873,
in the midst of congressional debates over what would become the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, during a period in which, according to the
conventional wisdom, the lawfulness of segregation was firmly and
widely accepted. The Court's reaction to the railroad's separate-
but-equal argument is therefore extremely revealing. The Justices
characterized that argument as "an ingenious attempt to evade a
compliance with the obvious meaning of the requirement."' 8°° The
Court conceded that the words of the statute "taken literally might
bear the interpretation put upon them" by the railroad, but stated
796 Id. at 446. This was one of a series of acts passed by Congress at the instigation of
Senator Sumner, requiring desegregation of railways and streetcars in the District of
Columbia. See Maltz, supra note 155, at 558-63.
797 Brown, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at 447.
798 Id. at 447-48.
799 Id. at 452. The railroad's "plain language" argument drew its force from the
particular wording of the statute, which forbade exclusion of any person on account of race
"from the cars"-rather than from "any car." Id. at 446.
800 Id. at 452.
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that "Congress did not use them in any such limited sense."'8 0 1 The
Court noted that there had been no need for legislation guarantee-
ing that the company would not exclude black passengers alto-
gether; "self-interest" would suffice to prevent that.s 2 "It was the
discrimination in the use of the cars on account of color, where
slavery obtained, which was the subject of discussion at the time,"
and Congress acted in the "belief that this discrimination was
unjust."' 0 3 Indeed, the Court commented, "in the temper of Con-
gress at the time, it is manifest the grant could not have been made
without" the condition.804
This first desegregation case did not involve the Fourteenth
Amendment, but presented merely a statutory question, and it is
perhaps for this reason that it has been forgotten. Yet at heart, the
issue is not much different from the question as it would arise
under the Fourteenth Amendment:805 whether separate but equal
facilities are a form of racial discrimination. On this point, it is
significant that the Court did not merely find that its interpretation
was the most plausible. It found the meaning "obvious" and the
counterargument "ingenious." It used the term "discrimination"
three times as embracing segregation. The Court specifically recal-
led "the temper of Congress at the time" and described it as "mani-
fest" that Congress would not have allowed the railroad to extend
its line if it were going to segregate the cars. This was the only time
during Reconstruction that the Supreme Court would address the
issue of segregation, and the opinion in Brown reinforces the con-
clusion of the 1875 Act debates: that, contrary to the conventional
wisdom, during the brief period between the end of the Civil War
and the end of Reconstruction segregation was widely considered
discriminatory and unjust. Just possibly, the Supreme Court under-
stood "the temper of Congress at the time" of the Fourteenth
Amendment better than it has been understood since.
801 Id.
802 Id.
80 Id. at 452-53.
804 Id. at 453.
805 Putting aside the state-action problem, which relates in this context to the common
carrier status of the railroad.
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B. Plessy v. Ferguson
At issue in the 1875 Act debates was whether federal law could
forbid private railroads and other common carriers to segregate
their passengers by race. By the time of Plessy v. Ferguson8s6 in
1896, the issue was whether state law could compel segregation.
Plessy involved a Louisiana statute, passed in 1890, requiring rail-
roads in the state to "provide equal but separate accommodations
for the white, and colored races, by providing two or more passen-
ger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger
coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommoda-
tions."80 7 Statutes of this sort, which were a recent development in
state law,80 were strongly opposed both by black citizens and by
many railroads. Maintenance of separate facilities was a considera-
ble expense, which railroads did not care to undertake. Indeed, in
many Southern states an alliance between black citizens and rail-
way interests successfully staved off Jim Crow legislation until the
turn of the century, after Plessy had already been decided. 0 9 The
railroad company in the Plessy case cooperated with the challenge
to the law, and it is rumored that it may even have contributed to
the costs of Plessy's litigation.
Over a justly famous dissent by Justice John Marshall Harlan,
the Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana statute. There are many
interesting features of the case, treated at length in a book by histo-
rian Charles A. Lofgren.81 ° The only question I will address is
whether the decision comports with the original understanding of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as revealed in the debates over the
1875 Act.
In the most obvious sense, Plessy involved precisely the question
debated and resolved by the Congress in 1875: whether black citi-
zens have a constitutionally protected right, equal to that of white
806 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
87 Act of July 10, 1890, No. 111, 1890 La. Acts 152, 153 (quoted in Plessy, 163 U.S. at
540).
808 See supra text accompanying notes 173-77.
809 For a detailed discussion of the politics of Jim Crow laws in South Carolina, see
Matthews, supra note 174. For an economic analysis of the companies' position and the
enactment of Jim Crow statutes, see Jennifer Roback, The Political Economy of
Segregation: The Case of Segregated Streetcars, 46 J. Econ. Hist. 893 (1986).
810 Charles A. Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation (1987).
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citizens, to accommodation on common carriers such as railroads.
But the Court reached an answer opposite to that reached by the
Congress in 1875. To the Congress, segregation of common carri-
ers was a violation of the letter as well as the spirit of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Railroads had well established common law
obligations to serve all paying customers without discrimination;
application of the 1875 Act to railroads was the least controversial
part of the proposed bill. In 1872, Matthew Carpenter's watered-
down civil rights bill, which mandated desegregation of common
carriers but not schools or juries, passed the Senate by a 2-1 mar-
gin.811 Even after the 1874 elections, the common carrier provi-
sions passed both houses of Congress by wide margins (162-99 in
the House; 38-26 in the Senate812). Proposals to allow separate but
equal facilities were repeatedly rejected, the last attempt, in Febru-
ary 1875, failing by a vote of 91-114 in the House.8 13
Each of the arguments accepted by the Plessy majority had been
urged in debate by the Act's opponents, but had been refuted by
the proponents and ultimately rejected. The Court began its analy-
sis of the Fourteenth Amendment issues8 14 with the proposition,
familiar from the Civil Rights Act debates, that desegregation was
an attempt to enforce "social equality." The Court explained the
"object of the amendment" as
undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races
before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been
intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce
811 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3736 (May 21, 1872); see supra text accompanying
notes 545-61.
812 3 Cong. Rec. 1011 (Feb. 4, 1875) (House); id. at 1870 (Feb. 27, 1875) (Senate).
813 Id. at 1010 (Feb. 4, 1875).
814 The Court quickly disposed of Plessy's argument based on the Thirteenth
Amendment, finding it "too clear for argument" that a "statute which implies merely a
legal distinction between the white and colored races... has no tendency to destroy the
legal equality of the two races, or redstablish a state of involuntary servitude." Plessy, 163
U.S. at 542, 543. The Court noted that the Thirteenth Amendment had been thought
"insufficient" to protect against laws imposing "onerous disabilities and burdens" on
members of the colored race, and that the Fourteenth Amendment was "devised" to
remedy this insufficiency. Id. at 542. Whether or not this is a valid interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment, it is true that opponents of segregation during the 1875 Act
debates relied principally on the Fourteenth.
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social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.8 15
This argument had been a central feature of the 1875 Act debates,
and was refuted by proponents of the Act. They pointed out, per-
suasively, that desegregation was mandated only in the context of
public facilities where patrons were already required to rub shoul-
ders with other persons not of their choosing. Unless all persons
with whom one shared a railway car thereby become one's social
equals (including "thieves, prostitutes, gamblers, and others who
have worse sins to answer for than the accident of color," as Con-
federate General P.G.T. Beauregard put it8 16), then to ride in the
same car was no sign of social equality. 17 On the contrary, the line
between "civil" and "social" rights was the line between law and
private choice. Because the law already governed the matter of
who had access to common carriers, this matter was seen to fall in
the civil sphere. Equality was to reign in the civil sphere.
Indeed, the "social equality" argument was even more implausi-
ble in Plessy than in the 1875 Act debates, because the question in
Plessy was not whether the state would seek to enforce equality
upon unwilling private parties, but whether the state could prevent
willing parties from associating voluntarily with one another. It
was a frequent theme of Democratic rhetoric against the 1875 Act
that the matter of "social rights" and "social equality" could not be
the subject of legislation. Representative H.D. McHenry of Ken-
tucky, a staunch opponent of the 1875 Act, argued that the manner
in which a person travels, is educated, or obtains entertainment "is
a matter of contract, in which the law has no right to interfere."
He continued:
If a man sees proper to associate with negroes, to eat at the same
table, ride on the same seat with them in cars, or sees proper to
send his children to the same schools with them, and place himself
815 Id. at 544. To the extent that the Court meant to imply that black citizens desired
segregation just as much as whites, this was a fiction exploded during the 1875 Act debates,
see supra text accompanying notes 315-18, and was no more true in the 1890s.
816 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 479 (June 16, 1874) (quoted by Rep. Darrall).
817 This is a summary of arguments discussed previously; see supra text accompanying
notes 323-61.
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upon the same level with them in any regard, I would not abridge
his right to do so .... 818
Thurman, the leading Northern Democratic opponent of the bill in
the Senate, couched this argument in libertarian language:
What is the true idea of civil liberty? It is simply that every citi-
zen shall have a right to do what to him seemeth good, so far as he
can do so without infringing the rights of others or endangering the
peace of society or the existence or just powers of the
Government. 19
If "the Government" interferes with this right, Thurman declared,
it becomes a "tyrant."820 He thus opposed the bill not because of a
belief in segregation as such, or even in states' rights, but in
defense of "liberty"-the liberty for individuals, through private
institutions, to decide such matters for themselves. Similarly, Sena-
tor Sargent of California objected to the proposition that the gov-
ernment should "interfere with the business of railroad companies
and hotel-keepers in this inquisitive way," invoking the "old
maxim" that it was "the best government which governed the
least."'821 But while this libertarian position may have supported
the opponents' side in the 1875 controversy, it plainly was an argu-
ment in favor of Plessy in 1896. As Justice Harlan stated: "If a
white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public con-
veyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no gov-
ernment, proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it
without infringing the personal liberty of each." 2
The Plessy Court also reiterated arguments, offered unsuccess-
fully by opponents of the 1875 Act, that segregation is not a form
of inequality. Recall that in the 1875 Act debates, this claim took
two forms. According to the formal argument, segregation was not
unequal because it was imposed equally on persons of both races.
The Plessy Court referred to this argument but hesitated to
embrace it, adopting instead the second form of the argument-
that the social meaning of segregation did not imply an imposition
818 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 217 (Apr. 13, 1872).
819 Id. at 27 (Feb. 6, 1872).
820 Id.
821 2 Cong. Rec. 4174-75 (May 22, 1874).
822 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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of inferior status upon blacks. The Justices apparently recognized
that the formal equality argument would undermine settled under-
standings of civil rights, even for white citizens. Indeed, it was
counsel for the plaintiff, Plessy, who articulated the formal argu-
ment as a parody of the defendant's position:
[Counsel for Plessy suggests] that the same argument that will jus-
tify the state legislature in requiring railways to provide separate
accommodations for the two races will also authorize them to
require separate cars to be provided for people whose hair is of a
certain color, or who are aliens, or who belong to certain nationali-
ties, or to enact laws requiring colored people to walk upon one
side of the street, and white people upon the other, or requiring
white men's houses to be painted white, and colored men's black,
or their vehicles or business signs to be of different colors, upon
the theory that one side of the street is as good as the other, or that
a house or vehicle of one color is as good as one of another
color.Y
In other words, if segregation is not recognized as a form of dis-
crimination, then the government would be free to enact legislation
that all would recognize as discriminatory. The Court was not will-
ing to embrace so sweeping a position. "The reply to all this," the
Court said, "is that every exercise of the police power must be rea-
sonable," which the Court defined as "enacted in good faith for the
promotion [of] the public good, and not for the annoyance or
oppression of a particular class." -4  Symmetrical treatment was
not enough; the ground of distinction must be reasonable. The
Court thus abandoned explicit reliance on the formal argument,
acknowledging that segregation would be unconstitutional if
enacted for the "annoyance or oppression of a particular class."
This made constitutionality turn on the purposes of the legislation
rather than a syllogistic conception of equality.
Justice Harlan squarely confronted the formal equality argument
with a formal argument of his own. He contended that the Consti-
tution does not "permit any public authority to know the race of
those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of [civil] rights.1' 2
A law is discriminatory if those who administer it are required to
823 Id. at 549-50.
824 Id. at 550.
825 Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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know the race of the persons affected. In other words: "Our Con-
stitution is color-blind. " 6 In this, Harlan was appealing to a con-
ception of civil rights that had figured prominently in the
arguments of proponents of the 1875 Act.827 Although proponents
of the Act had not used the term "color-blind," Representative
Lynch had stated that the lawmaker's duty was "to know no race,
no color, no religion, no nationality, except to prevent distinctions
on any of these grounds, so far as the law is concerned." Sumner
similarly said that the law "makes no discrimination on account of
color,' 'ar 9 and Senator Pratt had insisted that "free government
demands the abolition of all distinctions founded on color and
race.,,s80
Rather than argue that segregation is definitionally equal treat-
ment, the majority in Plessy argued that, understood in light of the
social circumstances, segregation of the races did not "necessarily
imply the inferiority of either race to the other. ' s31 In the most
famous passage of the opinion, the Court explained:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
The argument necessarily assumes that if ... the colored race
should become the dominant power in the state legislature, and
should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby rele-
gate the white race to an inferior position. We imagine that the
white race, at least, would not acquiesce in this assumption. 32
This echoes many statements by opponents of the 1875 Act. 33 It is
especially reminiscent of a speech by Senator Cooper of Tennessee:
But, sir, it is said that they [black Americans] desire this law, or
something similar, because it is an indignity to their race; and they
826 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
827 See supra text accompanying notes 286-91.
828 3 Cong. Rec. 945 (Feb. 3, 1875).
829 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 385 (Jan. 15, 1872).
830 2 Cong. Rec. 4083 (May 20, 1874); accord Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 819 (Feb.
5, 1872) (statement of Sen. Wdson).
831 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
832 Id. at 551.
833 See supra text accompanying notes 292-300.
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feel it as an indignity to their race to be refused admission to the
different places here mentioned. Have they no pride of race and of
kindred? Is there nothing in their nature that makes them proud
of their race as the white man is of his? Think you that it would
trouble the Anglo-Saxon for any other race to turn him aside?
Think you he would care?' 3
The argument, however, did not carry the day in the 1875 Act
debates. More compelling was Sumner's assertion that "any rule
excluding a man on account of his color is an indignity, an insult,
and a wrong."835 Senator Frelinghuysen called segregation by law
"an enactment of personal degradation" and a form of "legalized
disability or inferiority," effectively a denial of citizenship and a
return to slavery.836 Far from conceding that segregation would be
perceived as inoffensive if the shoe were on the other foot, Sum-
ner, after describing the effects of segregation, felt confident in
declaring that "[t]his is plain oppression, which you, sir, would feel
keenly were it directed against you or your child. '837 In the end,
though schools were excluded from the bill, a large majority of
both houses of Congress outlawed segregation in common carriers
in plain rejection of the Plessy Court's argument.
Indeed, the Plessy majority, like the opponents of the 1875 Act,
engaged in self-contradiction on this point. On the one hand, they
maintained that segregated facilities are objectively equal, but on
the other they complained that desegregation was an attempt to
foster "social equality." But if segregated facilities really were
equal, then social equality already would exist. If members of the
"white race"-including the Justices in the majority-"choose" to
construe racially mixed facilities as an imposition of "social equal-
ity," how can they fault the "black race" for construing segregated
facilities as an imposition of social inequality?
The Plessy Court's inference that any badge of inferiority per-
ceived by black citizens from the Jim Crow laws was a product of
their own imaginations was so implausible that Justice Harlan, in
dissent, suggested in effect that it was knowingly false. "The thin
disguise of 'equal' accommodations for passengers in railroad
834 2 Cong. Rec. 4155 (May 22, 1874).
835 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872) (Dec. 20, 1871).
836 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
837 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872).
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coaches will not mislead any one," he observed.8 38  "[A]1 will
admit," Justice Harlan said, conspicuously overlooking his breth-
ren, that the segregation laws "proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to
sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens[.] 8 39  The true
social meaning of the segregation laws, he maintained, is so obvi-
ous that it is universally understood&4°
Finally, according to the Court, the case "reduces itself to the
question whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable regula-
tion," and in "determining the question of reasonableness [the
state] is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages,
customs and traditions of the people."' 41 This analysis-the key to
the decision-is mistaken as to both law and fact. It is true that the
established usages, customs, and traditions of the people are rele-
vant to determining the civil rights (or privileges or immunities) of
the people. That is why application of the Act to schools was a
genuinely difficult question in 1875. But established usages, cus-
toms, and traditions were not relevant to determining whether to
allow distinctions of race or color with respect to those tradition-
ally-established civil rights. Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment
was understood and intended to make an upheaval in the estab-
lished usages, customs, and traditions of the people with regard (at
least) to the equal citizenship of the race of former slaves. The
content of "civil rights" may be conventionally determined, but the
equality of rights is fixed by constitutional law. That is the essen-
838 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
839 Id. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
840 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp's study showing that the Plessy decision was in
accord with the then-prevailing social scientific understanding of racial differences, see
Hovenkamp, supra note 332, while perhaps exonerating the Justices of the charge that they
were "prejudiced" in the sense of being ignorant of the best available evidence, does not
exonerate them from the charge that they misrepresented the known social meaning of
segregation. To be sure, the Justices may have been in tune with the "best" scientific
approach of the day in believing that inequality is rooted in the natural inferiority of the
black race; but that does not gainsay the fact that segregation was universally understood
as implying the superiority of one race and the inferiority of the other, as Harlan correctly
observed. Hovenkamp's argument goes to the reasonableness of the Plessy Court's
preference for inequality, not to whether segregation was understood to imply inequality.
841 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
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tial, fundamental normative core of the Amendment, which even
opponents of the 1875 Act could not deny."42
Thus, even if it were true that railroads customarily were
required to separate passengers by race, it would not justify the
practice under the Fourteenth Amendment. But it was not true.
Far from being an "established usage, custom, or tradition," the
Jim Crow law in Plessy was an innovation. The Louisiana legisla-
ture passed the law in 1890, less than two years before Homer
Plessy sought a seat in the white people's coach on the East Louisi-
ana Railway. The first such law in the land-that of Florida-was
passed in 1887. 843 The "established custom," after the end of
Reconstruction, was to leave this matter to the discretion of the
private market, which sometimes resulted in segregation and some-
times resulted in mixed transportation. Jim Crow laws were passed
toward the end of the century in order to change the status quo-
to mandate a degree of separation between the races far more rigid
and complete than the disorganized private sphere had
produced.844
There was a real irony, then, in the Court's claim that
"[l]egislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish
distinctions based upon physical differences." 45 It was the Jim
Crow legislators in the Southern states (not Plessy) who sought to
use legislation to affect racial instincts-to shore up and intensify
racial prejudice that was not strong enough to produce thorough-
going apartheid without the assistance of law.
In an important sense, the Plessy Court's position was more
extreme even than that taken by the leading opponents of desegre-
gation in 1875. If "social rights" must be left to private choice, as
Thurman, McHenry, Hill, Durham and others argued, 46 then laws
mandating segregation would be no less objectionable than laws
prohibiting segregation. Indeed, Plessy could have used the words
• 842 See, e.g., 2 Cong. Rec. app. at 314 (May 22, 1874) (statement of Sen. Merrimon)
(observing that "the general purpose of [the Reconstruction Amendments] was to liberate
the negro race and to confer upon them exactly the same civil rights that are enjoyed by
the white citizens of the United States").
843 Act of May 19, 1887, ch. 3743, 1887 Fla. Acts and Resolutions 116.
844 See Woodward, supra note 72, at 105 (calling Jim Crow "an elaborate program of
legislation to change the relations between races").
845 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
846 See supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
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of the opponents of the 1875 Act to support his attack on Jim Crow
laws. For example, Representative Durham of Kentucky had
argued that "[w]e have no more right or power to say who shall
enter a theater or a hotel and be accommodated therein than to say
who shall enter a private house."847 If that is true for desegrega-
tion, it is equally true for segregation. Thus, the holding of Plessy
should be recognized as inconsistent not only with the congres-
sional majority's desegregationist interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but even with the Democratic minority's position
that social relations are outside the legitimate sphere of regulation.
This "social rights" argument was linked with the "state action"
argument, where the arguments of the opposition in 1871-1875
likewise tend to support Plessy's position in 1896. A principal
question in the 1875 Act debates was whether federal intervention
was necessary to enforce the right, common to all citizens, to enjoy
the benefits of common carrier transportation without regard to
their race. One of the most common arguments of the opponents
was that Congress lacked power to legislate directly regarding the
practices of railroads and other private businesses. This was based
on the proposition that even if the equal benefit of the law of com-
mon carriers is a privilege and immunity of citizens (a "civil right"),
the Fourteenth Amendment is not implicated until and unless a
state makes or enforces a "law" that "abridges" that right. Senator
Gordon of Georgia conceded that the Fourteenth Amendment
"inhibits any State from passing laws denying to any citizens of the
United States the immunities and privileges which belong to other
citizens of the United States," but "[u]ntil that law is passed, how-
ever-until by statute a State denies some right which belongs to
all citizens of the United States... Congress has no power under
the fourteenth amendment to interfere." Similarly, Senator
Thurman argued that
this bill is only to secure privileges and immunities, and in respect
to them the Constitution is plain that no State shall make or
enforce any law to deprive any citizen of them, and it is equally
847 2 Cong. Rec. 405 (Jan. 6, 1974).
848 3 Cong. Rec. 1864 (Feb. 27, 1875). The specific context of his remarks was the jury
provision of the bill, but the theory would apply to other issues.
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clear that you have no right to interfere until the State has made or
enforced such a law.' 9
The leading speaker against the Act in the House, Alexander Ste-
phens, took a similar position.s 0 Under this view, segregation by
force of custom, private decision, or even discretionary action of
individual officials is outside the strictures of the Fourteenth
Amendment; but an actual statute compelling discrimination-like
the Louisiana statute at issue in Plessy-would be a violation.
Opponents of the 1875 Act stoutly maintained that there were
no laws-even in the Southern states-that abridged the common
law right of black passengers to equal service. Representative John
Atkins, a lawyer from Tennessee, "appeal[ed] to the myriads of
State statutes to-day" and "confidently assert[ed] that in all that
mass of laws there is not to be found one that discriminates
between its citizens [on the basis of] race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude. 8 51 He said that "It]here is no State statute for-
bidding colored people from entering any of the schools, churches,
inns, theaters, &c. They are only required to submit to even
chances with white people. 'n82 Atkins' statement may have been
an exaggeration (there were such laws that applied to schools), but
as applied to common carriers it was accurate. There were no laws
in the Southern states compelling separation of the races in com-
mon carriers at the time the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was debated.
No one could make such a statement by the time of Plessy.
The Supreme Court avoided the force of this argument only by
repeatedly misstating the question presented in Plessy. Thus, it
maintained that "[i]f the two races are to meet upon terms of social
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appre-
ciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individu-
als. '85 3 This conveniently overlooked the fact that Jim Crow laws
required segregation and imposed criminal penalties upon those
who sought to meet together in covered institutions by voluntary
849 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (Jan. 22, 1872).
850 2 Cong. Rec. 380 (Jan. 5, 1874) (stating that enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment is limited to "the judgments of courts.., declaring any State act in violation
of the prohibitions to be null and of no effect").
851 2 Cong. Rec. 454 (Jan. 7, 1874).
852 Id.; accord 3 Cong. Rec. 980 (Feb. 4, 1875) (statement of Rep. Lamar).
853 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
1130 [Vol. 81:947
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions
consent. "Legislation is powerless," said the Court, "to eradicate
racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differ-
ences. 8 54 That is a debatable proposition, but it turns the issue on
its head. No one in Plessy was seeking "legislation" to abolish dis-
tinctions; Plessy was challenging legislation enforcing racial distinc-
tions imposed upon the private market by the state. The Court was
wrong in framing the issue as whether the Fourteenth Amendment
would "enforce social... equality. 8 55 The question was whether
the Amendment would tolerate state legislation to enforce social
inequality. 56
As has been seen, the congressional majority in the years imme-
diately following ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
believed that the common law had already interfered with the pri-
vate market with respect to the duty of common carriage and pub-
lic accommodation. They therefore understood themselves simply
to be extending the same rights to black citizens as already existed
for whites. Some thought that this went too far in invading the
rights of private businesses, but they were voted down. Against
this backdrop, Plessy was not a difficult case. If the majority
thought that segregation must be prohibited, and a large part of the
minority thought that it should be left to private choice, that does
not leave much support for a law that interferes with private choice
by compelling segregation.
C. Brown v. Board of Education
Just as the Court unconsciously echoed the arguments of oppo-
nents of the 1875 Act in its opinion in Plessy, the central proposi-
854 Id.
855 Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
856 It has become common in constitutional scholarship to presume a link between
Plessy and the laissez-faire doctrines of the Lochner era, taking at face value some of the
misleading statements by the Court in its opinion. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We The
People: Foundations 146-50 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 42-51
(1993). But Jim Crow was manifestly not a product of laissez-faire ideology. Passage of
the segregation laws coincided with an upsurge of agrarian-oriented regulation, especially
of railroads. The progressive reform movement in the South, with few exceptions, was also
the white supremacist movement. Woodward, supra note 72, at 91. Jim Crow laws swept
the Southern legislatures when, buffeted by the depression of the 1890s, the business-
oriented "conservatives" who had dominated Southern politics were displaced by the
"progressives," and even the conservatives sought to maintain their political position by
switching to white supremacy.
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tion of Chief Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education85 7 could have come from the mouth of Charles Sumner.
To separate children "from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race," Warren wrote, "generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."' 8 The
Plessy Court had good reason to be silent about the source of its
ideas: the historical authorities standing behind the Plessy decision
were, for the most part, senators and representatives hostile to the
Fourteenth Amendment and the 1875 Act. To rely openly on the
arguments of the opponents would have tended to discredit the
decision. By contrast, the historical progenitors of the Brown deci-
sion were the champions of the Reconstruction Amendments and,
on relevant constitutional issues, the victors in the debates over its
meaning and enforcement.
One would never know this from reading the opinions. Indeed,
the Brown opinion, with its talk of not "turn[ing] the clock
back,"85 9 gives every impression that the Court thought it was
struggling against the historical understanding and original mean-
ing of the Constitution-an impression that, I am now convinced,
was unnecessary and even misleading. The Court summarized the
historical evidence in just three sentences:
The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubt-
edly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all per-
sons born or naturalized in the United States." Their opponents,
just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit
of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited
effect. What others in Congress and the state legislatures had in
mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.86
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
858 Id. at 494.
859 Id. at 492. The Court's full statement was that "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written."
The word "even" in this sentence is very odd, for it suggests that it would have been less of
a strain to turn the clock back to 1896 than to 1868. It suggests that the Court saw the
jurisprudential challenge more in terms of precedent (Plessy in 1896) than original
understanding (ratification in 1868). If the Court had taken an originalist approach, it
would have seen that the history of the Reconstruction period offered a principled basis for
rejecting the erroneous precedent of 1896. It is important to turn the clock back to the
proper year.
860 Id. at 489.
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The problem with this summary is that it treats the relevant dispute
as between the "most avid proponents" of the Amendment and
those "antagonistic" to it. But the Amendment passed. That is no
longer the question. The question now is what the Amendment
meant-not to its most avid proponents or most virulent enemies,
but to the great mass of citizens and their representatives, who had
the authority to add this Amendment to the Constitution. That a
significant segment of the population was hostile to the Amend-
ment is utterly irrelevant to its meaning (except insofar as their
understanding of the meaning of the Amendment casts light on its
commonly accepted meaning). Nor does it matter what the
Amendment's most avid proponents "intended" (except insofar as
they claimed, and others accepted, that their intentions had been
embodied in the Amendment). And most importantly, the sum-
mary implies that nothing useful is known about what "others in
Congress and the state legislatures" thought. These "others"-
presumably those who supported the Amendment but were not its
"most avid" proponents-were no less articulate than the
extremes. They participated in deliberations, they voted, and they
made constitutional arguments. They provided the votes to pass
legislation outlawing segregation in common carriers, and majority
support in both houses for legislation to desegregate the public
schools. The uncertainties here are not greater than in other areas
of constitutional law, in which the Court boldly acts on the basis of
the best knowledge it can summon about the relevant provisions.
From a vantage point of forty years, it may not seem to matter
much that the Court missed the historical argument, so long as it
reached the proper decision. But at the time of Brown, it was far
from clear that the Court's decision would carry the day. It invited
massive resistance in the South, much of it in the enraged tones of
those who thought that the Constitution had been willfully misin-
terpreted in service of social engineering. It was, indeed, more
than a decade before the desegregation decision was actually
enforced-and then, the agent of change was the Congress.861 The
first and foremost public argument of the resistance was based on
history. The so-called Southern Manifesto (signed by virtually the
861 See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? 39-172 (1991).
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entire congressional delegations of the states of the Deep South,
thereby lending respectability and authority to the resistance) was
based primarily on the supposed inconsistency between the Court's
decision and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 62 It
invoked the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, segregation
of schools in the District of Columbia, practices of the Northern
states, and other popular half-truths canvassed in Section I of this
Article. The Manifesto exploited the Court's implicit concessions
regarding this history to full advantage, and declared that the
Court "with no legal basis for such action, undertook to exercise
their naked judicial power and substituted their personal political
and social ideas for the established law of the land." 863 Might it not
have helped for the Court to have shown that its "personal political
and social ideas" were shared by the champions of the Amendment
at the time-and even conceded, in important respect, by much of
the Southern Democratic opposition? While not even the most
effective opinion for the Court could have easily reconciled the
segregationist South to this seemingly radical social change, the
opinion offered no answer to the critics on what they perceived to
be their strongest ground. If ever the Court needed to invoke the
hallowed authority of the framers of the Constitution, this was the
time. But the Court did not, and due to its neglect of history, could
not.
Having unnecessarily created the impression that the historical
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment was consistent with
de jure segregation, the Court proceeded to address the constitu-
tional question in ways that are curious, and seemingly counter-
productive. As noted above, the two grounds for legal argument
over the constitutionality of segregated public education are: (1)
whether education is a civil right, and (2) whether segregation is
unequal. The Brown opinion addresses both of these issues, but in
ways that depart from the theoretical grounding of the desegrega-
tion legislation of the Reconstruction Congress.
862 The Southern Manifesto was the most authoritative and widely publicized statement
of opposition to Brown. In an invitation to resistance, it "commend[ed] the motives of
those states which have declared the intention to resist forced integration." Text of 96
Congressmen's Declaration on Integration, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1956, at 19.
863 Id.
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The Court correctly noted that the place of education in Ameri-
can life had undergone a dramatic transformation in the years
between enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and the deci-
sion in Brown, and that these changes were relevant to the consti-
tutional question.164 In the earlier era, no child-white or black-
could be said to have a "right" to a common school education in
much of the nation. The common school system, especially in the
South, was uneven, spottily funded, and in many localities nonexis-
tent. This gave some plausibility to the claims of those opponents
of school desegregation legislation who claimed that education was
not a civil right. As the Brown Court noted, however, things had
changed by 1954, and this should have produced a different legal
conclusion.
Unfortunately, the Brown Court did not frame the question in
terms of whether education was a civil right, but rather in terms of
whether education was "important. '8 6  This rather missed the
point. Not everything that is "important" is a civil right and-
more to the point-not everything that is a civil right is "impor-
tant." The constitutional principle is that black citizens are entitled
to a perfect and complete equality in all matters of civil right.
The analytical confusion is compounded by the Court's apparent
belief that the importance of education is a feature that could dis-
tinguish Brown from Plessy. While far from clear, the most natural
reading of Brown is that the desegregation principle applies only
"in the field of public education" and not to transportation or other
areas of life.866 In light of the Court's discussion of the "impor-
tance" of education, the apparent rationale for distinguishing edu-
cation from transportation is that the latter does not have such a
strong connection to "democratic society," the performance of
"public responsibilities," "good citizenship," or the "opportunity"
864 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
865 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
866 See id. at 494-95. The Court did not overrule the earlier decision, stating only that
"[a]ny language" in Plessy contradicting the "finding" that segregated education is unequal
is "rejected." Id. The Court stated its holding as follows: "We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." Id. at 495. This
strongly suggests that the "language" in Plessy that was "rejected" was its discussion of
segregated education, and that the doctrine of separate but equal might well continue to be
valid in the context of transportation.
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to "succeed in life. ' 867 The irony is that, in the nineteenth century,
the right to nondiscriminatory access to common carriers was far
more firmly established as a "civil right" than was the incipient
right to a public education. As education evolved into an enforcea-
ble legal right, that did not differentiate it from the right to com-
mon carriage, but put it on the same constitutional footing. The
Court's attempt to distinguish rather than overrule Plessy is utterly
inconsistent with the constitutional theory on which the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 rested.
Moreover, this analytical confusion had a practical consequence.
Many Southerners, not unnaturally, read the opinion as implying
that in matters of lesser importance, including transportation, seg-
regation would be permissible. This purchased trouble for future
cases. Education may well be "the most important function of
state and local governments,' ' 86 but in the years immediately after
Brown, plaintiffs brought cases involving segregation of some dis-
tinctly less important functions of government, from airport coffee
shops to municipal auditoriums. What would be the Court's
answer in those cases? It decided these cases-among the most
controversial in its history-by per curiam orders and summary
dispositions, without any serious discussion of the merits.869 Never
did the Court get around to informing the nation of the legal basis
for desegregating the South, outside the context of education. In
Johnson v. Virginia,870 a case involving a segregated courtroom
decided eight years after Brown, the Court finally announced that
"a State may not constitutionally require segregation of public
facilities." 871 The only reason the Court gave, however, was that
867 Id. at 493.
868 Id.
869 See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (per curiam) (municipal auditorium);
Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam) (restaurant in municipal
airport); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (per curiam) (athletic
contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per
curiam) (public golf course and parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam)
(public transportation); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam)
(municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per
curiam) (public beaches); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954)
(per curiam) (municipal amphitheaters).
870 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam).
871 Id. at 62.
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this issue was "no longer open to question. ' ' s 2 It is embarrassing
that the first of the three cases cited for this proposition, Mayor of
Baltimore City v. Dawson,87 had supplied no reasons whatsoever;
the second, Turner v. City of Memphis,874 rested solely on the
precedents of Dawson and Brown, with no explanation for the
extension of the holding; and the third was Brown, which appeared
to be based, in some sense, on the peculiarly important character of
education.875 The Court thus forfeited its opportunity to explain
the real basis for its decision, which is rooted in an equality of
rights-not in the importance of education.
The second constitutional issue was whether segregation is a
form of inequality. Here the Brown opinion is on stronger ground,
in its rejection of the Plessy Court's conclusion that segregation
does not import a stigma of inequality. 6 But even here, the Court
adopted a rhetoric that would give color to the resistance. Rather
than root its decision in constitutional and legal principle, historical
evidence, or even in the common sense of the matter, the Brown
Court portrayed its disagreement with the reasoning of Plessy as
turning on differences in "psychological knowledge."'877  In a
famous footnote, the Court cited books and articles from the social
science literature,' concluding that its holding was thus "amply
supported by modem authority."8 79 This weakened the force and
persuasiveness of the Court's holding, for two reasons.
First, it made the unconstitutionality of segregation appear to be
contingent on controversial and potentially changeable empirical
judgments, in the evaluation of which the Supreme Court has no
natural competence or authority.8 80 The problem was particularly
acute because the leading piece of social science evidence, Kenneth
872 Id.
873 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam).
874 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (per curiam).
875 See Johnson, 373 U.S. at 62 (citing Dawson, Turner and Brown).
876 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
8n Id. at 494.
878 Id. at 494 n.11.
879 Id. at 494.
880 Compare Justice Antonin Scalia's remarks in Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2681
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), about "psychology practiced by amateurs": "A few citations
of '[r]esearch in psychology' that have no particular bearing upon the precise issue here,
cannot disguise the fact that the Court has gone beyond the realm where judges know what
they are doing." (Citations omitted.) Whether or not this response is fair and valid, it
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Clark's famous study of the selection of black and white dolls, did
not evidently support the Court's conclusion.881 This invited such
reactions as the notorious trial in the Southern District of Georgia,
in which the court took evidence on the empirical validity of the
social science evidence in Brown and, having concluded that it was
faulty, refused to follow the decision.8s
Herbert Hovenkamp's study, Social Science and Segregation
Before Brown, offers the further cautionary note that the nine-
teenth-century decisions upholding segregation were based on
then-prevailing social scientific knowledge no less than Brown was
based on the social scientific knowledge of its day.8s3 There is no
reason to assume modern "science"-or for that matter, modern
philosophy-will be congruent with our constitutional principles.
Social science evidence certainly has its place in the law, and judges
should not be ignorant of the real-world effects of their decisions.
But the Court sacrifices its position of authority when it makes
judgments appear to rest on contested issues of empirical fact, ordi-
narily the stuff of legislative resolution, instead of constitutional
principles, which are entrusted to the Court's charge. To submerge
the issue of constitutional principle weakened the force of the
Court's opinion in Brown.
Second, the emphasis on the psychological and pedagogical
effects'on black schoolchildren distracted attention from the social
function of segregation in Southern society. I stated at the begin-
ning of this Section that the Court's comment on the effects of seg-
regation on the "hearts and minds" of the schoolchildren could
have come from Sumner. But effects of this sort were not at the
heart of Sumner's opposition to segregation. The critical point,
according to Sumner and his allies, was the formal expression of
subordination. "[A]ny rule excluding a man on account of his
should be evident that reliance on contestable psychological studies to overturn democratic
decisions is bad judicial rhetoric.
881 The study had no control group, and when replicated in jurisdictions with
desegregated schools showed effects even larger than those in the South. For evaluations
of Brown's use of social scientific evidence, see Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 150, 157-68 (1955); Symposium, The Courts, Social Science, and School
Desegregation, 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (1975).
882 Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Bd. of Educ., 220 F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963), rev'd, 333
F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964).
883 See Hovenkamp, supra note 332, at 664-65.
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color," Sumner said, "is an indignity, an insult, and a wrong...."884
Frelinghuysen called segregation by law "an enactment of personal
degradation" and a form of "legalized disability or inferiority." 885
The key issue was equality before the law. Even if the motivations
and achievements of black schoolchildren were not measurably
affected by segregation, it still would be inconsistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment's insistence on equality of citizenship for the
state to brand members of one race as too "inferior and
degraded '' 886 to mix with the other.
This is not a proposition of psychology, to be studied in con-
trolled experiments and disputed in technical journals. It is a mat-
ter of constitutional principle and common moral understanding.
When segregationists complained of the attempt to force "social
equality," they were admitting, quite clearly, that segregation is
part and parcel of a system of inequality. The Court should have
held that the state may play no part in such a system. That is what
Sumner would have said:
It is easy to see that the separate school founded on an odious
discrimination and sometimes offered as an equivalent for the
common school, is an ill-disguised violation of the principle of
Equality ....
... Colored children, living near what is called the common
school, are driven from its doors, and compelled to walk a consid-
erable distance, often troublesome and in certain conditions of the
weather difficult, to attend the separate school. One of these chil-
dren has suffered from this exposure, and I have myself witnessed
the emotion of the parent.... Now, it is idle to assert that children
compelled to this exceptional journeying to and fro, are in the
enjoyment of equal rights.
.. The indignity offered to the colored child is worse than any
compulsory exposure, and here not only the child suffers, but the
race to which he belongs is blasted and the whole community is
hardened in wrong.
... Surely the race enslaved for generations has suffered enough
without being compelled to bear this prolonged proscription. 8 7
884 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1872) (Dec. 20, 1871).
885 2 Cong. Rec. 3452 (Apr. 29, 1874).
886 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
887 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 384 (Jan. 15, 1872).
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And we should not allow the ultimate fate of the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 to obscure the fact that on this fundamental interpretation
of the requirement of equality, Sumner carried large majorities of
both houses of Congress with him, even as Reconstruction was
drawing to a close. Sumner's words were the authentic voice of the
Reconstruction Amendments, well worth the effort of turning the
clock back.
CONCLUSION
Racial segregation presented the most important question of
constitutional law in the decade of Brown, but that question was
addressed by the courts in an historical vacuum, as if constitutional
law were a matter of social policy rather than legal principle. Most
commentators have assumed that the ahistorical quality of Brown
was unavoidable, because an historical approach to the question
would have produced a morally unacceptable answer. This Article
shows, to the contrary, that school segregation was understood dur-
ing Reconstruction to violate the principles of equality of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Between 1870 and 1875, both houses of Congress voted repeat-
edly, by large margins, in favor of legislation premised on the
theory that de jure segregation of the public schools is unconstitu-
tional. The desegregation bills never became law because, for pro-
cedural reasons, a two-thirds majority of the House of
Representatives was required for final passage. Even so, the
Reconstruction Congress passed legislation prohibiting segregation
of inns, theaters, railroads, and other common carriers, and
rejected legislation that would have countenanced segregated edu-
cation on a separate-but-equal basis. The Court in Brown refused
to "turn the clock back." But had it done so, it would have discov-
ered strong support for its holding-stronger than the dubious
"modern authority" on which the Court relied.
